

MODERNIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE STATE-ALIGNED IRANIAN
AND TURKISH NEWSPAPERS IN THE 1920s-1940s

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**MODERNIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE STATE-ALIGNED IRANIAN
AND TURKISH NEWSPAPERS IN THE 1920s-1940s**

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ABSTRACT

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The present thesis aims at examining and comparing the ways in which the various aspects of modernization were presented and promoted by the Iranian and Turkish elites on the front pages of the Iranian *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* and the Turkish *Ulus* (*Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*) and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers in the 1920s-1940s. Modernization and Selectorate theories have been used as the theoretical pillars of the present thesis in order to delve into the specific ways in which Iranian and Turkish states/elites tried to transform their nations from traditional to modern ones. The overarching themes of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization” and their respective sub-themes as presented on the front pages of the selected newspapers were traced and analyzed using thematic analysis. This helped reconstruct a general image of the way in which the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in the 1920s-1940s performed the modernization plan. It is argued in the present thesis that the states/elites of the two countries pursued a two-pronged approach, trying to perform modernization on both the “pragmatic” and “ideological” levels, modernizing both their countries’ appearance

and the people's ways of thinking and living. The findings demonstrate that the differences in the historical and political legacies of the two nations before the 1920s and the divergences in the way modernization was performed by each nation's state/elites in the 1920s-1940s strongly shaped Iranian and Turkish nations' trajectory of modernization in their foundation era and the eras after that.

Keywords: Modernization, Selectorate Theory, Newspapers, Iran, Turkey

ÖZ

MODERNİZASYONA KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR BAKIŞ: 1920-1940'LARDA DEVLETE YAKIN İRAN VE TÜRK GAZETELERİNİN BİR İNCELEMESİ

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Bu tez, modernizasyonun çeşitli yönlerinin İranlı ve Türk seçkinler tarafından İran Ettelaat ve Koushesh ve Türk Ulus (Hâkimiyet-i Milliye) ve Cumhuriyet gazetelerinin ön sayfalarında 1920'lerden 1940'lara sunulma ve teşvik edilme biçimlerini incelemeyi ve karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Modernizasyon ve Selectorate teorileri, İran ve Türk devletlerinin/elitlerinin uluslarını gelenekselden moderne dönüştürmeye çalıştıkları belirli yolları araştırmak için mevcut tezin teorik dayanakları olarak kullanılmıştır. Seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfalarında yer alan “ekonomik modernizasyon”, “sosyo-kültürel modernizasyon” ve “siyasi/hukuki modernizasyon” gibi kapsayıcı temalar ve bunların alt temaları, tematik analiz kullanılarak izlenmiş ve analiz edilmiştir. Bunun sonucunda, bu araştırma 1920'lerden 1940'lara İran ve Türk devletlerinin/elitlerinin modernleşme planını nasıl uyguladığına dair genel bir imajın yeniden oluşturulmasına yardımcı olmuştur. Bu tezde, iki ülke devletlerinin/elitlerinin iki yönlü bir yaklaşım izledikleri, modernleşmeyi hem “pragmatik” hem de “ideolojik” düzeyde gerçekleştirmeye çalıştıkları, hem ülkelerinin görünüşünü hem de insanların yaşam ve düşünce

biçimlerini modernize ettikleri tartışılmaktadır. Bulgular, 1920'lerden önce iki ulusun tarihsel ve siyasi miraslarındaki farklılıkların ve 1920'lerden 1940'lara her ulusun devleti/elitleri tarafından modernleşmeyi gerçekleştirme şeklindeki farklılıkların, İran ve Türk uluslarının modernleşme yörüngesini onların kuruluş dönemi ve ondan sonraki dönemleri güçlü bir şekilde şekillendirdiğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Modernizasyon, Selectorate Teorisi, Gazeteler, İran, Türkiye

To the great nations of Iran and Turkey

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Modernization has been one of the most frequently and hotly discussed concepts in social sciences for the past several decades. Scholars from various academic fields including political science, sociology, economics, history and psychology among others have tried to decipher the mechanisms through which modernization takes place on both the individual and social levels. Meanwhile, some have moved beyond theoretical debates and offered concrete suggestions aimed at making policies that help modernization materialize in various countries and nations. As an interdisciplinary and macro-sociological theory of change, modernization theory was the title given to a diffuse body of work by theorists from various intellectual traditions. The common thread connecting these works was a conception of modernity and the modernization process as one referring to a wholesale transformation of society, politics, cultural norms and individuals. Modernization theorists were convinced that they could unearth “the common and essential pattern of development defined by progress in technology, military and bureaucratic institutions, and the political and social structure” (Gilman 2007, 3). They argued that such a discovery could in turn be converted into an empirically useful and viable roadmap of individual and social transformation to be utilized by developing and underdeveloped societies.

Modernization theorists mentioned certain processes as characterizing a transition to modernity for a nation. Industrialization, urbanization, centralization, bureaucratization, secularization, establishing a system of nation-wide public education, technological advancement, emergence of mass media such as newspapers, rising levels of wealth and sustained economic growth, introduction of advanced transportation technologies and political democratization were the most

frequently mentioned of the processes signaling a transition to modernity (Gilman 2007; Lerner 1958; Marsh 2014; Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009).

The present thesis will utilize the basic notions and assumptions of modernization theory as a starting point to delve into the discursive and ideological package of modernization promoted by the Iranian and Turkish elites in the foundation eras of modern Iran and Turkey, roughly corresponding to 1920s-1940s. To do so, the front pages of four state-aligned newspapers, two for each respective case, have been studied to determine and reconstruct the contours and details of the modernization package promoted by the states/elites of these two nations. This is a significant departure from the majority of works previously published under modernization theory which limit themselves to secondary sources and the history of major social and political events and actors at the expense of ordinary people. The choice of newspapers as primary historical sources and the accompanying approach of focusing on ordinary people's history called "history from below" addresses these major gaps in the literature on modernization. Moreover, it provides an opportunity to assess the core assumptions put forth by modernization theorists against the realities and complexities of the modernization process in Iran and Turkey as non-Western modernizing nations with historical legacies that were in sharp contrast to the early modernizing nations in the West.

The Selectorate theory put forth by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors serves as another key theoretical pillar of the present study. The Theory originally presented in the book called *The Logic of Political Survival* tries to decipher the mechanism of social and political development through delving into what the political leader and her supporting elite do in order to keep their power over the political system and society. They utilize the two key concepts of the "Selectorate" and "winning coalition" to explain the leaders' choices and the prospects of social and economic change in a society. According to this theory, the selectorate includes all those individuals who have a formal right to express their preference over the selection of the leader. However, the support of a smaller subset of the selectorate is necessary if the incumbent leader wants to remain in office. This group is called the winning coalition. The importance of the winning coalition is that

“they control the resources vital to the political survival of the incumbent” (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, 38) and to whom every leader answers. The leader tries to keep the members of the winning coalition on his side by distributing private goods to them including money and power that is not accessible to the masses.

The present study will take advantage of the notions of the Selectorate theory, especially that of the “winning coalition”. This will help trace the members of the leader’s winning coalition trying to shape the debate surrounding modernization through writing on the front pages of the selected newspapers in each of the two cases of Iran and Turkey. Such an approach sheds light on the indispensable role played by a group of elites in creating the modern nations of Iran and Turkey and modernizing each respective country. This is in contrast to the majority of pieces in the literature that focus solely on the figure of the leader and present him as the protagonist who carried out the whole nation building and modernization projects single-handedly and without really needing others’ help in the process. Using Selectorate theory will also help reconstruct the particular version of modernization promoted by the modern Iranian and Turkish states/elites in the foundation era of these two nations roughly covering 1920s-1940s. It was through such a concentrated ideological campaign and discourse that the leaders and regimes in either case tried to consolidate their hold over political power. It would also make it possible to observe the wide cultural and ideological gap that existed between the elites and the ordinary people at the time. Such a gap later gave rise to state-society friction and caused some major threats to the survival of the regimes established by the leaders and elites at the time. Moreover, the present study will make it possible to assess the core assumption of the Selectorate theory against the realities of our two cases. According to Selectorate theory, the most important issue for every leader is to keep his hold over power and therefore, all her decisions can be described by recourse to this central logic. The insights gained from the modernization processes in the cases of Iran and Turkey will help evaluate the central notions of Selectorate theory against the seemingly ideological preferences driving leaders and elites’ choices of decisions and actions in regards with modernizing their countries.

The comparative approach of the present study is also a significant point. Comparing the front pages of the two selected Iranian and the two selected Turkish newspapers helps demonstrate the points of similarity and difference between the visions of modernization promoted by the elites of these two countries. This in turn helps us better understand the reasons for the success or failure of the overall modernization project or some aspects of it in either country. Another major outcome of such a comparison is that it enables us to see how the differences that characterized the modernization paths of these two countries created divergent futures for these two nations following the transition from the foundation era of 1920s-1940s to the one after that. Turkey transitioned to a multi-party system while Iran remained a constitutional monarchy where the shah dictated his power over the parliament.

1.1. Case Selection Criteria

Conducting comparative studies starts with case selection. Deciding which cases to choose could be a subtle matter requiring much care and accuracy. The period spanning 1920s-1940s is special since it included the most concentrated modernization and development efforts in the history of these two nations with the quantum leaps of modernization and development and the successes and failures of the modernization projects performed during this period and their immediate impacts directly shaping these two nations' political, social, economic and cultural life in the contemporary time and to the future. These cases are suitable and interesting in many regards with the most important point being the striking similarities in many aspects enabling one to assume many variables such as timeframe, geography, population, ideological and somehow institutional heritage to be almost similar. This in turn provides an ideal case for understanding the divergent paths these nations took during and after their foundation eras.

The logic behind case selection in the present study is presented here. The cases of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras have been chosen since from a practical point of view they present one with an almost ideal pair. First, the modern countries of Iran and Turkey and the kingdoms/empires preceding them shared a

border for several centuries and had extensive cultural contact in addition to long wars. Therefore, historically speaking they had shared geographical and cultural spaces and a high level of interaction with and influence over each other. Second, both countries experienced constitutional movements in roughly the same time in the early twentieth century with the notions of constitutionalism, modernization, westernization and change taking center stage. Both of these constitutional revolutions later gave rise to the modernization drives performed under Iran's and Turkey's modernizing leaders and their supporting elites. Third, the timeframe of the foundation eras of modern Iran and Turkey and the modernization initiatives that followed in each case were roughly the same corresponding to 1920s-1940s with many of the main components of the modernization projects being similar and with considerable influence and interaction between the two cases. Fourth, both countries were Muslim majority countries with roughly the same population when their leaders started the modernization project in the early 1920s. This gives one the opportunity to assess the level of penetration of Western ideas and culture in these Muslim countries and conclude whether the values of a secular western project of modernization can take root in Muslim societies. Finally, the founding leaders of Iran and Turkey, respectively Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk shared many characteristics, with the most notable being their careers as military officers, their allegiance to the reform programs of their preceding constitutional eras, and the authoritative and elitist way they led their modernization programs.

Following the case selection logic, it should be noted that the case selection strategy for these two cases is the Most Similar System Design since as has been mentioned, there are many commonalities between the two cases from historical, geographical and cultural perspectives and to some extent from an institutional one. This makes the two cases ideal for assessing the divergent paths of modernization and development they took. The similarities and differences between the two cases are discussed in further detail in the comparative section and it is argued there that those differences serve as independent variables and provide the basis for the hypotheses that explain the divergent paths of modernization and development in the cases of Iran and Turkey. The similarities include the same timeframe, similar

leaders, similar ideological packages inherited by the leaders and elites from the preceding constitutional eras in each case, the same authoritative and elitist mode of modernization, similar heavy emphasis on secularization and education as necessary for joining modern civilization, promoting women's rights and also a drive for industrialization. The differences include divergent institutional heritage, the nature of the leaders' winning coalition, divergent national identity formation paths and timings, the institutions of kingship vis-à-vis republic and its associated modern political party and the European Union factor. All these differences are the independent variables that explain the two nations' divergent paths of modernization and development and serve as the basis of the hypotheses describing such a divergence.

1.2. Overview of the Chapters

The present study includes six chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theories of modernization and development by reviewing the existing literature on these topics. A thorough discussion of the basic tenets of modernization theory and its salient and latent assumptions is followed by the review of literature. The review of literature delves into the various theoretical vantage points of modernization theorists both in the early phase of it in the 1950s-1960s and its revival phase in the 1990s. The chapter is concluded by presenting the systematic criticisms of modernization theory and the rival theories of socio-political change and development. The basic notions of the Selectorate theory are given particular emphasis in this part and the reasons for utilizing this theory as a theoretical tool in the present study are explained.

Chapter 3 tries to embed the modernization drive undertaken by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in the 1920s-1940s corresponding to the foundation era of the modern Iranian and Turkish nations. A general review of the literature on the trajectories of modernization in Iran and Turkey starts the chapter, followed by an explanation of the gaps in the literature and the current study's specific theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the existing literature. The next part of the chapter is dedicated to an extensive discussion of the history and narratives of

modernization and development in Iran and Turkey with a particular emphasis on the constitutional eras preceding the emergence of the modern Iranian and Turkish nations. An account of the historical and intellectual roots of the modernization drive in either cases is provided followed by a comparison of the modernization efforts undertaken by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in the 1920s-1940s. The differences mentioned between the modernization efforts in the two nations are argued to serve as critical independent variables and the basis for hypotheses that would explain the future divergent paths of modernization and development in the two cases.

Chapter 4 presents the methodological tools utilized in the present study. It will elaborate on the probability and non-probability sampling strategies applied in order to analyze the vision of modernization promoted by the Iranian and Turkish elites on the front pages of four state-aligned newspapers, two respectively from each side. The second section of the chapter provides an account of thematic analysis as the methodological tool used in order to determine the particular themes and subthemes of modernization analyzed in the present study and their linkages to modernization theory.

Chapter 5 builds on the theoretical and methodological frameworks developed in the previous chapters to present and interpret the empirical findings. The empirical findings are presented in the form of a narrative with the aim of reconstructing the particular vision and version of modernization promoted by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites on the front pages of the selected state-aligned newspapers in each case. The thematic analysis tool utilized focuses on the “modernization” aspect of the data by analyzing specific themes and sub-themes related to this concept. The analysis serves as the basis for producing a final report that argues that the process of modernization pursued by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in their foundation eras had been a two-pronged approach carried out at both the “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels with almost equal intensity and yet varying degrees of success. It could be argued that based on the close reading of the newspaper samples, the elites of the two countries had fully recognized the fact that these two levels of modernization were interconnected and in order to take their

nations to the ranks of modern nation-states, they needed to pay serious attention to both “ideological” and “pragmatic” sides of the modernization process. In the same vein, it could be argued that modernization meant different things to different elites and people in the cases of Iran and Turkey and this fact is revealed by the comprehensive and multi-faceted approach of the present thesis. The narrative produced through the use of thematic analysis highlights the different meanings ascribed to modernization in general and its various particular aspects by the elites of the two countries and the ways in which these understandings were reflected on the front pages of the four selected state-aligned newspapers. The narrative also helps compare the subtleties of the modernization process in the two countries in order to shed some light on the reasons behind the successes and failures of the various aspects of modernization in the two cases in comparison and the divergent paths taken by the two in regards with modernization and democracy in the era following 1920s-1940s. Indeed, the present study made it clear that modernization means different things in different contexts and times. As such, Iranian and Turkish elites’ ideas on modernization and its various aspects evolved and changed prior to the timeframe of the present study (1920s-1940s), during the foundation eras of these two nations and following 1940s. The Iranian and Turkish elites’ ideas on modernization in the 1920s-1940s were at the same time facilitated and limited by the ideas promoted in the constitutional eras preceding 1920s and in their turn shaped the realities and discourse of modernization in the period after 1940s.

Chapter 6 recaptures the main findings of the research and what they entail for the cases of Iran and Turkey together with comparative insights that are also relevant to the modernization process in the Middle East and North Africa. The chapter also relates back the present study’s main research question “In what ways is modernization presented and discussed on the front pages of the four selected newspapers?” and the subquestions on how economic, socio-cultural and political/legal modernization are presented and discussed on the front pages of these newspapers. Moreover, it relates back the present research’s main argument that modernization was a two-pronged approach pursued at both “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels with the already existing literature on modernization in general

and modernization in Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s in particular. Modernization theory provided a starting point for tracking and looking into the various aspects of modernization presented on the newspapers and the assumptions regarding modernization in general. Selectorate theory provided a window into understanding how the elites of Iran and Turkey played a significant role in shaping and performing the modernization process and supporting the leaders. Utilizing these two theories and taking the existing literature on modernization into account, the present research shows that modernization meant different things to the different members of the Iranian and Turkish elites and as such was presented differently by each of them on the front pages of the selected newspapers. In the same vein, it shows that the modernization process in general and in the case of Iran and Turkey in particular is more complicated, multi-faceted and sinuous than what the classic modernization theory posits. It also shades light on the high potential of the Selectorate theory and the literature associated with it for explaining the process of modernization in Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras and beyond. However, the present research's argument that modernization efforts by the elites of these two countries were pursued at both the ideological and pragmatic levels is confirmed by the existing literature. Indeed, the body of works on modernization of Iran and Turkey can be divided in the same vein to those discussing the more pragmatic aspect of modernization having to do with changing the country's infrastructure and appearance and those addressing the ideological battles between modern ideas and their proponents and tradition and its supporters. As such, the main argument of the present study is approved by a similar but latent trend in the literature that includes works covering the pragmatic and/or ideological levels of modernization. In addition, the chapter clarifies the links between literature review and the research question "In what ways is modernization presented and discussed on the front pages of the four selected newspapers?" and the subquestions about how economic, socio-cultural and political/legal modernization are presented and discussed on these front pages. Indeed, the existing literature is dedicated to demonstrating the different ways in which modernization was performed, presented and discussed in general and in the contexts of Iran and Turkey in particular. The research question of the present study

is addressing the same issue but with a focus on newspapers as primary sources that are closer to the public and as sites where state and society meet. Moreover, the research question and its answer, while building on the existing literature, depart from it significantly with their comparison of primary sources, large pool of data and wide and multifaceted scope. As such the chapter presents the contributions of the present research that go beyond the existing insights and arguments in the literature.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Outline of the Chapter

The present chapter covers the various theories aimed at explaining the process of development and modernization in the modern times. In order to do this, first, a discussion of the issue of change and its roots in the social transformations of the 17th and 18th century Western Europe is presented. The emphasis in this part is on the ideas and tenets of Enlightenment and their continuing legacy for the theories of development and modernization that were introduced after the second world war in general and for what came to be known as “modernization theory” in particular. Next, a thorough overview of modernization theory’s notions of modernity, modern society, modernization processes and the theory’s key assumptions is presented. This is in turn followed by a review of the literature on the early modernization theory in the 1950s-1960s and the continuing legacy of its original debates and also the theory’s revival in the 1990s and the new directions it took. A discussion of the systematic criticisms aimed modernization theory by dependency and world systems theories ends this part. Finally, there will be a brief discussion of other significant theoretical camps/trends in relation to theorizing socio-economic and political development. Particular sections on Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s “selectorate” theory and the economic/institutional theory of development and democracy presented by Acemoglu and Robinson and their relevance to the cases of modernization in Iran and Turkey conclude this part.

2.2. The Issue of Change and Enlightenment's Legacy

The dynamism of societies throughout history has puzzled numerous savvy observers and intellectuals. Such an amazement has led in some cases to extensive efforts aimed at discovering the mechanisms and processes through which societies pass from a specific social order to the next. Historically, numerous thinkers dedicated considerable effort to explaining the transitions from hunter-gatherer societies to rural ones and from there to the emergence of cities. Depending on their particular intellectual perspective, they attributed the materialization of such transitions to various social, economic, historical, technological, military and political factors among others.

Change has always remained a constant of human history. However, the scope and pace of the changes introduced to societies increased considerably with the advent of modern times. The ideas propagated by Enlightenment thinkers in the 17th and 18th centuries penetrated the social fabric and enabled a wholesale reimagining and reconstructing of some European societies (Bristow 2017; Delon 2013; Fitzpatrick et al. 2007; Reil and Wilson 2004). The ascendancy of reason to prominence helped human beings decipher the secrets of nature and tame natural forces in the service of facilitating human life. Such a demystification of the natural world led to the flourishing of science and in turn industrialization and production of surplus at high levels; The new modern markets emerged, money gained focal importance and level of trade rose to unprecedented levels.

The Enlightenment struck a chord with both intellectuals and the populace alike since their mastery of the hitherto unknown natural forces provided them with a sense of self-confidence and knowledge. These newly gained assets enabled human beings to see order instead of chaos and to imagine progress instead of the apocalyptic scenarios put forth by the major religions of the day. Human progress became a major social goal and reason was thought to be able to make an ongoing process of improvement in all spheres of life possible. The ascendancy of reason meant the authority of religion was limited to spiritual matters with the management of earthly affairs delegated to human administrators equipped with reason. The realpolitik of the nation states replaced the supposedly divinely sanctioned activities

of holy emperors and popes. Meanwhile, thinkers such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill and John Jack Roseau argued passionately for the liberty of mankind and the need for people to be represented in the government. The end result of the emergence of the modern ideas of liberty and constitutional government was the gradual introduction of democracy to some European countries through either reform or revolution.

Working in the mid-1950s and mid-1960s, some of the scholars in the consolidated democracies of the West rediscovered the power of the tenets of Enlightenment to theorize about the process of social change. The specific form of modernity they cherished celebrated the ideals of the Enlightenment including “the power of science, the importance of control, and the possibility of achieving progress through application of human will and instrumental reason” (Gilman 2007, 7-8). Modernization theorists saw their project as the continuation of the unfinished project of Enlightenment. Theirs was a project amounting to recreating the ideals of Enlightenment in the developing or underdeveloped societies; in other words, they had in mind a project of “total history” that aimed to “to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle—material or spiritual—of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period...” (Foucault 1972, 8 cited in Gilman 2007). Initially, they tried to explain how modernized societies have come into being in order to devise road maps for the newly established nation states of the post-World War II era to navigate the same path and become “modern”. The proponents of the set of ideas later loosely categorized under the “modernization theory” undertook their intellectual endeavors based on a specific conception of modernity and its accompanying features.

2.3. Modernization Theory

2.3.1. The Ideas of Modernity, Modern Society and Modernization Processes

The intellectual roots of the modernization theory can be traced back to the theories of Ferdinand Tönnies’s *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, Émile Durkheim’s

mechanical and organic solidarity, Max Weber's traditional and modern rational bourgeois society, and Talcott Parsons's ideas of modernity, which were based on the distinction between tradition and modernity (Cheibub and Vreeland 2018, 4; Gilman 2007,4; Gwynne 2009; Roxborough 1988). Indeed, modernization theorists worked mostly on the process of modernization and the distinction between modern and traditional societies than on the definition of "modernization".

Drawing on the ideas of Max Weber, these scholars mentioned that a modernized society included a calculating spirit for individuals in a world with which they felt disenchanted. In such a world, instrumental rationality, bureaucratic domination, activism and world mastery (Marsh 2014, 263) enabled human beings to utilize reason and science to exploit natural resources, launch industries and run governments more efficiently. Functional differentiation and institutionalized individualism were the concepts they borrowed from Durkheim and Parsons. The former made specialization of work and modern division of labor possible, while the latter gave precedence to the rights of individuals over their commitment to the community. Modernization theorists used Ferdinand Tönnies's dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* to characterize social relations in a modern society. Modernity made the universalistic, impersonal relations and roles of the *gesellschaft* (society) the basis of social relations at the expense of the personal and particularistic relations of the *gemeinschaft* (community). Starting from such premises, modernization theorists saw the modern society as being "cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of change, and characterized by a complex division of labor" (Gilman 2007,5), in contrast to traditional societies which were "inward-looking, inert, passive toward nature, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically simple" (Ibid).

The considerable variety within modernization theory as an interdisciplinary and macro-sociological theory of social change makes it very difficult to come up with a definition that would do justice to all the ideas subsumed under modernization theory. Meanwhile, more recent definitions of modernization such as "the social, economic, and technological process of progressive historical change" (Gilman 2007,7) seem too broad to tell us much about the core of the theory. The problem is

compounded by modernization theorists' multiple points of focus including the relationship between culture and economic progress, culture and political development and also economic growth and democracy (Knöbl 2003, 96). To these theorists, modernity was a phenomenon going beyond new ways of organizing economic production, referring instead to a wholesale transformation of society, politics, cultural norms and individuals. Having this conception of modernity in mind, modernization theorists developed a two-pronged approach. The first part of their project was dedicated to discovering the causal mechanisms resulting in the "take-off" of a society toward modernity. They believed they could discover "the common and essential pattern of development defined by progress in technology, military and bureaucratic institutions, and the political and social structure" (Gilman 2007, 3). Such a discovery could help them with the second part of their project: developing an empirically useful and viable theory of social change to be utilized by developing and underdeveloped societies.

Regardless of its diffuse and interdisciplinary nature, modernization theorists mentioned certain processes which characterized the transition to modernity. The list of such processes include industrialization, urbanization, centralization, bureaucratization, secularization, extension of education to all levels of society, technological advancement, emergence of mass media such as newspapers, rising income, introduction of advanced transportation technologies and political democratization. (Gilman 2007; Lerner 1958; Marsh 2014; Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). Some of these processes were more highlighted and discussed in the works of modernization theorists.

The transition from agrarian to industrial societies was argued to be one of the major processes underlying modernization. In general, modernization theorists believed that as societies industrialize, the changes go beyond the economic sphere and spill over into the social and cultural spheres. Industrialized societies value reason, rationality, trade, individualism and the role of science in bringing about progress (Lerner 1958; Levy 1952; Lipset 1960; Rostow 1960).

Urbanization was another major modernizing process according to this theory. The proponents of the theory believed that "it was supposed that urbanization

will quickly and completely change the demographic and professional structure of a population” (Knöbl 2003, 100). Urbanization caused the sidelining of peasants and land-owning classes at the expense of the rise to prominence of the bourgeoisie middle class in the cities. The importance of the urban bourgeoisie middle classes to the process of modernization and democratization was later discussed by various scholars.

One of the other major processes of modernization according to its proponents was the expansion of education to the majority of population. In a modernized society, education was available to the masses as the society needed to train its members intellectually for being part of the new modern world. The educational system served as the platform through which the state and the elites controlling it tried to replace the cultural values of a traditional society by the modern emphasis on science, rationality, secularism, individualism among others (Lipset 1960; Inkeles 1978; Almond and Verba 1963).

The emergence of mass media as new channels for communication was another important feature of modernized societies according to modernization theorists. The rise of newspapers, and later on radio and television meant that the modernizing vision defined by the elites could be dispersed to almost every corner of a society. As the command center for the modernization process the state “developed the media of mass communications as agencies of mass socialization” (Kumar 2020).

Democratization of the political system and its relation to economic development was another major theme discussed by modernization theorists. Indeed, early modernization theory “had proclaimed the supposed synergies between democracy and modernity” (Gilman 2007,12). The idea of the functional interdependence of economic growth and democratization was emphatically put forth by Marion Levy (1952). According to Levy, economic and political processes could not be separated as they were highly interconnected and integrated. This point was later taken on by various scholars who tried to prove or disprove the existence of a causal or correlational link between economic development and modernization.

2.3.2. Key Assumptions of Modernization Theory

Modernization theory includes much variety and is a very loose bundling of articles and books published from different standpoints. As such, it would be difficult to outline the basic assumptions of the theory. However, as with any other school of social, political or economic thought, a number of latent and stated assumptions can be found in the works of modernization theorists. Some of the most important of these as mentioned by Knöbl (2003) will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

One of the first assumptions of modernization theory is that modernization is “a global and irreversible process, which began with the Industrial Revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century in Europe” (Knöbl 2003, 96) and which would concern the whole world as it proceeds. Some scholars such as proponents of dependency theory took issue with this assumption claiming that modernization theory was a West-centered theory trying to impose the cultural, economic and social norms of western societies on other nations. For instance, Nils Gilman (2007) goes even as far as arguing that modernization theory was an effort to define US national identity in the post- World War II era and impose its vision of modernization on developing countries. However, it should be remembered that various developing and underdeveloped countries had started to modernize as a result of military defeats suffered on the ground well before modernization theory came into being to shape their modernization path.

Positing modernization to be a historical and teleological process that necessarily leads from traditional to modern societies is a second important assumption. The distinction between the two types of societies implies an antithesis between tradition and modernity with the first standing for all that is backward and the second for all that is conducive to progress. Such an antithesis can be criticized from various points. First, the binary posits that to modernize, societies have to part ways with tradition fully and instantly. However, as has been shown by various scholars, the process of change is a path-dependent one, with the history of a nation setting limitations on how and what it can change. A second point is that elements of tradition in some cultures and nations would be conducive to a transition to modernity. As has been posited by some scholars such as Bellah (1957), elements of

tradition can exist and even help the process of transition to modernity. A third point mentioned by critics is that modernization theory conveniently overlooks the undesirable results modernization produces in societies and provides an unrealistically optimistic picture of the move to modernity. The fourth point is that modernization theory is elitist as it views elites to be the prime movers of the modernization process and regards the population as unruly backward masses who should be aligned with the modernization process through state decrees.

As a third assumption, modernization theorists argue that the move toward modernity in distinct societies will follow a more or less uniform, linear and convergent logic. Such a proposition amounts to an almost deterministic and hierarchical understanding of social change that took the transition to modernity to be inevitable for various societies. Critics have been quick to point out that such a theoretical stance leads to an “almost exclusive analytical focus on the logic of social developments and a parallel neglect of real historical and social processes driven forward by certain groups and actors” (Knöbl 2003, 106). As historical evidence shows, the cause of modernization particularly in developing countries was pushed forward by elite classes and authoritarian states backed by segments of the middle class. Another point of criticism is that the theory ignores or downplays the differences between the different modernization paths of various developing or underdeveloped countries. For instance, the modernization process in the early modernizers of the Western Europe exhibited certain features that were missing or appeared differently in the modernizing countries of the Eastern Europe, Latin America or the Middle East.

The assumption that in the modern societies of the west, secular, individualistic and scientific values are predominant while the traditional societies of the “third-world” exhibit the dominance of values such as “ascription”, “particularism” and “functional diffuseness” (Knöbl 2003, 97) as powerful barriers to development is a fourth major tenet of modernization theory. However, such generalization errs in bundling together societies with different social, political and historical backgrounds into two antithetical camps. Another issue with such a conception is that it conceals the long path travelled by Western societies to reach a

point where modern values have become prominent and as such positing a latent superiority for the Western individual over his/her counterparts in the developing societies who are unable to acquire such values in a leap of faith. This point is explicitly made by Karl Deutsch (1961) as he argues that the contemporary developing countries “may have to accomplish this accelerated change almost in the manner of a jump, omitting as impractical some of the historic stages of transition...” (Deutsch 1961, 498).

The argument by modernization theorists that modernization is “an endogenously driven process to be localized within societies” (Knöbl 2003, 97) was a fifth important assumption of the theory. According to such a proposition, a society’s trajectory of modernizing is decided by mechanism and forces inside a country. This notion was forcefully criticized by dependency and world systems theories. The proponents of these two theories argued that the path and qualities of modernization in contemporary developing countries were determined outside these societies; developing countries were on the periphery of the global system, while the developed Western economies constituting the core. As such, how modernization proceeded in developing countries depended on their strength and location on the core-periphery continuum and not the decisions taken by forces inside the society.

Assuming a causal or correlational link between economic development and democracy is the sixth major assumption of modernization theory and arguably its most discussed and contested one. Indeed, various modernization theorists implied that an evolutionary thesis existed based on which there is a significant relationship between socio-economic development and democracy with the former ultimately leading to the latter (Lipset 1959; Almond and Coleman 1960; Boix and Stokes 2003). This assumption has been addressed in various qualitative and more recently quantitative studies with strikingly opposing conclusions by various scholars. The debate has also been moved into various new directions beyond the original thesis, which will be addressed in some detail in the literature review subsection.

2.3.3. Early Modernization Theory: Dominant Themes and Their Continuing Legacy

The first and formative wave of modernization theory has been dated to early 1950s-late 1960s according to various scholars (Gilman 2007; Knöbl 2003; Marsh 2014). The major political events of the period included the post-World War II postcolonial movements and the emergence of new nations and the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union. Both of these events affected the trajectory of modernization in the newly established nation states. In such an atmosphere, the scholars of early modernization theory analyzed the various political, social, economic and even psychological aspects of the modernization process. They focused on the processes through which modernization took place on both the individual and social scales, analyzing the personal value orientations and social integration mechanism through societies modernized. The discussion of socio-economic development by early modernization theorists gave rise to the debate on the relationship between economic development and democratization later on, a theme that has been pursued by various scholars up until contemporary time. The following paragraphs will discuss the early literature on modernization theory and its major themes. In the case of the literature on economic development and democratization, the debate is well alive today and has been vigorously developed and move into new directions by various scholars. Therefore, a specific subsection has been devoted to it that covers the most important works in this area to date.

The literature on modernization theory can be reviewed based on different vantage points. Some of the more interesting and fruitful ones are mentioned here. Roxborough (1988) has argued that most of the early modernization theorists emphasized the importance of “values, of social integration and of elites” in their conceptions of social change. Gilman (2007) has distinguished three flavors inside the modernization camp including “a techno-cosmopolitan flavor,” arguing for modernity to be built on the foundations of tradition, “a revolutionary flavor” arguing for the need for a radical rupture with tradition and a third “authoritarian flavor” positing the necessity of a centralizing and omniscient state to execute the rupture with tradition. Gwynne (2009) distinguished between the economic and

sociological theories of modernization. Goorha (2017) proposed a division based on microcosmic evaluations of modernization based on “the componential elements of social modernization” and macrocosmic studies focusing on the “the empirical trajectories and manifest processes of modernization”.

Here, I try to utilize Roxborough’s position to review the literature since it looks to be more in line with the original objectives of the thesis which emphasize values, social integration and the role of elites in the cases of Iran and Turkey. The literature will be divided to two camps with one covering “values” and the other “social integration and elites”. I have bundled social integration and the elites together under the more general category of social mechanism and forces. It should be noted that some of the works covered address a combination or even all three of the aspects and may appear in both camps. However, in each work, one of the three concepts is usually much more highlighted than the other two. Also, a separate section is dedicated to reviewing those works that address the link between economic development and democratization since it is a tail of the debate that is very much relevant to the study of our cases of Iran and Turkey.

The issue of modern values and the significance of their acquisition by individuals for transformation to modernity was a key point of focus for various modernization theorists. As one of the earliest works on value modernization, Levy (1952) argued that economic growth and industrialization bring with them certain value orientations which are rational, universalistic and functionally specific. As such values dominate, they cause repercussions in other fields including the political one. Therefore, the emergence of such values would be necessary for the transformation to modernity in developing countries. In a similar vein, Almond and Verba (1963) saw the emergence of a civic culture based on specific modern values as a precondition for the emergence of democracy.

The psychologists Lerner (1958) and David McClelland (1961) tried to determine the psychological prerequisites for the acquisition of modern values by individuals. Lerner posited “psychic mobility” to be the characteristic accompanying modernization at the level of individuals. Such a psychic mobility materialized as a result of empathy. According to him, a high level of empathy was the dominant style

in the modern society. He saw mass media as the key to distributing such ideas and attitudes among the public (McClelland 1961, 192-193). McClelland tried to discover the psychological mechanism behind the modern individual's will for "achievement" which he saw as the decisive precondition for economic activity and consequently economic growth to take off in a society.

Some scholars, however, questioned the assumption of the existence of certain traditional and modern values as necessary components in traditional or modern societies. In his study of Japanese modernization, Robert Bellah (1957) concluded that Japanese modernization was based on strong particularistic values and the ensuing ties between various societal elites and the emperor's family. Therefore, he questioned the idea that particularistic values were characteristic of traditional societies and by extension pointed out that modernization does not lead to a final and clear dominance of rational and secular values. In a similar vein, Bert Hoselitz (1961) concluded that the distinction between tradition and modernity is not an accurate one as traditional values and structures continue to survive for a long time even after modernity emerges. David Apter (1963) and Clifford Geertz (1963) took the debate further claiming that rational and irrational elements and values were always interwoven in the modernizing ideologies. Inkeles (1978) emphasized the need for *individual modernity* in the modernization process arguing for the importance of rising levels of education and occupational differentiation as mechanisms necessary to make individuals more autonomous and able to adapt to a modern society.

Another group of scholars focused more on the social mechanisms and forces that made modernization possible. As an early example, Lipset (1959 and 1960) focused on a complex of social and economic conditions as the preconditions for the emergence of a modern and democratic society. Particularly, he emphasized the importance of education and its significance for the emergence of a modern society. Deutsch (1966) and Pye (1966) argued for the necessity of creating an integrative system of mass communications which would in turn build the social cohesion that is key to sustaining and reinforcing democratic procedures. Rostow (1960) provided a theory of the stages of economic growth and the necessity of economic growth for

initiating certain modern social mechanisms. He also emphasized the significance of the emergence of a certain “constellation of political actors” to move the process of economic progress forward. Edward A. Shils (1963) assessed the same theme emphasizing the role of the new professional middle class as the actors who could push the process of modernization forward. Smelser (1959) introduced the concept of “differentiation” to the debate and defined it as a move from multi-functional structures to more specialized ones. According to him differentiation was the key mechanism of the move toward modernity. Moreover, social conflict and social movements were seen as significant factors for the emergence of the new social structures of modernity. Barrington Moore (1971) provided a thorough comparative analysis of various agrarian societies as they were transformed into industrial ones. The particular interactions between the land-owning classes and peasants and the role of the bourgeoisie class in bringing about democracy were the major points of emphasis in this work.

Certain economists focused on the economic development aspect of modernization process and their ensuing effects on the emergence of modern social mechanisms. Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) pointed to the importance of the link between economic modernization and backwardness arguing that backward societies become increasingly sensitive to their backwardness in comparison with modernizing states and this could motivate them to a “spurt” of accelerated growth. Albert O. Hirschman (1968) hypothesized the issue from a different angle saying that a pattern of accelerated growth could be stimulated through concentration of development efforts on key industries and locations in lagging regions which will lead to social transformation to modern ways of life. Gunnar Myrdal (1968) took this spatial dimension of economic modernization as the starting point but using the concepts of *spread* and *backwash*, he called attention to the increasing inequality that happens with the modernization of economies. In a similar vein, John Friedmann (1973) systematized the works of Hirschman and Myrdal and provided an in-depth explanation of the core-periphery model in economically developing countries.

2.3.3.1. Economic Development and Democratization

The debate over the existence or lack of a connection between economic development and democracy has been so intensive that some people have come to wrongly take the claim that economic development leads to democracy as the fundamental idea of modernization theory. The debate started with the claim by Levy (1952) that higher levels of economic growth and democratization were interconnected and what would ensue from a sufficiently high level of GDP per capita would be the emergence of democratic forms of government. The idea, however, was developed and brought to the attention of other scholars when Lipset (1959) claimed rather convincingly that a link existed between the economic processes of modernization at the micro level and the process of democratization at the macro level and conducted empirical testing to prove his point. According to Lipset, economic development which includes phenomena such as urbanization, wealth and education “works as a mediating variable that is part of a larger syndrome of conditions favorable to democratization” (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009, 2). The hypotheses put forth by Levy and then Lipset gave rise to a vibrant literature in early modernization theory on the existence or lack of the link between economic development and democracy. Works by Almond and Coleman (1960), Cutright (1963), Cutright and Wiley (1969), Smith (1969) and Coulter (1975) concluded that there existed a positive linear link between the level of economic development and democracy. Meanwhile, another group of authors, with Neubauer (1967), Jackman (1973), Arat (1988) and more recently Cheibub and Vreeland (2018) being the most prominent examples, found no significant correlation between economic development and democratization.

Later theorists retorted to qualitative studies to find an answer to this puzzle. Moore (1966) called the existence of such a link into question showing that there were multiple paths to modernity and that those paths did not always end in democracy and Huntington (1968) argued that there was no guarantee that economic development would end in democracy. The core idea of his work is that “whereas modernity may be associated with democracy, modernization is not necessarily” (Cheibub and Vreeland 2018, 6). O’Donnell (1973) similarly refutes the existence of

the link between economic development and democracy, positing that economic development faces constraints that can be overcome just by the force of an authoritarian state. Therefore, in his rendering, economic development does not help the emergence of democracy and indeed works to undermine it.

The debate was revived and took to new directions by Przeworski and Limongi (1997). They admitted that the relation between levels of development and the rise of democratic regimes is strong. However, they posited that this may be due to two distinct reasons “either democracies may be more likely to emerge as countries develop economically, or they may be established independently of economic development but may be more likely to survive in developed countries” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 157). They call the first explanation “endogenous” and the second one “exogenous”. They call the endogenous explanation the “modernization” theory proper. Testing their data to see if the “endogenous” explanation holds, they find no meaningful correlation concluding that there is no causal mechanism connecting economic development and democracy. While they flatly reject what they see as the basic claim of modernization theory, they find a significant relation between the rise in the level of per capita income and the survival of democracies.

Another significant contribution to the same debate came from Boix and Stokes (2003) who tried to challenge Przeworski and Limongi’s refutation of endogenous modernization. The core of their argument is that both endogenous and exogenous explanations of the emergence of democracy are valid as “development increases both the probability of the transition to democracy and the probability that an existing democracy will sustain itself” (Ibid, 518-519). Doing their tests on a larger data set and breaking it down to various periods covering both the time before and after the second world war, they conclude that “democratization is a process endogenous to development” (Ibid, 531). However, they posit higher levels of income equality rather than income or GDP per capita to be the explaining factor behind both the democratization of countries and the consolidation of democracy in them (Ibid, 540).

Contrary to this vantage point, a considerable number of scholars were convinced that the emergence of democracy was not caused by economic development. According to scholars in this camp, democracy emerged because certain actors who favored democracy were successful at seizing power or that there was a constellation of actors among whom the balance of power made it impossible for any single actor to impose his will over the others. Such scholars proposed different explanations why such an actor or balance of forces may exist. Some proposed that economic development may favor a democratic actor such as the working class (Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992) who were the main forces behind democratization. Meanwhile, other authors provided reasons that were independent of economic development. The decisions made by the military government (Lamounier 1984), geopolitical considerations by the dominant party (Dickson 1998), democratization of partners and regional neighbors (Gleditsch 2002; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Donno 2010), the international norm favoring democracy (Hyde 2011), a civil war (Mukherjee 2006) among others were seen as reason for the emergence of democracy.

Some more recent works such as those by Acemoglu et al (2007, 2008) changed the trajectory of the debate by rejecting the correlation between economic development and democracy and pointing to the importance of taking country-specific factors into account. According to them, taking the divergent historical paths of countries into consideration can explain the emergence of democracy in a country or its lack of. Therefore, according to them economic development by itself has got nothing to do with the transition to democracy or the sustainability of democracy. The latent assumption behind their argument is that “the strength of civil society and the structure of political institutions” (Cheibub and Vreeland 2018, 13) are the two major factors contributing to democratization. However, some authors such as Boix (2011) and Benhabib, Corvalan and Spiegel (2011) find a statistically significant correlation between economic development and democracy even after controlling for country-specific factors.

2.3.4. The Revival of Modernization Theory: New Directions, New Themes and New Extensions

Early modernization theory had its heyday through the 1950s and 1960s and then gradually started to decline as its assumptions were scrutinized and attacked during the 1970s by rival theories of social change such as dependency theory and world-systems theory among others. However, it made a comeback in the period since the 1990s. Indeed, as early as 1988, Roxborough pronounced that modernization theory was once again “alive and well” and contemporary theorists such as Knöbl (2003) and Marsh (2014) recognized and discussed this revival.

The resurgence of interest in modernization theory has been attributed to various factors including its loose and inclusive nature, the economic rise of “Asian tiger-states” in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the gradual decline and the collapse of the Soviet empire (Marsh 2014; Knöbl 2003) which removed the Soviet model as a rival model of development and the economic rise of China since the 1970s which the Chinese explicitly referred to as “modernization” and that attracted much attention from both other nations and academic scholars. Moreover, another significant factor for the revival has been the way younger scholars “creatively responded to criticisms and other limitations in modernization theory by introducing new conceptual extensions of the theory” (Marsh 2014, 267).

The revival of modernization theory took place as its new students and scholars recognized its weaknesses and theoretical flaws, observed the real trajectory of modernization in the developing countries of the time and took note of the powerful criticisms aimed at modernization theory by the proponents of dependency and world systems theories (Knöbl 2003; Marsh 2014; Bates 2018). The socio-political events of the time and their theoretical repercussions, and the vigorous criticisms of modernization theory provided fresh impetus for these later theorists to theorize about the modernization process and in the process revitalize the theory as well. Later scholars of modernization theory came up with their own creative ways of theorizing about modernization and in doing so created new ways of theorizing about the modernization process, adding several new elements, extensions and themes to the debate on modernization (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992; Eisenstadt 2002;

Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Newson and Richerson 2009; Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2015). These new extensions viewed the modernization process from novel vantage points and emphasized features and themes that were not theorized or undertheorized by early modernization theorists. The new themes and extensions subsumed under this later phase of modernization theory are briefly reviewed in the following subsections.

2.3.4.1. Reflexive Modernization and Risk Society

Modernization theory was almost exclusively concerned with the positive aspects of the transformation to modernity. Developments in science, technology, bureaucracy, markets and the rest were supposed to improve the lot of the peoples in developing countries. A group of thinkers of the second-wave modernization called attention to the bitter side of the modernization process. As Beck (1992), Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) and Beck, Bonss and Lau (2003) argue modernization increasingly gives rise to a process of “self-reflexivity” through which people seriously question the givenness of concepts such as occupation patterns, nation, gender and family. This also causes the public to doubt the authority and effectiveness of science and industry as the symbols of modernity’s instrumental rationality. Such a process enables people to become alert to the problems caused by modernization process. Of all such problems, these scholars are mostly concerned with the new kinds of “risk” created for future generations. These increasingly human-made risks have caused a transition from the industrial social order of “first modernity” to the “world risk society” of “second modernity” (Beck 1999 cited in Marsh 2014). Therefore, in the second modernity risks are global and flow into and out of the various countries that are the members of the increasingly global world system. These scholars, however, retain the classic modernization theory’s optimism by positing that reflexivity is also an enabling mechanism since it helps people anticipate the risks and take steps to resolve or mitigate them.

2.3.4.2. Ecological Modernization

The foregrounding of ecological problems in the recent decades has resulted in the emergence of new and concentrated bodies of theorizing about such problems under various theories. The ecological hazards caused by modernization processes are highlighted in Schnaiberg (1980) and Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg (2015) with the concept of “treadmill of production” being the focal point. They argue that modern societies and markets have generated a constant search for economic growth in developed economies. Such a mechanism causes these economies to be stuck in a treadmill of production causing unprecedented demand for and consumption of energy which in turn causes massive environmental damages. To these scholars, the whole process is a result of the processes of capitalism, urbanization and population growth which are characteristically modern phenomena.

The concept of the treadmill of production has been challenged by Mol (2001) who argues that the rationality inherent in modernization would help mitigate ecological degradation and helps protect the environment. He points out to the improving recycling technologies, green energy technology and the like as the by-products of a modern science and technology that will help save the environment. Ecological modernization theory also claims that as modernization proceeds and matures, energy consumption becomes more efficient and this by itself helps reduce the damage caused to the environment.

2.3.4.3. Values Modernization

Values definitely play an important role in all social processes including those of social change and development. While various early modernization theorists focused on the significance of a change in personal values to the modernization process, they theorized it in relation with social processes such as urbanization, industrialization, bureaucratization and the like. A more purely and systematically developed theory of values and their role in modernization appeared in Inglehart and Welzel’s 2005 book *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. In this book, they claim that the central role of cultural change in modernization has been either

overlooked or underestimated in the previous theories of modernization. They theorize the process of transformation from materialist to post-materialist values. According to them, the change from traditional to secular-rational values in the early phase of modernization has moved beyond its original intent and produced a shift from survival values to self-expression values. They claim that their value surveys of cross-national data prove that “socioeconomic modernization...a cultural shift toward rising emphasis on self-expression values...and democratization are all components of a single underlying process: human development” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2). According to them, the expansion of human choice and autonomy is at the core of what they call “the human development sequence”. They believe that as this specific aspect of modernization assumes prominence, it produces cultural changes that “make democracy the logical institutional outcome” (Ibid). This is by itself a unique way of viewing the modernization and development question as the fight between modernity and tradition is depicted to be ultimately fought and won in the sphere of values and not as a necessary part of the economic development or industrialization processes of modernization. Some scholars tried to put the arguments of value modernization to test through conducting value surveys. For instance, Chang, Chu and Tsai (2005) tried to test the relationship between Confucian values and the emergence of democracy and found that Confucian values are negatively related to democratic values.

2.3.4.4. Multiple Modernities

Early modernization theory included the belief that as modernization proceeds, the level of structural uniformity among modernized societies increases. Indeed, there was almost a consensus among early modernization theorists that modernization results in convergence. Such a claim minimized the importance of the historical experiences of the different countries on their path toward modernity. Eisenstadt (1967 and 2002) challenged such a notion, arguing that far from converging, the forms of modernity in the highly modernized societies of the West and East Asia are considerably varied and different due to various civilizational, cultural and historical paths each of these societies have taken. Therefore, speaking

of a single modernity is a false imposition of unity on a phenomenon that is inherently diverse and we should address multiple modernities. In the same vein, Weiming (2017) provides an explanation of the “Confucian” type of modernity he tracks in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. In this Confucian version of modernity, the importance of “quality rather than freedom, sympathy rather than rationality, civility rather than law, duty rather than rights, and human-relatedness rather than individualism” (Weiming 2002, 199) are emphasized which are opposed to the western conception of modernity rooted in Enlightenment ideals. Marsh (2008) put the ideas of the multiple modernities’ theorists to test through his quantitative analysis and concluded that the convergence proposition of the early modernization theory holds. He concluded that the variation among highly modernized societies is limited to the structural level and that the variation is minimal compared to that among less modernized societies.

2.3.4.5. Global Modernity

Early modernization theorists usually took nation-states as their unit of analysis. However, they did not do this at the expense of ignoring the exogenous sources of change affecting various societies. In the revival of modernization theory, some scholars followed the logical extensions of this line of thought and combined modernization with the increasingly important phenomenon of globalization to produce a body of theory called “global modernity”. Scholars such as Giddens (1990), Delanty (2007) and Schmidt (2012) posit that globalization is rooted in a continuation of the phenomenon of modernity and is by its nature globalizing. According to these scholars, there is a distinct feature that separates global modernity as the newest phase of the modernization process from its earlier classic phase: the shift from Western dominance to polycentric modernity (Schmidt 2012). This means that the lifestyle, food, music, movies and other arrangements of modern life will be diffused by and through different centers in the world and will not be concentrated in just one center such as the US. Another shade of the global modernity hypothesis is that national governments and societies are not the prime movers when it comes to ideas such as good governance and transparency as proposed by early modernization

theory. Such ideas are advanced and promoted by international organizations, the open global markets and the global science and higher education institutions. This means that elements of the globalization process have taken the lead in initiating and promoting modernization in various countries. As a result, proponents of global modernity believe that modernity is logically extending and moving into a new direction, a direction in which it has become a global condition that “affects all our actions, interpretations and habits, across nations and irrespective of which civilizational roots we may have...it is a common condition on a global scale that we live in and with...” (Schmidt 2002, 58).

2.3.4.6. Evolutionary Theory and Modernization

In his theory of modernization, Talcot Parsons had presented an evolutionary hypothesis positing that societies use adaptive upgrading to modernize. He had identified evolutionary universals such as social organization through kinship, bureaucracy, money and markets and democracy (Marsh 2014, 269). Writing as the scholars of the second wave of modernization theory, Newson and Richerson (2009) posit that economic development disrupts the social mechanism of pre-modern societies by reducing the importance of kin relations in society. Such a change causes people’s interaction with non-kin to increase and the importance of concepts such as family, marriage and community solidarity to decline. People instead regard education, professional success and property as highly important. The “kin hypothesis” central to their work predicts that “the switch from largely kin-based to largely non-kin- based social networks generates a strong cultural evolutionary force that is common to almost all modernizing societies” (Newson and Richerson 2009, 123). They further link this shift to modern values with a decline in fertility rate. According to them, all societies that have registered high levels of economic development have experienced a decline in their fertility rate.

2.3.5. Systematic Criticisms of Modernization Theory

2.3.5.1. Dependency and World Systems Theories

The first major systematic criticisms aimed at modernization theory came from dependency and world-systems theories in the late 1960s. Both theories rejected the notion that the processes of modernization were initiated by forces inside a nation such as elites or middle classes and that national states were in charge of the process. Instead, they called attention to the idea that “the trajectory of economic transformation differed significantly and systematically as a function of the way that countries were inserted in the international system” (Cheibub and Vreeland 2018, 5). They also called out the inequalities that modernization process caused among countries positing that modernization did not necessarily translate into the sharing of its benefits among countries. Another aspect of their criticism targeted what they saw as the biases of modernization theory in favor of the dominant capitalist system and interests. They focused on explaining the reasons for the underdevelopment of the Third World countries or regions of the world “in terms of colonization, imperialist interference, and neocolonial exploitation of developing countries since their gaining independence.” (Armer and Katsillis 2000). According to these perspectives, development and underdevelopment are the inseparable parts of the same process through which countries of the “center” achieve economic development at the expense of “periphery” areas.

Dependency theory emerged mostly as an attempt by scholars working on Latin American countries as they attempted to understand the inability of this region to experience the particular kind of industrial development that advanced capitalist countries had previously made (Mahoney and Rodriguez- Franco 2018, 23). Proponents of dependency theory called *dependencistas* who consisted mostly of historians and social scientists working on Latin America refuted the neo-classical optimism that trade and comparative advantage would ultimately lead to economic growth and modernization for Latin American countries. Of focal importance to *dependencistas* was the concept of *dependencia* which referred to a context or background setting inside which processes of development materialize (Duval 1978,

57-59). The most significant feature of this context is the condition of internal processes by external factors. Therefore, dependency theorists argued that dependent countries are those whose economic development is “conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy” (Dos Santos 1970, 236). Therefore, dependencistas took dependence as a common background feature for Latin American countries and undertook to analyze the different situations, forms and historical manifestations that it took. (Mahoney and Rodriguez- Franco 2008, 24). According to these theorists, understanding the specific manifestations of dependence requires looking into transnational actors and processes and domestic classes and the state with an emphasis on the economic aspects of the structural interrelationships among them (Evans 1979 cited in Mahoney and Rodriguez- Franco 2008, 24).

Starting from the concept of *dependencia* and theorizing about its manifestations in the political and economic systems of the world, *dependencistas* argued that underdevelopment in the contemporary world was “an outgrowth of asymmetrical contacts with capitalism” (Hendricks 2000). The main thesis of dependency theory is that “following the first wave of modernization, less-developed countries are transformed by their interconnectedness with other nations, and the nature of their contacts, economies, and ideologies” (Keith 1997 cited in Hendricks 2000). However, the interaction that ensues is not a neutral one and the direction and pace of change lead to the restructuring of the weaker partners so as to enhance the interests of the economically more powerful partner without changing the international distribution of wealth.

Proponents of this theory also refute modernization theory’s hypothesis that the countries of the Third World could follow development patterns similar to the rich western countries. On the contrary, dependency theorists “stressed the hierarchical and enduring structure of the international economy and its relationship to internal class dynamics” (Mahoney and Rodriguez-Franco 2018, 23) as the main reason for underdevelopment of poor countries. As one of the classic proponents of the theory, Frank (1966, 1969) argued that underdevelopment in contemporary times is the outcome of an international division of labor exploited by capitalist interests.

Dos Santos (1996) built on and radicalized Frank's thesis positing that all sorts of economic change that happen merely happen for the benefit of the dominant center. In summary, the proponents of dependency theory believe that many facets of less developed countries "are products of the penetration of external capital" (Hendricks 2000, 643).

World systems theory gained strength in the early 1970s. It was built on the classical Marxist theories of imperialism, the premises of the dependency theory and the work of historian Ferdinand Braudel (Teschke 2008, 169). Its main aim was providing a theoretical framework that could make it possible to interpret the entire history of the capitalist world system. According to this theory, the world economy is "an integrated totality defined by a single international division of labor" that is based on different regimes of labor control among various states (Ibid). The theory depicted global unity as going hand in hand with an international division of labor with its corresponding political alignments. In this system, the unequal exchange between the core and the periphery leads to the transfer of surplus from the periphery to the core.

Wallerstein (1980), Chirot and Hall (1982) and Arrighi (1994) as some of the most prominent world systems theorists shifted the debate from the dependency theory's focus on the level of nation-states to corporate actors as the most significant players, which they see as being well capable of shaping activities according to their interests. In this theory, the strength and location of specific states in the core-periphery continuum depends on their integration into the economic structure of the international division of labor through trade. In turn, such a mechanism works to reinforce the already existing economic and political hierarchies among countries; the richest and most powerful countries constitute a de facto collective core that distributes productive activities globally in a way that benefits the powerful countries. In this way, not just production and consumption but political ideologies as well are legitimated and transplanted globally.

The criticisms aimed at modernization theory by the proponents of dependency and world systems theories have some strengths and weaknesses. Calling attention to the different and divergent modernization processes of the

developing countries and highlighting the importance of outside forces in the increasingly globalized world were significant and accurate points. Developing such notions foregrounded the internal and external contexts a society/nation was part of and brought to attention the limiting and enabling effects of such contexts for the modernization process. Another important and valid point was the notion that the world of international politics and economy is one of unequal status and relationships where the politically and economically stronger countries may exploit the less advantaged ones. However, it should be noted that the same systems can and have enabled modernization in developing countries by providing investment and development models and it would be misleading to present them merely as sources of harm to the interests of developing countries.

On the other side of the coin, some of the notions put forward by dependency and world systems theories are open to much debate and criticism. Firstly, in a good number of developing countries including Iran and Turkey, the process of modernization was arguably a conscious effort by certain domestic elites to transform the society with the influence of transnational actors remaining low for some time. Even after the process of modernization took off in such countries, the prolonged state control of the economy meant a weak and loose integration into the international economy and trade systems. Such real-life processes undermine some of the basic notions put forth by *dependencistas* and world systems theorists. Secondly, these two theories have a latent understanding of the international political and economic orders as being static. If we take the notion that the countries of the core limit the economic prospects of those in the periphery to a considerable extent, it would be difficult to explain the economic rise of the “Asian Tigers”, China and more recently India to prominence on the world stage. Finally, explaining the reasons for the underdevelopment of Third World countries in terms of “colonization, imperialist interference, and neocolonial exploitation” (Armer and Katsillis 2000) is incomplete and even misleading; it ignores the focal importance of the corruption, mismanagement and anti-development practices by the domestic political systems and elites as major impediments to the processes of modernization and development.

2.4. Alternative Theories of Socio-Economic and Political Development

Modernization theory and its systematic criticisms in the form of dependency and world systems theories were theories of socio-economic and political development that tried to explain the processes through which socio-economic and political development is materialized. Each of these theories have their particular approach toward the issue of development and modernization and see specific factors and agents as formative forces in the processes of socio-economic and political development. However, these were not the only theories trying to address the issue of development and since their heyday various other theories of development have been put forward. These new theoretical camps and trends of theorizing about development will be discussed briefly in the following paragraphs. The review is not an exhaustive one and just touches upon the other major scholarly developments in the field of theorizing development and modernization.

One of the main camps giving rise to theories of development is called “structuralism” which focuses on the “underlying structures of society that affect developmental politics” (Green 2018, 43). Although various social structures can be discussed in this regard, the main points of debate have focused on geographical and demographic structural factors and their impact on development.

Proponents of the more recent geographical theories of development argue that a country’s geography has a strong impact on a country’s chances of development, while dropping a deterministic understanding of geography as concerns development. In this vein, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) base their institutional description of development on geography. They argue that the political institutions that brought about prolonged economic growth in some former colonies were the outcome of the geography of those regions. Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) argue for the indirect impact of geography on development via political institutions. In a somewhat way, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) claim that geographic differences such as soil types leave deep impacts on economic systems and in turn politics in the developing world and by doing so affect the chances and trajectory of socio-economic and political development in these countries.

Proponents of the demographic theories of development try to explain socio-economic development by reverting to the idea of demographic transition. Based on this notion, demographic transition is one of the most important aspects of the transition to modernity and involves the “the movement from a society characterized as having high fertility and mortality levels to one with low fertility and mortality levels...” (Green 2018 46). Such a transition and its timing is thought to have profound influences on the economic and political fortunes of societies and their trajectory of development. The theories developed in this camp focus on the relationship between the demographic transition and politics of development and can be put into three broad subcategories. In the first subcategory, the emphasis is on the different levels of population density in different societies prior to the transition and its repercussions for these societies’ chances of development (for example Carneiro 1970; Green (2012a). The theories in the second subcategory (for example Gellner 2006; Mann 2005) emphasize the fact that the demographic transition happened in different times in different societies and by the virtue of this left divergent and lasting impacts on the political and economic systems of these societies and their trajectory of development. Finally, other scholars (for example Grossman and Iyigun 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) argue that the demographic transition has taken different amounts of time to reach completion in different societies and because of this has shaped development or underdevelopment in various societies differently. In each case, the scholars scrutinize the impact of this structural demographic transition on the socio-economic and political development of certain societies.

Political economy had served and still serves as one of the main pillars of theorizing about development. However, following the fall of the Soviet Union and the resurgence of democracy that followed it gave rise to a concentrated and fresh body of theories about political and socio-economic development from non- Marxist scholars in the field of political economy. The new wave of democratization and its aftermath led to three major streams of scholarly work on development including “research into the collapse of authoritarianism, the rise of democracy and civic violence” (Bates 2018, 67), all affected by the events on the ground in the immediate post-Soviet Union era. The collapse of authoritarianism drew particular attention

from scholars in Latin America (for example O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Magaloni 2006) who delved into the reasons for the erosion of authoritarianism in their area. Meanwhile, the rise of democracy attracted the attention of those working on Africa (for example Bratton and van de Walle 1997) who traced the emergence of the democracy movement and campaigns for democracy in the African continent. Finally, other scholars paid attention to the civil unrest and violence that followed the struggle for democratization in some former Soviet Union satellites and a number of African countries. These scholars (for example Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 1999; Klare 2002) studied civic violence, its causes and its relation to the emergence of democracy.

Another major body of theorizing about socio-economic and political development came from scholars of cultural politics. These scholars, replaced the focus of political economy on economic and political aspects of development with one that brought culture and cultural values to the fore. As a classic example, Huntington (1993) studied the effects of cultural values and faiths on political development with a particular emphasis on Islam. However, of the more recent scholarship in this field, those focusing on ethnicity and its effects on development have been the most productive and influential. Some scholars have argued that ethnicity has positive effects on development (for example Bates and Yackolev 2002) claiming ethnic groups help promote economic growth through producing human capital and nourishing private investment. On the contrary, others (for example Alesina et al. 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007) see ethnic diversity as inhibiting economic growth since it makes the formation of public goods more costly.

The study of economic history and the role of institutions has served as another major source for the production of theories on socio-economic and political development. The new institutional economics has been among the most productive and influential currents in recent theorizing about development. Proponents of this approach, analyze and emphasize historical factors such as a society's economic, social, political and legal institutions and discuss the relevance of such legacies on that society's contemporary status of development and utilize such insights in

explaining the prospects and trajectory of development for societies in contemporary times. According to these theorists, a society's institutions provide both limiting and enabling mechanisms for its trajectory of development. In this vein, La Porta et al. (1999) tried to identify the impact of legal systems on economic growth while Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) scrutinized the impacts of political institutions on economic growth and development.

Numerous theories of socio-economic and political development have been produced and continue to be produced by scholars from various field in social sciences. However, reviewing all of them and discussing them in detail is not the main concern of the present study and is impossible as well. Of all the various theories that help explain the processes of socio-economic and political development, two will be discussed in the following subsections. These theories have been selected for their theoretical rigor and novelty and high level of relevance to the objectives of the inquiry at hand in this study. A discussion of the general contours of these theories and their relevance to the study at hand will follow.

2.4.1. Selectorate Theory

What Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors call their theory of “the logic of political survival” is discussed in a book of the same name published in 2003. Their theory tries to explain the mechanism of social and political development by looking at what the political leader and the elite in a society do in order to stay in power. They resort to the two key concepts of the “Selectorate” and “winning coalition” to explain the leaders' choices and the prospects of social and economic change in a society. According to them, the selectorate includes all those individuals who have a formal role in expressing their preference over the selection of the leader. However, their expression of the preference may directly influence the outcome or not; in other words, they are those who have a right to vote. Meanwhile, the support of a smaller subset of the selectorate is necessary if the incumbent leader wants to remain in office. This group is called the winning coalition. The importance of the winning coalition is that “they control the resources vital to the political

survival of the incumbent” (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, 38) and to whom every leader answers. Leaders always face the threat of being deposed by challengers from within the system. Such challengers would be able to depose the incumbent through attracting enough members of the incumbent’s winning coalition. Therefore, in order to remain in office, the leader use their powers of decision-making regarding the tax rate, spending of the revenues and their provision of a mix of private and public goods to stay in power.

The core of selectorate theory’s argument is that the political selection institutions help explain leaders’ policy choices and significantly influence the economic prospects of that society including income levels, income distribution and growth rates and. After running several quantitative game theoretical tests, they conclude that a large winning coalition is conducive to income growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 20). They followed by running other game theoretic tests to show how economic development is facilitated by what they call a large winning coalition. They posit that the relationship between coalition size and the relative importance of public versus private goods in a leader’s policies is very significant. This is due to the fact that as the winning coalition becomes substantially large as in democracies, leaders find it in line with their chances of political survival to run public policies that satisfy the welfare of their winning coalition, which includes a large segment of the population. By doing so, such leaders help bolster economic growth and per capita income. Indeed, they explain how the selection institutions encourage leaders to make decisions for their political survival that also benefit the majority of the population and help generate economic growth.

The selectorate theory serves as the key theoretical backbone of the current study for several reasons. The current study is mainly concerned with the ways in which the discourse of modernization was created and promoted by the elites in Iran and Turkey by analyzing state-aligned newspapers. Using the notions of “selectorate” and “winning coalition” provide theoretical tools for tracking the members of each leader’s winning coalition and how they tried to reshape the society and keep the incumbent leader in power by promoting certain modernizing themes, ideas and discourses through their establishment of and writing in newspapers as

channels of mass communication. Indeed, these newspapers served as platforms through which the winning coalition dispersed their vision of modernization to the various corners of their societies. Additionally, the selectorate theory's notions of the "challenger" and its characterization of "rigged-election autocracies...characterized by small winning coalitions and large selectorates" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 8) are very much applicable to the cases of Iran and Turkey. Using these notions to analyze the ruling elites' discourses on political opposition, parties and democracy as promoted in the newspapers serve as windows to understand the impediments to political democratization in our two cases. Such an application can help us understand why effective opposition figures and parties as challengers to the incumbent leaders could not gain a foothold in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey regardless of the introduction of some formal mechanisms of democracy into these two countries.

2.4.2. Economic-Institutional Theory of Democracy and Development

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) proposed their own theory of political change and its repercussions for the social and economic spheres. Central to their theory is the notion that policies and social choices that benefit the elites -who are closely associated with the rich- are different from those benefiting the majority of the population and this causes a conflict over social choices and policies (Ibid, 15) with the conflict between the rich and the poor who respectively lose and gain due to economic redistribution as a result of the emergence of democracy taking center stage. The basic notion of their theory is that some of the economic and political crises cause the population to assume temporary de facto political power threatening to bring down the whole social and political system. In such cases, in order to avoid radical outcomes, the elites are forced to "create a credible commitment to future majoritarian policies" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, xiii) i.e. to democratize in order to appease the population, since the people want to turn their temporary power into permanent institutionalized de jure power. Such moments are the points at which political change takes place altering future allocations of power with its significant repercussions for the economic sphere among others.

As they develop their “economic” and “conflictual” theory, they argue that when there is a transition to democracy, more economic resources are redistributed to the majority of the population. As a result, the majority are in favor of democracy while the elites are on the side of non-democracy. However, they posit that specific factors including a strong civil society, shocks and crises, sources of income and composition of wealth, political institutions, the role of inter-group inequality, the middle class and globalization affect the chances for the emergence of democracy in a society. Running several game theoretic tests, they claim that richer and more educated countries are more likely to be democratic while refuting modernization theory’s claim that economic development necessarily leads to democracy. Meanwhile, however, they find a strong connection between higher levels of economic equality and the survival of democracy in a country.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory of change posits the existence of conflict between elites and the majority of the population as a central theme which could fruitfully be used in the current study. The main conflict of concern in the current study is the one between the elites’ vision of the society based modernization, social change and the values accompanying it and the traditional vision of society, tradition and stability espoused by the majority of the population. These conflicting visions came into conflict in both of the cases of Iran and Turkey, with the main nodes of such conflicts being visible in the discussions regarding tradition and traditional values in each case. Therefore, the theory’s notions can be used to determine the major ideological conflicts between elites and the masses in our two cases. Moreover, based on this theory, the masses favor democracy because it causes more economic resources to be distributed to the majority of the population, in contrast to the elites who prefer non-democracy and the keeping of their advantages. Analyzing the elites’ discourses regarding democracy and economic redistribution in the newspapers can shed light on the challenges that impeded the establishment of democracy (in Iran’s case) and its development and consolidation (in Turkey’s case) in the era following these two nations’ establishment eras.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY AND NARRATIVES OF MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT: IRAN AND TURKEY IN THEIR FOUNDATION ERAS

3.1. Outline of the Chapter

The current chapter aims at discussing the history and narratives of modernization and development in the cases of Iran and Turkey, with a particular emphasis on the foundation eras of the modern Iranian and Turkish nations corresponding to 1920s-1940s. In order to do so, first a general review of the literature will be presented to distinguish the contours and the main themes of debate regarding modernization and development of these two nation-states in the mentioned period. This will in turn be followed by an elaboration on the gaps in the literature and the current study's specific theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the state of literature. The next section will be dedicated to a thorough discussion of the history and narratives of modernization and development in Iran and Turkey, including an account of the historical and intellectual roots of the modernization drives of the two nations in 1920s-1940s. Then, the two cases will be compared by taking account of commonalities and differences in some detail. It will be argued that the differences mentioned by the present study serve as critical independent variables and the basis for hypotheses that would explain the divergent paths of modernization and development in our two cases.

3.2. Review of Literature: Modernization and Development of Iran and Turkey (1920s-1940s)

Modernization and development in the cases of Iran and Turkey and particularly the unveiling of these processes in the foundation eras of these two nations have attracted considerable attention throughout the years. Scholars from various fields including history, political science and sociology among others have

tried to explain the emergence of the modern nations of Iran and Turkey following the upheavals of World War I and its aftermath and out of the ashes of Qajar Dynasty and Ottoman Empire respectively. In this vein, certain works provide panoramic views of the mentioned period with some discussion of the path toward modernization and development, while others focus on the figures of Reza Shah and Atatürk and their critical role in leading their nations toward modernization and development. The works in this category include “general” overviews of the foundation eras or leaders including analyses of the two nations’ paths toward modernization. Özbudun and Kazancigil (1981), Landau (1984), and Mango (2000) discuss Atatürk’s life and also his legacy for the modernization of Turkey, while Ghani (1998) and Keddie (1999) provide an overview of Reza Shah’s life and his lasting impact on the modernization of Iran. Other works in this “general” category include chapters on the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey, with Lewis (1961), Ahmad (1993), and Zürcher (1993) being some of the classic works on modern Turkey with comprehensive chapters on the Republican Era of the country. Regarding the Iranian case, Chehabi (1998), Abrahamian (2008) and Amanat (2017) offer a thorough discussion of the foundation era and the different forces that shaped it.

Another important category of works includes those written with a “specific” focus on the modernization and development processes in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey and their intellectual roots. Included in this category are various subcategories each dealing with modernization and development from a particular vantage point. For the purpose of clarity, such “specific” works would be dealt with separately for the cases of Iran and Turkey respectively, followed by those that provide comparative perspectives.

3.2.1. Major Trends and Debates: Iran

The scholarly works dedicated to Iran’s trajectory of modernization and development in its foundation era under Reza Shah cover a variety of themes and have different vantage points. Some of the works are dedicated to the discussion of the top-down, authoritative and statist modernization efforts by the state and its

nationalist elite supporters, highlighting the figure of the Shah and the state in shaping the modernization agenda. Such works remain confined to explaining the ways in which a strong central state consolidated its power and projected it into every corner of society and land through the establishment of a professional army, modern bureaucracy, reformed financial system and other processes and in doing so tried to create a modern national identity, country and society. Banani (1961), Bill (1970), and Matin-Asgari (2011) discuss the reform measures pursued by Reza Shah and his supporting elites with Banani focusing on the legislative reforms by the Shah as an expression of the encounter between the ideals of traditional Iranian society and those of the west. Katouzian (1979) and Ghods (1991b) take up the issue of Iranian nationalism and its indispensable impact in helping Reza Shah assume power, while at the same time shaping his later modernization agenda as well. In the same vein, Matin (2013) has a comprehensive chapter on the connection between nationalism and the “defensive” modernization program carried out by the Iranian state in the foundation era. Katouzian (2000) keeps the state-centric approach presenting the theory of “arbitrary rule” as the central theme of his work with some significant discussion of state-society relations, certain social aspects of the modernization agenda of the state and the social base of support for Reza Shah’s modernizing program. Ghods (1991a) follows in the same line with a focus on the reasons for the failure of state’s modernization initiatives to penetrate deep into the various layers of society. Faghfoory (1987) is an interesting departure from the theme of presenting the state and its supporting elites, and the class of ulema as being enemies. This article explains ulema’s role in helping Reza Khan’s rise to power and the relationship between the state and the religious community before and after the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty.

A number of other works have delved into the other side of the modernization story’s coin elaborating on “history from below”. Such works examine how the various aspects and processes of modernization were rolled out in society while at the same time reflecting on people’s reception of and reaction to modernity and the state/elites’ modernization drive. Another point that sets such works apart from the state-centric ones is their use of primary sources such as newspapers, journals,

posters and people's letters. Cronin (2003a), a collection of essays, is a significant work in this regard covering social and cultural issues as diverse as the social base of support for Reza Shah, education, traditional culture's encounter with modernity, women's participation and the tribes. In the same vein, Atabaki (2007) includes various essays on workers' reception of modernization, Iranian subalterns' impact on the process, Iranian society's various classes and their reactions to the modernization process and women's role and participation. Cronin's essay in this book provides an account of the opponents of the new state under Reza Shah and its supporting elites by describing the various opposition movements formed within social and religious strata in opposition to Reza Shah's regime. The paucity of such works analyzing modernization with a focus on the masses reflects the need for further works on the people's role in the processes of modernization and the reasons for the penetration or lack thereof such processes into the depth of the social fabric.

A number of other works have taken secularization as their point of departure focusing on how secularization as a key component of the modernization process took place in Iran's foundation era. Kian (1998) provides a deeper perspective into the role of the new middle class in the making of modern Iran. It emphasizes the significant role of this secular middle class in introducing modern ideas and demands into Iran's politics in the Pahlavi era and their failure to assume a leadership position in the post-1979 Islamic Republic of Iran. In the same vein, Başkan (2014) traces the roots of secularization in the case of Iran to the Constitutional Period (1905-1911) and calls the specific brand of secularization in Iran "separationist state secularization" meaning that religion was not incorporated into the state in Iran's case since the elite reformers introduced secularization only after consolidating their power and while the religious community had an alternative source of power in the Iranian society.

Finally, some of the scholarly works discuss the historical and intellectual roots of the modernization drive under the Reza Shah and his supporting elite. Some of these works point to Abbas Mirza's efforts in the first decades of the 19th century and the reforms by Amir Kabir in the mid-19th century as the starting point for modernization in Iran, most have traced the roots of the more concentrated practical

and intellectual attempts at modernization to the last decades of the 19th century and the first major victory of the modernizers during the Constitutional Revolution of the 1905-1911. Abrahamian (1982 & 2008), Cole (1992), Sohrabi (2011 & 2020) and Fernée (2012) discuss the circulation of modern Western ideas in Iran in the late 19th and early 20th century and their culmination in the conflict that led to the emergence of the constitutional regime and the first national parliament. Cole's work stands out among others as it tries to find the roots of democratic thinking and the call for representative government among Iranian elites to the Bahai faith as one of Iran's millenarian movements. Fernee's work is also novel in the sense that it traces the pathology of Iran's modernization by positing that the modernization efforts in Iran's case, with a few examples, had historically been driven forward by the elites through decree and could not integrate the society and masses into the process. Therefore, according to this, Fernee maintains that the modernization process in Iran during the 1920s-1940s never turned into a grass roots movement in society as the modernizing Iranian state always tried to stay above society and preferred coercion rather than persuasion in bringing its modernization agenda into fruition.

The ideas of education, language reform, culture, the change in the dress code, role of military and bureaucracy in modernization, the impact of the reforms on women's lives and international power dynamics are usually addressed within more comprehensive works such as Chehabi (1998), Abrahamian (2008), and Amanat (2017). There are also some other essays that cover some specific aspect of modernization in Iran's foundation era. However, many of them are stand-alone pieces or works dedicated to understudied areas. The pieces by Zirinsky (2003) and Marashi (2003) cover the international aspect of the Reza Shah's regime with the latter focusing on the Shah's state visit to Turkey and its significance. Matthee (2003) and Boroujerdi (2003) discuss the educational reforms under the modernist state of Reza Shah and its successes and failures. Discussing women's fortunes during the modernizing regime and the reforms' impacts on women are the subject of pieces by Rostam-Kolayi (2003), Mahdavi (2003) and Chehabi (2003) with the last one going over the controversial ban on the veil and its effects on women's lives and participation in society. The issue of the dissolution of parties under Reza Shah is the

theme of Elliot (2003), while Cronin (2004) discusses the army's role in the modernization drive and its relation to society.

3.2.2. Major Trends and Debates: Turkey

Turkey's foundation era has aroused much interest among scholars and given rise to a considerable number of works published on the trajectory of modernization and development. Some of these works look into the totality of the move toward modernity and the leap toward modernization and discuss its various components, while others keep their scope limited to a specific shade or feature of the process. However, most of the works remain limited to elaborating on the efforts of the state and its supporting elites and the role of Atatürk in pushing the reform agenda forward. Lewis (1961), Shaw (1977), Ahmad (1993), and Zürcher (1993) all contain valuable chapters on how the modern Turkish Republic emerged under Atatürk and his allies with elaborate discussions of how the statist modernization effort was pursued by Atatürk and the elites who supported him. Ahmad's work, while staying committed to the state-centric narrative of modernization, provides a more elaborate discussion and interesting insights into the state of the society and how the modernizing efforts of the state affected the people and were received by them. Atabaki and Zürcher (2004) contains a number of essays on the modernizing efforts of the state. A reprint of Rustow (1959) in this book sheds light on the role of the army in founding of the modern Turkish Republic and its significance as one of the sources for the distribution of modern ideas and pursuing of modernization drive in Turkey. The piece by Zürcher (2004) builds on works by Dodd (1991) and Karpat (1991) by delving into the significant issue of modern political institution building by the state, and expands the scope by elaborating on the Republican People's Party's role in propagating modern ideas and setting the agenda for modernization and reform. Koçak (2004) follows in the same vein but limits its scope to the nature of the Single- Party Regime under Ismet İnönü period (1938-45). The volume edited by Bozdoğan and Kasaba (1997) is a collection of essays on the issues surrounding modernity and Turkish national identity, with the focus still being mainly on state policies and their effects on society. However, some pieces such as the one by

Kasaba (1997) discuss the shift in the people's reaction to the socio-cultural project of Kemalist modernization. The same focus on nationalism and national identity is visible in Çağaptay (2006) and Findley (2010), which keep the focus on nationalism and the formation of the national identity as a central part of the modernization process. Çağaptay includes extended discussions of secularism and Islam in relation to nationalism and explains their key impact on defining Turkish nationalism and Turkishness.

Another category of works includes those which have taken the people's reception of and reaction to modernization as their vantage point to create "history from below". These works have made greater use of primary sources such as newspapers, magazines, journals, posters and even politicians' reports to provide a more immediate look into the rolling out of modernizing reforms in Turkey. Atabaki (2007) includes some of the interesting essays in this regard. Quataert (2007) looks into the effects of modernization on workers' life prospects and their reaction toward the state's push for modernization. Küçük (2007) and Azak (2007) discuss the reaction of the members of the Sufi orders and the events of the Menemen Incident at length in order to provide an in-depth understanding of popular reaction to the state's modernization efforts and agenda. Kechriotis (2007) and Os (2007) respectively demonstrate the reaction of the Greek Orthodox minority to the policies of Young Turks and the impact of changes in family law on women's social life and marriage fortunes.

Discussing the issue of secularization as an integral component of the modernizing reforms by the Turkish state in its foundation era and tracing its roots to the efforts by Young Turks and Young Ottomans is the main focus of a number of works. Özbudun (1984) provides an extended discussion of the Ottoman roots of the secularization efforts by the Kemalist state and demonstrates the relationship between secularization, modernization and nationalism in this context. Davison (1995), Başkan (2014), and Çağaptay (2006) look into the importance of secularization to the state's program of modernization and the historical roots of the secular state established by the Kemalist elite and how far their secularizing efforts penetrated the social fabric. Başkan delves into the Ottoman state's relation with the

ulema and describes its significance to the future Turkish Republic and labels the Turkish brand of secularization as “accommodationist state secularization” and describes how and why the state accommodated the religion in modern Turkey’s case. Çağaptay extends the discussion to the matrix of the relationship between secularization, nationalism and the Turkish identity, while Davison provides an in-depth look into the ideas of Ziya Gökalp to account for the specific criteria of secularization pursued by the elites of the modern Turkish state in its foundation era.

Another category of scholarly works includes those that trace the intellectual roots of the modernization agenda of the modern Turkish state. Such works usually provide an account of the reforms of the *Tanzimat* era as the starting point and then move on to explaining the relevance of the ideas propagated by the Young Ottomans and then the CUP members and after that the Young Turks to the modernization criteria and project pursued by the Kemalist elite. Mardin (2000) focuses more specifically on the genesis of the Young Ottoman thought with interesting chapters on Şinasi, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, Ali Suavi and Hayreddin Pasha as the intellectual forefathers of the modernization of Turkish political ideas, while Kuran (1970) focuses on the figure of Küçük Said Paşa and his ideas about modernization, and Parla (1985) on the significance of the social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp to modernization ideology and efforts under Atatürk. Hanioglu (1995), Fernée (2012) and Sohrabi (2011 & 2020) elaborate on the genealogy of the intellectual roots of the modernization of social and political thought in Turkey with Fernée pointing out the failure of the Turkish elites in creating a grass-roots social base for the modernization project and convincing the majority of the population to join in. Hanioglu’s account of the political ideas of the Young Turks and their ideological roots offers a window into understanding the modernizing reforms carried out under Atatürk and how such reforms were a continuity of the modernizing ideas put forth by the CUP and the Young Turks.

In Turkey’s case, issues such as the modernization of language, role of military and bureaucracy in modernization, educational reforms, the impact of the reforms on women’s lives and international power dynamics are discussed within more comprehensive works such as Lewis (1961), Ahmad (1993), and Zürcher

(1993). Various other scholarly works exist that cover some aspect of the modernization process in Turkey under the Kemalist regime. However, these belong to the less well-studied areas or have not given rise to much interest among other scholars. Renda and Kortepeter (1986) address the issue of the lasting legacy of Kemalist modern ideas on Turkish culture and how they have helped shape the culture of modern Turkey. In the same vein, Turan (1984) delves into the formation and evolution of the Turkish political culture in the Turkish Republic and its relation to political democracy. The piece by Szyliowicz (1966) discusses the issue of political participation and its relationship with modernization and how the different classes, especially the peasantry, were shaped during Turkey's path toward modernity in its foundation era and afterward. Karpat (2003) takes the issues of identity, state, faith and community as its main points of focus to explain how Islam was politicized by the late Ottoman state. The book elaborates on the various aspects of Islamism and its impact on the various spheres of society and state which makes it valuable to understanding the way in which the Kemalist state and intellectuals diverged from the late Ottoman Islamic heritage. Finally, Karpat (2017) discusses people's reaction to democracy and the democratization experiments and processes under the Kemalist regime and the transition to the multi-party system afterwards.

3.2.3. Major Trends and Debates: Comparing Iran and Turkey

The number and scope of works in the comparative category is significantly more limited than the separate cases of Iran and Turkey, as one may expect. One major group of works in the comparative literature on the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey focuses on the state's central role in the modernization processes in both countries and the significant role played by the leaders and their supporting elite. Atabaki and Zürcher's (2004) and Sohrabi (2011 & 2020) discuss the central role of the state and the elites in introducing modernization to their societies. The former includes comparative pieces on dress code reforms in the two countries by Chehabi (2004) which addresses how such reforms were unrolled and received by the masses. It also includes a piece by Perry (2004) on language reform in the two countries and how far such reforms proceeded. Sohrabi's works compare the Young Turk

revolution, its roots and legacies for the upcoming Turkish Republic with the Constitutional Revolution in Iran and how it shaped the modernization agenda under Reza Shah. They also shed some light on the links between the constitutional revolutions in Iran and Turkey and how the elites in the two countries were affected or inspired by the events in the other country, in addition to mentioning the opposition to such reforms and the aftermath of these two big revolutions.

Another group of works focus on the issue of nationalism, its links with modernity and the significance of nationalism as the center-piece of the projects of modernization in the two countries. The pieces by Keyman and Yilmaz (2006) and Fernée (2012) fit in this category. They provide extensive analyses of the emergence of the ideas of modernity/modernization in the two cases and how nationalism operated as a dominant ideology in the transition to a modern state and society in the two countries. The piece by Keyman and Yilmaz is very insightful especially in regards with the differences in the legacies and the outcomes of the modernization efforts under Atatürk and Reza Shah. Fernée's essay has a more philosophical standpoint toward the nation-making experiences of Iran and Turkey taking the distinct visions of modernity and the political heritage of Enlightenment in the two countries into account. According to Fernée, the inside/out dichotomy created by the modernizing states in the two countries led to an elitist and authoritarian nation-making and modernizing process and made it impossible for the people and the society to be integrated into the process or for the processes to become deeply rooted in Iran's or Turkey's society.

The third category includes works on the link between secularization and modernization and their mutual impact on each other and the extent to which secularization became embedded in the two societies of Iran and Turkey. Atabaki (2004), Hurd (2008) and Başkan (2014) trace the roots of the secularizing reforms of the modern Turkish Republic and Iran's state under Atatürk and Reza Shah and provide insights into the relationship and the comparative power of the state and the ulema in the late Ottoman period and the Constitutional Revolution's era in Iran. Başkan compares the two positing that the Iranian version of secularization under Reza Shah was "separationist" with the religious community not being integrated

into the state in Iran's case, while the Turkish one was "accommodationist" as the steps toward accommodating religion into the state taken in the late Ottoman era were completed by the Kemalist state. Hurd compares how the secularization efforts were undertaken and performed in the cases of Iran and Turkey while providing reasons for why secularization remained contested in the two countries and how the domestic renegotiations of Western secularization in the two societies took place. In a similar vein, Pfaff (1963) compares and describes the process of the disengagement of the polity from the influence of Islamic traditionalism and the ensuing emergence of secular nationalism and the remaining uneasy relation between Islam and secularism in these societies.

There are few other works in the comparative category that are directly relevant to modernization in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey and which may have significance for the study at hand. Of the very few available, Akkoyunlu (2014) traces the rise of the hybrid regime in the cases of Iran and Turkey with its roots in their foundation eras, maintaining that such political systems in the two cases under study are built on two contesting sources of legitimacy that he calls elitist and popular and their corresponding institutions of guardianship and democracy. Szyliowicz (1976) provides insights into educational reforms as agents and objects of change in Iran, Turkey and Egypt and how these educational reforms are linked with the ideology of the political system, presenting potentially insightful points for comparing educational reforms' effects and legacy in the case of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras and afterward.

3.2.4. Gaps in Literature and the Present Study's Contribution

Having gone through the various trends and themes in the literature, we need to identify the existing gaps. Finding the gaps will help us navigate our course toward achieving the research's main aims while enabling us to make the necessary adjustments to address those gaps if necessary. Moreover, it will help clarify the specific ways in which the present study makes its contribution to the existing literature on modernization and development in the cases of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras, roughly corresponding to 1920s- 1940s. Some of the most

significant gaps in the literature are highlighted here, followed by the discussion of the current study's planned contribution to the literature.

Firstly, the lion's share of the works in the existing literature remained fixated on the role of the state, founding figures, political elites and intellectuals of the Kemalist and Reza Shah eras and the Young Turk and Constitutional Revolution eras respectively preceding each, in pushing forward a project of modernization and development. As such, the main shortcoming of the existing literature is its neglect of the people's voices, perceptions and roles in the processes of modernization in their respective countries/societies. Secondly, it could be said that the majority of the relevant scholarly works have used other relevant secondary articles and books to analyze the cases of Iran and Turkey. This means that most of these works remain mostly limited to insights into other scholars' depiction and understanding of the modernization processes under way in Iran and Turkey in the period of concern to the present study. Failing to give primary sources such as newspapers, journals, propaganda posters, biographies and other primary sources their fair share of analysis is a serious flaw since it significantly limits one's understanding of the real processes of modernization and change and how the discourses on them were shaped by the elite. Thirdly, the possible links between modernization and democracy and the possible constitutive role of modernization in the creation or lack thereof of democracy in Iran and Turkey in the period after Reza Shah's reign and Single-Party Era are ignored in the literature or at best have received cursory treatment. Such a conspicuous silence on this important issue is all the more puzzling given the fact that such a link is discussed extensively by various scholars in the global context (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski & Limongi 1997). Such a gap in the literature deprives us of one of the most significant variables for explaining the reasons behind the emergence of a multi-party parliamentary regime in Turkey in the 1950s and the failure for such a transition in Iran's case in the meantime.

Newspapers are chosen as the main sources of the present study since as primary sources they provide one with the opportunity for a more in-depth and broader analysis and understanding of the dynamics of reform, modernization and development in Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras. Moreover, such an analysis

can help address the mentioned gaps in the literature. For one thing, newspapers are relatively closer to the public than academic papers and books and were widely circulated and read among the people in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey. Therefore, analyzing newspapers as primary sources that naturally focus on “history from below” helps us gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of the processes of modernization, the debates surrounding modernity and development and the features and conditions of the societies that the modern states of Iran and Turkey and their supporting elites tried to reshape and modernize. Secondly, newspapers are sites where the state and society meet. Thus, they are invaluable sources for gauging both the state/elites’ understanding of modernity and modernization and the discourses generated by them in order to instill the values of modern culture, society and state in their existing traditional societies. Moreover, while these state-aligned newspapers remained mostly within the confines of official state ideology and propaganda, at times they provided windows into the effects of the modernizing reforms on the ordinary people’s lives and fortunes and their understanding and reception of the modernizing reforms undertaken by the state during the period of the current study. Thirdly, analyzing the elites’ discourses in newspapers on modernization and democracy and the way in which they are depicted as being interconnected or causing/being caused by each other or not can provide new avenues for understanding the trajectory and pathology of democracy and democratization processes in Iran and Turkey since the time of the present study. Analyzing the way in which the state/elites understood and propagated their statist/elitist version of modernization and the role they ascribed to people and their participation in the polity and society in such discourses may open new avenues for understanding the travails of Turkish democracy since its transition to a multi-party system and the virtual absence of tangible progress in democratization in the case of Iran. Finally, analyzing the front pages of the selected newspapers enables one to assess the specific features of modernization to which more space and emphasis was dedicated by the elites and the ones not extensively discussed by them. This will help one infer the features that the elites saw as paramount and integral to the process of modernization at the expense of other aspects. It can also help one infer the specific

modern features and values to which the public showed stronger resistance and that the elites felt the need for trumpeting more frequently and much more strongly than other features.

As already discussed in the previous chapter, the Selectorate theory serves as the theoretical backbone of the current study. This theory in its own particular way enriches the present study's focus on the chosen state-aligned newspapers as primary sources and makes specific contributions to the existing literature possible. First, the current study is mainly concerned with the ways in which the discourses of modernization were created and promoted by the elites in Iran and Turkey. Using the notions of the "selectorate" and "winning coalition" provide theoretical tools for tracking the members of each leader's winning coalition and how they collectively tried to reshape the society and keep the incumbent leader in power by promoting certain modernizing themes, ideas and discourses through their establishment and writing in newspapers as channels of mass communication. Indeed, these newspapers served as platforms through which the winning coalitions in the cases of Iran and Turkey dispersed their visions of modernization to the various corners of their societies. Therefore, the totality of these elites' discourses on modernization can be reconstructed by analyzing the newspapers and in few cases, it may even be possible to analyze the themes propagated by a specific member of the elite in regards with modernization. However, this latter possibility remains a highly restricted one as many articles are published without the author's name and as the contributions by the members of the elite remained mostly infrequent and restricted to special occasions. Additionally, the selectorate theory's notions of the "challenger" and its characterization of "rigged-election autocracies...characterized by small winning coalitions and large selectorates" (Buono de Mesquita et al. 2003, 8) are very much applicable to the cases of Iran and Turkey. Using these notions to analyze the ruling elites' discourses on political opposition, parties and democracy as promoted in the newspapers opens doors to understanding the impediments to political democratization in our two cases. Such an application can help us understand why effective opposition figures and parties as challengers to the incumbent leaders could not gain a foothold in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey regardless of the

introduction of some formal mechanisms of democracy into these two countries. Finally, comparing the modernization discourses propounded by the members of the winning coalitions in the cases of Iran and Turkey helps us understand the ways in which they were affected by the other side, their successes and failures in comparison with each other, and the reasons why the trajectory of modernization diverged in the two countries in the period after the reign of the Reza Shah in Iran and the end of the Single-Party Era in Turkey.

3.3. The History and Narrative of Modernization and Development: Iran

3.3.1. The Emergence of the Ideas of Reform and Modernization

The trajectory of modernization in Iran in its foundation era spanning 1920s-1940s can be best understood when put into its particular historical context. The ideas of modernizing the state and society pursued by the Iranian elites during the reign of Reza Shah built on several decades of efforts to modernize the country and its people. The earliest efforts in modernizing the state dates back to the time of the Safavid Shah Abbas I (reigned 1588- 1629) who introduced the innovations of a loyal standing army and a new taxation system in the Shah's effort to end the previously tribal and provisory basis of the state's military power (Fernée 2012, 76). Such efforts were renewed during the Qajar era in the first half of the nineteenth century when Abbas Mirza (1789-1833) and later Amir Kabir (1807-1852) launched two ambitious programs "for rapid, defensive, and statewide modernization" (Abrahamian 1982, 52). In the case of the former, the initiative for modernization rose out of the decisive defeats by Iran's tribal army against Russia's modern army. Following these defeats, new equipment and organization were introduced and the first permanent army units were established but the attempt did not proceed very far. It was at the same time that Iran's first students were dispatched to Europe to study "practical subjects such as military science, engineering, gun making, medicine, typography, and modern languages" (Ibid). Amir Kabir who had served as special envoy to the Ottoman Empire and grown fond of *Nizam-e Jadid* and *Tanzimat* reforms, later revived the standing army, established the country's first newspaper

and also its first secular high school Dar al Fonun. Both projects failed as a result of domestic intrigue and foreign interference.

More accurately speaking, the roots of the ideas of the need for modernization go back to the second half of the nineteenth century and the theorizations of a number of educated men who distinguished themselves from the religiously based ulema and urafa with the ulema and urafa having enjoyed a monopoly on literacy and scholarship in Iran for centuries. This group of the modern educated men included prominent figures such as Mirza Malkom Khan (1833–1908) and Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838-1897) who were inspired by the anti-theological philosophers of eighteenth century Europe and privileged pragmatic solutions to particular problems instead of the “mystery of life” creed put forward by the ulema and urafa. Meanwhile, Malkom Khan put forth his “Humanity” creed (Adamiyat), which was inspired by August Comte’s positivist Religion of Humanity (Amanat 2017, 426) making Malkom Khan a prophet of secular modernity. This new creed aimed at rising above organized religion and “aspired to the universal values of scientific progress, human rights, and tolerance” (Ibid) and favored social engineering from above in order to modernize the Iranian society. Another key figure was Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838-1897) whose ideas were the polar opposite of Malkom Khan. Afghani was a pioneer of political Islam influenced by Ottoman-supported pan-Islamic activism. The shade of his ideas that resonated with his Iranian audience was his “politicized reading of Islam as a community of resistance, a force of unanimity that had already proved effective during the Tobacco Protest” (Ibid, 427). This message of encountering Europe’s imperial powers through religious-national solidarity found him many enthusiasts in Iran. The other aspect of his ideas called for religious renewal or an Islamic Reformation that could rescue Muslims from the yoke of European colonialism and their tyrannical rulers. This ambiguous intellectual package of the Constitutional Revolution and the oddity of the union of the supporters of Western modernity and pan-Islamism led to the ideological tensions that later characterized this era. Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1854–1896) who was familiar with the works of Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Spencer and Darwin theorized about the man’s thirst for knowledge and progress, while

positing that religion was a pragmatic and useful instrument. Kermani mixed Malkom Khan's positivist reformism with Afghani's anti-imperialist ideology and created an ideology of "conscious nationalism rooted in the idealized narrative of the ancient Iranian past" (Amanat 2007, 428), which had a formative impact on the ideas of those intellectuals and classes that carried out the Constitutional Revolution. Kermani's brand of nationalism held the Arabo-Islamic influence as the major cause of Iran's backwardness and decline and called for casting aside this legacy to return to the Iranian culture and language's lost purity in order to rejuvenate the country. Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh (1812- 1878) shared Kermani's anti-Islamic sentiments, argued for the incompatibility of Islam with the requirements of the modern world and advocated a rationalistic view of civilization close to that of the ideas of the Deist French thinkers of the Enlightenment. Yusef Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh (1823-1895) was another key figure who tried to reconcile the modern legal code of the French Revolution with Islamic principles and offered a reading of Islamic theology and law that depicted it as compatible with the rule of law, limits on the state's authority and human/civil rights. Such a reading later inspired many intellectuals and laymen alike who could convince themselves that Islam already included the seeds of the ideas of constitutionalism and in this way could be reconciled with modern Western political ideals. As can be retrieved from the ideas discussed here, the themes of civilization and reform, a constitution, the rich heritage of Iran's pre-Islamic past versus the present decline and the critique of Islam and ulema as obstacles to modernization all originated in the ideas that later gave shape to the Constitutional Revolution. These intellectuals shared a belief in the values of constitutionalism, secularism and nationalism as indispensable to the establishment of a modern, strong and developed Iran (Abrahamian 1982, 62).

3.3.2. Constitutional Revolution

The ideas of these figures found an enthusiastic audience among the intellectuals of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century who led Iran's Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), which is the direct precursor to and intellectual forefather of the modernization agenda and reforms under Reza Shah and

his supporting elites. Therefore, an overview of the ideas that were espoused by the constitutionalists in the case of Iran is key here. The Constitutional Revolution has ever since remained a turning point in Iran's history since it marked the first serious move toward sociopolitical modernity in modern Iran. The Constitutional Revolution originated as a minor protest against unjust treatment of the people by the Qajar rulers and had the call for the establishment of justice by the state as its center-piece (Abrahamian 1982; Katouzian 2004). However, it later turned into a national movement that required nothing less than a constitution that provided people with representation in state affairs (i.e. a parliament) and propounded the power of the ruler to be partially rooted in people's will and consent. The constituency of the revolution included merchants (as the main starting force) and artisans, lower- and middle- ranking mullahs, the urban population especially in big cities and the Western-educated elite and later the great mujtaheds Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani and Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabai who saw the arbitrary Qajar rule as embodying the evils that had brought the country to its dire condition. In time, the Constitutional Revolution turned into a call for nationalism, rule of law, limiting state's power through a constitution, respecting people's rights and people's right to be represented in the state and it was argued by the elite that the country could reach these goals and be rescued from its dire situation only through adopting Western political models. However, as the revolution succeeded and the work on drafting a constitution started, the uneasy and problematic alliance between the Islamist and secularist supporters of the revolution reemerged. Such a potentially troublesome alliance that did not decisively tilt in favor of either side was the main issue behind the ambiguous legacy of the Constitutional Revolution. While it helped the state and society make a few steps toward Western modernization and secularization, its achievements remained highly limited. The constitutionalists' insistence that the new reforms in no way contradicted Islamic principles and their failure to define the relationship between religious and political spheres paralyzed the move toward state and society's secularization. Later Reza Shah had to deal with this legacy and try to sever the link between Islam and the state through his modernization project. Indeed, the new constitutional parliament imposed limits on the ulema's sphere of authority and

defined the boundaries of sharia (Amanat 2007, 423) as preliminary steps toward secularization of the state and society but still kept Twelver Shi'i Islam as the official religion of Iran and decided that a committee of five Mujtaheds would oversee all the laws passed by the parliament to ratify their compatibility with Sharia. In this sense, the secularization of state and society in the case of Iran's Constitutional Revolution could never proceed very far and Islam as a comprehensive social doctrine, and the theory of a secular modernity retained an uneasy co-existence as the two great mujtaheds and their followers and also lower and middle-ranking clergy composed a major bulk of the supporters of the revolution. Aside from this, the parliament tried but failed in the creation of a modern army and could not overhaul the country's finances or shed off the capitulations imposed by Russia and Britain while also being unable to establish a strong central state which was the main factor behind the failure of the constitutional revolution (Abrahamian 2008, 35). All these legacies later haunted Reza Shah and his supporting elites and their modernization project. Therefore, while the kingship and the clergy as the two pillars of ancient Iranian order were threatened, they kept a good portion of their power well into the end of the Constitutional Revolution.

Despite all its failures and the conspicuous paucity of serious political thinking and theorizing, the Constitutional Revolution had major impacts on the Iranian society and its trajectory of modernization. It gave rise to a palpable growth of the press and publications and their readership and brought about a flourishing of intellectual debate on themes such as liberty, equality and fraternity among others (Abrahamian 2008). It also caused the emergence of parliamentary factions and proto-political parties, introduced the idea of people's sovereignty and the right for representation, caused a sophistication in cultural, social and political discourses, highlighted the importance of reform and modernization to the state, economy and society's regeneration, highlighted the necessity of establishing nation-wide education and health, and gave women small windows of opportunity to ask for their rights and participation in society (Katouzian 2000; Amanat 2007). Moreover, the modernizing project of the state under Reza Shah was a direct legacy of the Constitutional Revolution. "State centralization; an integrated army; reforms in

finances, civil and penal codes, and modern public education” and the notions of “law and order” (Amanat 2007, 498) all grew out of the debates in the constitutional period and continued to shape the modernization aims of Reza Shah’s era. More accurately speaking, Reza Shah and his supporting elites were shaped by the experiences of the Constitutional Revolution and later adopted many of its non-political and some of its political aims. What they added to the mix was an emphasis on the construction of a strong central state as the integral part of the process of modernizing the country and as the only way to save it from internal disintegration and external threats to its sovereignty by the great imperial powers.

3.3.3. Modernization Efforts under Reza Shah

Reza Pahlavi rose to prominence on Iran’s political stage as a result of a coup d’état in 1921 and later assumed the title of the Shah in 1925 to start his own Pahlavi dynasty on the back of an ancient tradition of kingship in Iran. The coup d’état caused relief among the population more than anything else. The Constitutional Revolution and its aftermath and the first world war and the occupation of Iran by Britain and Russia had contributed to a melting pot of an inefficient and self-serving government, a population suffering from poverty and neglect and a general atmosphere of chaos. In such a situation, the elite and the masses of people would welcome anyone who could bring a semblance of law and order to the society. Indeed, the creation of a strong central state had remained the Achilles’ heel of the Constitutional Revolution and made any efforts at modernization and development evasive. In this context, Reza Khan a military man from the Cossack Brigade with considerable political savvy seemed to be the perfect match for the job in the eyes of many elite and laymen in Iran. His rise to power and its consolidation could not have occurred had it not been for the support he received from various social classes and elites. At the time, people and elites alike felt the need for a strong government that could create a unified modern army, modernize the country’s financial system and bring an end to disorder (Katouzian 2004). However, some social and political strata had a more highlighted role in supporting him and helping him consolidate his power. He had considerable support among the modern middle-class elite educated

in the West or influenced by Western ideas, the nationalists who held the ideals of the Constitutional Revolution in high regard, modernists who had ideas of radical and wholesale reform in mind, the socialists in the parliament and the army and the higher civil service. Regardless of his later efforts to curtail the power of the ulema, Reza Khan in the early years of his rise to prominence in domestic politics tried to gain the tacit approval of them by presenting himself as the defender of the faith by various means and this guaranteed his accession to the throne in 1925 as the ulema did not campaign against this move by him. It should be noted that there was neither great hostility nor enthusiasm for the new state among the public (Katouzian 2004, 23) but the influential social classes and groups and many members of the social and political elite including middle and upper-class intelligentsia, foreign-educated young people, merchants, landlords and provincial magnates unanimously supported him.

Reza Shah and his nationalist elite supporters carried on a modernization project that was in essence a continuation of the demands of the constitutional era (Cronin 2003a; Cronin 2007), with the major exception of undermining the role of parliament and popular representation. The authoritative, elitist, statist, secular and rapid program of modernization they performed aimed at lifting the country out of its backwardness and deliver it to a new age and condition of “civilization” in a big leap. While this multi-pronged project built on the ideals of the Constitutional Revolution, it was special in regards with its all-encompassing plan of state and social reforms as well as its establishment for the first time of a strong central state that could create a national identity rooted in Iran’s pre-Islamic history and the Persian language, the first traces of which appeared in the Constitutional period. Iran emerged as a modern nation-state during the reign of the Reza Shah with the name of the country being changed from “Persia” to “Iran” to denote a nation of the various ethnicities living in the territory and not that of the “Persians” only. It could strongly be argued that what gained Reza Shah much credit among the elites and some goodwill among the public was his successful bid at establishing peace and order in the county through a strong central government that was seen to be capable of modernizing the country (Katouzian 2004).

Modernizing the state was the prime objective in the modernization project run by Reza Shah and his supporting elites. Indeed, it could be argued that modernization and nation and state building went hand in hand in the case of Iran (Cronin 2007). As Reza Shah and his supporting elite understood it, this would in turn entail “the importation of the science and technology of the West as well as European principles of administration, education and economics” (Ghani 2001, 397). One of the first things he did was to announce national conscription in Iran in order to establish a modern standing army. Indeed, the needs of the army and to some extent those of his police force called the gendarmerie and the effort to create a unified, centralized and national army free of foreign influence remained Reza Shah’s priority all through his reign (Cronin 2003b). Prior to Reza Shah’s reign, the Qajar army had relied on tribal contingents as its main source of power with only a small modern arm called the Cossack Brigade. The measures taken by the Shah and his supporting elites helped him build an army that by 1941 had a mobilizable force of 400,000, an impressive figure at the time (Cronin 2003b, 45). The army also served as part of the nation-making project since all the conscripted soldiers had to learn and speak Persian while serving in the military (Abrahamian 2008). In the meantime, the civil bureaucracy was modernized and expanded and the country’s administration was centralized in the format of an official hierarchy controlled by the interior ministry (Cronin 2003a). In addition, Reza Shah, used his modern army to suppress the power of nomadic tribes, tribal khans and provincial magnates who had for a long time held considerable military power and conducted their business with foreign powers autonomously without regard for the central state. While the Qajar state had been a weak state whose real authority did not go far beyond the capital Tehran, the measures by Reza Shah and his supporting elites helped concentrate power in the hands of the central government and made it possible for the Iranian state to project its power to every corner of the territory for the first time in centuries. Reza Shah centralized power in the hands of the state and destroyed traditional leaders and groups. He also laid the foundations for a state that was actively engaged in shaping economy, society and culture. However, for all the efforts by him and his supporting elites to modernize Iran, he kept one of the traditional sources of power in

the history of Iranian politics intact, that of the kingship. This measure in turn undermined the success of his modernizing program.

Another important aspect of the modernization process carried out by the state was the launching of several initiatives to restructure the entire legal system and administration of laws along a secular path. The elites advising him saw this as an important tool through which to limit the power of the clergy and by doing so secularize the state and society. At the time of Reza Shah, clerical courts still existed with considerable power especially regarding marriage and family life. The Iranian Civil Code that resulted curtailed the power of clergy in various judicial matters and granted women better terms in marriage in addition to the training of non-clerical secular judges educated in Western legal doctrines, thus severing the clergy from the administration of laws to a great extent (Ghani 2001, 397). However, despite all these efforts, the Shi'ite faith remained the official religion of the country. A second goal of drafting the Civil Code was the termination of extra-territorial rights or capitulations that foreign nationals enjoyed in Iran. As the law was passed by the parliament in 1928, Reza Shah announced the abrogation of all capitulations enjoyed by foreign nationals in Iran. This measure made the Iranian state independent and sovereign over his territory and provided it with fresh revenues and the real power to take control of the domestic economy.

Various other measures were pursued by the state to modernize the country's economic, urban and road infrastructures. The fiscal and financial systems were modernized and centralized by the state and a restructuring of the tax system enabled the government to earn significantly higher revenues through taxing. The first National Bank of Iran was established in 1927 and became the sole entity to issue currency in the territory. The regaining of tariff control and several measures to protect the budding industries also contributed to balancing the government's budget. Establishing a ministry of health, construction of hospitals and campaigns such as the ones against small pox and malaria improved the citizens' standards of living. The establishment of the trans-Iranian railway by the state was viewed by the public as an assertion of independence, the move from backwardness to development and a way to reassert Iran's lost confidence while serving as the most visible symbol of the

state's industrial policy. Several programs aimed at urban development, constructing road and transport facilities, building telegraph, telephone and radio broadcasting networks helped the economy develop and the country's landscape be changed from a predominantly rural one to one with major modern urban population centers.

Reforming, secularizing and modernizing the education system was a further aspect of the modernization project undertaken by the Iranian state. Education which had previously been monopolized by the clergy was made secular and modern curricula were drafted for schools. The educational reforms under Reza Shah and his nationalist supporting elite were designed to uproot the traditional customs and patterns of the Iranian society (Matthee 2003). They inherited an underdeveloped educational system that was mostly organized by private entities and was in no way available to the population at large. As part of the same package, a uniform and standardized school system was established in 1923, which made Persian the exclusive language in the school system in order to promote centralization and the creation of a homogenous national identity. Education was made mandatory for children aged six to thirteen years old and a second cycle constituting six years of secondary education based on French curriculum was introduced. As a result, the number of students enrolled in elementary education increased from about 43,000 in 1925 to almost 170,000 in 1941 (Ibid). The number of elementary schools quadrupled between 1925 and 1939 while the number of secondary schools increased six-fold (Ghani 2001, 399). However, most of the new schools were established in urban centers and rural areas were mostly neglected. Meanwhile, girls found better opportunities for education as their enrolment increased tenfold and they enjoyed the same educational opportunities as their male counterparts. There was also a concentrated effort to curb the influence of the ulema and religious education in order to promote secular values. In this vein, measures were taken to limit the number of students enrolled in religiously controlled schools and to bring their curricula under state control to replace traditional religious teaching with secular values such as patriotism and citizenship (Matthee 2003, 138). As other modernizing measures in education, sending of students to Europe for education was pursued with greater vigor, various teacher's colleges and several technical and vocational schools

were established, a nation-wide general literacy campaign started in the late 1930s in addition to the inauguration of University of Tehran in 1935 as Iran's first university. All these various educational reform measures also had political goals including central control and conformity, national unity and the creation of a national identity based on an elitist version that could create a homogenized modern and secular society.

Secularizing the society and creating modern secular citizens through reforms was another aspect of the modernization project pursued by the Iranian state. The more effective part of the secularization drive was the drafting of the Civil Code and secularizing of the legal system and also the concentrated attacks on the clergy through state-aligned public communication channels such as newspapers and journals that to a considerable extent reduced the power of the ulema in society. Indeed, in the same vein, the theology college in Tehran University was charged with examining candidates to determine who could teach religion and wear clerical clothes (Abrahamian 2008, 85). Indeed, the secular state for the first time determined who was a member of the ulema and thus, to some extent undermined the religious establishment's autonomy and made it subservient to its own power. However, it should be noted that Reza Shah's aim was more to bring the propagation of Islam under state supervision (Ibid) than to undermine religion with secular thought. The other less successful part of the secularization program and attack on the religious community included mandatory changes to men's and women's garments. The state first forcefully enacted a change of men's traditional hats to the European bowler hats and from traditional clothes to Western-style trousers and coat and then banned the wearing of veil for women and held compulsory district parties to which men had to bring their wives who were ordered to appear without the veil. These measures were designed to promote national identity and homogeneity in society together with secularization and the sidelining of religious symbols and customs. The measures such as the banning of veil and allowing women to participate in the public space and talk with members of the opposite sex on the street without the need for accompanying their husbands, fathers or brothers gave women some opportunity for participation and an aspiration to gain equality with men. However, aside from the

modern middle and upper-class women, these measures remained very limited in their effect and the majority of women were unable or unwilling to utilize these new opportunities due to the preeminence of traditional and religious customs in society. As a result, as soon as Reza Shah abdicated, many women who had formerly been forced to adopt the new state's orders reverted back to their old ways and many of those forced to take off their chadors put them back on. In a similar vein, participation by women in education, economy and public life remained limited to those of the upper and middle classes in cities. These measures gave rise to strong resentment in the public and never took much root in society as the state preferred coercion to persuasion (Katouzian 2003, 31). In addition, such secularizing measures remained superficial as they forced the population to look like Westerners while did little in the way of changing their style of thinking. The state also created cultural organizations such as Farhangestan (Cultural Academy), which was modeled on the French Academy, Department of Public Guidance, the National Heritage Society, the journal *Iran-e Bastan* (Ancient Iran) as well as two main government-subsidized papers *Ettela'at* and *Journal de Tehran* with the aim of creating greater national awareness in the public (Ibid). All these organizations and papers waged a concentrated campaign to glorify ancient pre-Islamic Iran and purify the Persian language from foreign words. These two precepts rooted in the Constitutional Revolution worked as the pillars of the statist ideology of a national identity. The state also performed other secularizing acts such as limiting the clerics' control over endowment (vaqf) properties, using solar instead of lunar calendar months, and declaring divorce and marriage to be civil affairs (Borujerdi 2003). These secularizing measures aim to reduce the power of the ulema. However, at the end of the day, the character of Iranian secularism remained partial and incremental as the clergy could retain considerable influence over the population and remain financially independent of the state and as the country's official religion in the constitution remained the Shia faith.

The project of establishing a strong central state and the modernization and secularization drive were received differently among the different public strata. While the middle and upper classes upholding the nationalist and modernizing values

of the Constitutional Revolution hailed it, the majority of the population showed relief, apathy and at times active resistance to certain components of the program. Restoration of peace, order and stability was widely welcomed, however, the regime's recourse to radical reforms such as the change of the men's dress code and the banning of veil provoked resentment and active resistance (Cronin 2007). Such authoritarian measures at reform in a rapid way worsened the lot of the non-metropolitan and non-elite groups and increased the already wide gulf between the elite and the other members of the population (Ibid, 73). The major opposition to the new regime was organized by members of the traditional power-holding classes, including middle-ranking ulema and their affiliated guilds in urban centers and junior tribal khans and aghas in the countryside (Ibid, 72). Also, members of the young generation of intelligentsia who had not lived through the years of trouble during the Constitutional Revolution and transition from Qajar rule to Reza Shah and who were influenced by the left while studying in France and Germany in the 1930s were among the opponents of the regime. They viewed the Shah as a despot who was supported and trained by the Russians and the British and prioritized his own interests over those of the nation. Some also found his use of history to be racist and designed to keep them quiet. However, they could not gather a social base or create major popular opposition to the regime.

There were several main sources of discontent felt by the masses toward the state's modernizing program. One of the most contentious ones was the conscription program that took away many rural and some urban families' manpower. In addition, the army officers in charge of these practices were mostly corrupt and harassed the public. The marginalization of provincial towns at the expense of the capital Tehran also aroused much discontent since it put the burden of taxation mainly on the provinces and took away the local magnates' power and influence. Yet another source of opposition was generated by the government's interference with the seventh parliament's elections where the Shah and his men engineered the election and in effect did not let any opposition figure to sit in the new parliament. The clergy, especially the middle and lower-ranking ones, were infuriated at the secularizing of the laws and the introduction of bowler hats for men and banning of

veil for women and in effect the severe blows to their power, but they could in no way roll back the reforms or put up a serious challenge to the state. The nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes in rural areas made up another source of opposition to the state as they resisted the increasing power of the central state and its efforts at their disarmament and conscription, forced settlement, taxation and the new dress code which aimed at breaking their power and autonomy.

Despite the huge efforts put into modernizing and reforming the Iranian state and society, the success and effectiveness of the program remained limited. Reza Shah and his supporting nationalist elite never made a serious effort to convince the masses to join in the program and instead chose to impose their orders on society and this authoritative, commandist way of reforms was the main force undermining its success. This in turn meant that the modernizing agenda never took real root in society and was merely a superficial one limited to changing men's and women's appearance. Another reason had to do with Reza Khan's choice to keep the ancient tradition of kingship which in turn meant a continuation of one of the main pillars of traditional politics in Iran. Reza Shah's disregard for democracy, parliament and representation as the liberal ideals of the Constitutional Revolution and the concentration of power in the person of the king avoided the emergence of a significant political party or class of capable politicians who would vigorously carry out the modernizing agenda throughout his reign and afterward. In his time, the parliament, a center-piece of the Constitutional Revolution, ceased to be a significant political institution and became a rubber stamp for the Shah's decrees. Reza Shah's reign started in 1925 and ended in 1941 when he was forced to abdicate by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. Indeed, his rule turned from being autocratic in the first stage of his reign covering 1925- early 1930s to fully arbitrary in its second stage starting in the early 1930s until his abdication in 1941. In this second stage, he eliminated the popular constitutionalists and then even the capable politicians loyal to him such as Ali Akbar Davar (1885- 1937), Abdolhossein Teymourash (1881-1933) and Firouz Mirza (1885-1938) (Katouzian 2004; Ghani 2001), who had served as Western-educated enlightened forces behind the state's modernization efforts. This in turn undermined the modernizing power of the state and further made its

legitimacy dubious among the nationalist elite that served as its main constituency. The state also alienated the social classes and lost whatever little legitimacy it enjoyed among them as it resorted to a fully arbitrary style of ruling in the early 1930s. Private property and especially land were weakened, the state's monopoly of trade in important commodities such as wheat angered the landlords and peasants and the merchants suffered because of the state's increasing economic interventionism (Katouzian 2004 in; Boroujerdi 2003). Through these practices, the nation/society was fully alienated from the state in the latter phase of Reza Shah's reign. It also resulted in a lack of intellectual vitality as the state's monological discourse, its harsh repression and censorship against critics and the press, its heavy reliance on propaganda dimmed the prospects of a flourishing of serious intellectual debates (Boroujerdi 2003).

3.4. The History and Narrative of Modernization and Development:

Turkey

3.4.1. Emergence of the Ideas of Reform and Modernization

The history of modernization and development in the case of modern Turkey and its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire starts with a familiar theme: the necessity of introducing reforms in the face of disastrous military defeats. In an interesting similarity with the Iranian case, the seeds of the reform and modernization were planted in the aftermath of military defeats against Russia. The late seventeenth century defeats at the hand of Russian armies during 1672-1725 forced the Ottomans to adopt modernizing reforms as a mechanism for survival. This drive at reform took an uninterrupted but at times contested momentum from the end of the eighteenth century (Fernée 2012, 77). The reforms introduced under Sultan Selim III during the late 18th and early 19th centuries were aimed at helping Ottoman Empire increase the strength of the central state administration and organization against both internal and external enemies (Zürcher 1993). The reforms introduced under Selim III focused largely on the reorganization of the army along European lines. As a result of the initiative, the new army got close to 30,000 men in 1807 by the end of Selim's reign

and it was relatively well-equipped and trained by the standards of the day (Ibid) and in addition, the navy was fully reorganized. However, more important were the increased opportunities under Selim III for communication with Europe and the flow of Western ideas into the Ottoman Empire. Various European instructors, mainly French ones, were brought in to help found or reform parts of the army corps and in time their Ottoman students who had learned French started to discuss new kinds of ideas with their foreign teachers. In addition, these teachers regularly socialized with members of the Ottoman ruling class which provided occasions for discussions of European ideas that were new to Ottomans. However, Selim III's reforms did not go very far as a coalition of ulema and traditional army officers of the Janissaries deposed him.

3.4.2. Tanzimat Era

The effort at modernization received a fresh impetus with the emergence of the Tanzimat Era spanning 1839-1878. The era that began with the reform edict of Gülhane which promised guarantees for the life, honor and property of the subjects, modernizing the taxation system, introducing conscription for the army and equality before the law of all subjects regardless of their religion gave the Ottoman drive for reform new energy and transferred the center of power from the palace to the Sublime Porte or the bureaucracy (Zürcher 1993, 44). The men behind the reforms who were mostly western-educated bureaucrats believed that the only way to save the Ottoman Empire was to introduce European-style reforms. The main points of reforms included the army, the central bureaucracy, the provincial administration, taxation, education and communication with emphasis on judicial reform and consultative procedures (Ibid, 51). As a result, conscription was introduced in most areas of the empire, the army was expanded and the military equipment were modernized, rationalization and specialization were introduced to the bureaucracy, consultative assemblies and commissions were developed, the taxation system was reorganized and made more efficient especially at the provincial level with tax farming being replaced with direct collection of taxes through officials appointed by the central government, the sharia's scope was limited to family law, secularization

of education was pursued with the creation of new professional training colleges for the army and bureaucracy and a three-tier system of secular education modelled on the French lycées were introduced. However, the Tanzimat reforms came to a halt by the mid-1870s which corresponded with the last years of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign and the occurrence of internal, financial and diplomatic crises.

3.4.3. Young Ottomans

The Young Ottomans refers to a group of Turkish intellectuals who rose to prominence in the late Tanzimat era years spanning 1867-1878. The group included figures such as İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, Ziya Pasha, and Agah Efendi who felt dissatisfied with the Tanzimat reforms which they viewed as insufficient for modernizing the state. Their ideas later culminated in Sultan Abdul Hamid II's reluctant promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 which ushered in the first constitutional era in the Ottoman Empire. However, their success on the ground remained limited as Abdul Hamid II suspended the constitution and the parliament born out of it in 1878 and returned to governing as an absolute monarch.

The Young Ottomans had a vision of transforming the Ottoman state along the European tradition of introducing a constitutional government in order to save the empire from disintegration (Keyman and Yilmaz 2006). Many of the ideas of modernization pursued later by the Young Turks and the Kemalists are rooted in the propositions put forth by the Young Ottomans (Mardin 2000), therefore, taking account of their views is of focal importance. Of special importance is their introduction of the ideas of the Enlightenment and the theorizing of a working synthesis between these ideas and the Islam for the first time (Ibid), in addition to opposing superwesternization and the destruction of domestic culture (Hanioglu 1995) and introducing the Ottoman society to the latest political ideas of Europe. They indigenized Western constitutionalism through inventing a constitutional tradition for Islam (Sohrabi 2020), however, the success of their effort to fuse the secular Enlightenment ideals and tenets of Islam remained limited but left a significant legacy for the Young Turks later. As the first ideologues of the Ottoman

Empire, they used their newspapers to attack what they saw as the corruption and inefficiency of the bureaucrats of Sublime Porte. However, it should be noted that the main concern behind their theories was to save the Ottoman state since they all cherished the ideology of loyalty to the Ottoman state (Ibid, 398). The novel points in their thought included a heightened appreciation of the material aspect of Europe's development and the material element in social and political problems. As a result, they emphasized an activist attitude that highlighted rationality and active control over man's fate and that would bring about change which helped modernize the state and society. The emphasis on rational activism was the element of their thought that was closest to the ideas of European modernization.

3.4.4. Young Turks

The Young Turks constituted a group of western-educated intellectuals, lower-ranking bureaucrats and army officers whose thoughts and activities in the period spanning 1889-1908 culminated in the rebellion by the Committee of Union and Progress inspired by Young Turks' thoughts against the absolute rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the start of the Second Constitutional era in the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks movement originated in the Royal Medical Academy that had long been a center for scientific, materialist and anti-religious ideas with Abdullah Cevdet as its head. The most prominent figures usually categorized as Young Turks include Tunalı Hilmi, Yusuf Akçura, Abdullah Cevdet, Ziya Gökalp, Mehmet Cavit Bey, Talat Pasha and Ahmed Riza among others. The Young Turks who emerged as the superwesternized Ottoman elite in the late nineteenth century represented the modernist and radical wing of Ottoman intelligentsia and bureaucracy and emphasized the importance of westernization as an instrument of change (Hanioglu 1995). Ottomans' disastrous defeats in wars with the Western powers and the revolutions in Europe, starting with the French Revolution of 1789 exposed them to the new western political ideas. The Young Turks found these new ideas and the Western culture superior to the ways and mores of their traditional society and saw the adoption of western systems as the only way for the Ottoman Empire to survive the internal and external headwinds it faced. The super-

westernization in Istanbul, the Young Turks' belief that their empire's destiny lay with Europe and the ulema's failure in producing a concentrated anti-Western ideology all helped the intellectual transformation of the Ottoman intelligentsia in their encounter with the West (Ibid, 10).

The Young Turks' embrace of western social, cultural and political values caused enormous changes in their ideas. While politics played a very minor role in their grandiose agenda (Hanioglu 1995, 208), they theorized a lot about society and culture. For one thing, they came to the view that what had caused Western powers' superiority vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire was science (Ibid, 12). To Young Turks, modern science came to acquire an authority and transcendent meaning previously reserved for religion and analysis of topics using a scientific viewpoint became the order of the day. It should be noted that their vision of science was one that was biological-materialist and Darwinist. In a similar vein, effective administration of the empire was reexamined along scientific lines and it was argued that public administration was to be managed by men of science. The discussions on the conflict between science and religion became common where science was depicted as the authority destined to replace religion and the one that ensured better guidance for human kind and according to which every aspect of life should and would be regulated. A second point highlighted by the Young Turks was that of progress. They had a new conception of progress in mind along the lines proposed by Turgot and Condorcet (Ibid). In line with their biological-materialist view of science, they had a materialistic meaning of progress in mind. Voltaire and Rousseau received special attention, and the former's views on religion and the latter's credit as an antithetical thinker were held in high esteem. In summary, science and progress were the two main pillars of the Young Turks' ideology.

The Young Turks did not constitute a homogeneous group of thinkers. Indeed, within their camp a major division emerged. The ones in the moderate group opposed wholesale westernization and destruction of local culture and promoted the development of a single-minded westernization policy that called for the development of whatever technology needed to defeat the west and no more than that. However, the more radical modernist group denounced any efforts to use Islam

as a modernizing tool or a reconciliation between Islam and western civilization and called for a wholesale adoption of western culture and ways of life. The members of this latter group believed in positivism and a positivist philosophy based on science and rationality and rendered all traditional philosophies and domestic culture old-fashioned and unresponsive to the problems of the day. All these meant that modernization was an important pillar of the new materialist intelligentsia's ideology and was depicted by them as a scientific necessity (Ibid, 16). Most of the Young Turks were low-ranking bureaucrats and students of royal colleges but viewed their ideology as one that galvanized all pro-modernists regardless of their ideology. Representing the modernist wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy, they saw themselves as the natural heirs of the Ottoman modernization movement. Thus, they praised previous reform movements such as the Tanzimat and the Young Ottomans and called in their periodicals on the Ottoman state to adopt Western institutions and civilization with all its aspects. As Abdullah Cevdet said "There is only one civilization, and that is European civilization. Therefore, we must borrow western civilization with both its rose and its thorn." (cited in Hanioglu 1995).

The Young Turks and the members of the Committee of Union and Progress influenced by them were influenced by the scientific and materialist theories of their time to a great extent. The French Revolution which had exposed the ethnicities within the Ottoman Empire to the idea of nationalism (Ahmad 1993, 24), limiting the power of the sovereign and other ideas held an exemplary status in the minds of the Young Turks and of great influence to the Young Turks' and CUP members' thoughts were the ideas of Francois-Vincent Raspail, Claude Bernard, Ludwig Büchner, Gustave Le Bon and Charles Letourneau (Hanioglu 1995). The major themes of these thinkers' works as adopted by the Young Turks and the ones developed by the Young Turks themselves were an opposition to religion as a major obstacle to human progress, underscoring the materialist foundations of life with a strong focus on science, the theory of social Darwinism as a way to understand social reality, the "scientific" theories of race that described the evolution of various subjects within different races, a great faith in the power of education to promote the objective scientific truth and elevate the people, an implicit belief in the role of the

state as the prime mover in society and a belief in the value of being young (Hanioglu 1995; Zürcher 1993). They believed that these materialist, scientific ideas provided them with a tool to transform their antiquated society. The Young Turks viewed history and the progress of mankind as a constant war between science and religion and therefore a commitment to a battle against religion and an employment of social Darwinism to social problems were the two important pillars of their ideology. Of equal importance was Le Bon's elitist psychological theory that dismissed the masses as intellectually inferior to the intellectuals and claimed superiority for the intellectuals with Abdullah Cevdet's highlighting of the value of an "intellectual aristocracy". The Young Turks saw their task as the creation of an elite that would and could guide the masses through the imposition of their ideas on them.

In addition to their social and cultural ideas, the Young Turks promoted specific ideas in regards with administration system, bureaucracy and army. Under Abdul Hamid II, the new class of western-educated bureaucrats and trained army officers were placed under the control of loyal, old-fashioned and unschooled bureaucrats and army officers. Looking up to the rational Tanzimat bureaucracy, the Young Turks argued that the Sultan's neo-patrimonial bureaucracy and army had to be replaced by a modern one organized based on rational and scientific methods. The Young Turks who had mostly emerged as a result of Sultan Abdul Hamid II's promotion of western technology and education, felt unable to rise within the bureaucratic ranks due to the Sultan's neo-patrimonial regime and his request for absolute loyalty to himself as a means of promotion within the bureaucracy. To them, the system had to be reorganized to promote loyalty to the fatherland or the state and not the person of the Sultan. They envisioned a society grounded on the laws of science and based on relations between superiors and inferiors (Hanioglu 1995, 204), arguing that unity among the Ottomans was among their primary goals with an emphasis on proper duties and responsibilities for each member in a society of united people. In this same vein, in 1909, for the first time, a new military service law imposed a duty on all male Ottomans to serve in the army regardless of their religion or ethnicity (Zürcher 1993, 97).

The culmination of the ideas of the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress was the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution and the recalling of the parliament, both suspended by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. However, the restoration of the constitution did not mean the emergence of a representative government based on popular choice. The original framers of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876 and the Young Turks that helped restore it envisaged it not as a means to introduce popular representation but as a way to reform the government bureaucracy and administration along their ideal rational and scientific lines and as a means to limit the power of the sultan and viewed a constitutional regime as one that made possible the building of the most sophisticated, advanced and scientific civil systems across Europe as the basis for the modern bureaucracy needed to save the Ottoman state (Hanioglu 1995, 28). The Young Turks also saw the constitution as a romantic symbol of western modernity and a mechanism for preventing Great Powers' intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman state, however, in line with their elitist ideology that viewed the masses as despicable, popular representative government as a part of constitutionalism meant little to them (Ibid) since they saw such a popular assembly as a hazardous gathering of inferior and irrational crowds.

3.4.5. Modernization Efforts Under Atatürk and the Single-Party Era

The modern Turkish Republic that emerged following the Turkish War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was the successor to the Ottoman Empire that had ruled over a vast territory consisting of several minorities. The traumatic events of World War I and its aftermath caused the disintegration of the empire and its provinces, leaving the new territory and composition of the population under the modern Turkish Republic to be starkly different with its predecessor. The republic that emerged was still a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual one with a large majority of Turks and significant minorities of Kurds and Arabs but was far less multi-ethnic than the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher 2007, 96). As a result of World War I, Turkish War of Independence and their aftermath, the large Christian communities had left and 98 percent of the population of 13 million at the start of the

republic were Muslim (Ibid). Therefore, the Turks who had thought of themselves as the Muslim subjects of an Islamic empire, had now to start imagining themselves as “Turks”. The country had also lost the majority of its professionals who had been part of the Christian and Greek minorities. However, the new republic inherited a significant and rich institutional legacy from the late Ottoman Empire. For one thing, the cultural and administrative center of the empire, and a considerable portion of its army, administrative and civil bureaucracy and of the people with political experience were left for the new republic, and this helped the new state project its power into every corner of the new republic in due course. Also, the new republic inherited the regular ministry of finance and the administration of the Ottoman public debt which eased the new state’s lot in the field of finance and economy to a large extent. Moreover, the leaders of the new republic who had made their careers in the service of the Ottoman State composed mostly of military officers and to some extent bureaucrats and were products of the “modern educational establishments of the empire” (Ibid, 102). These men had played a role in the politics of the second constitutional period and were former members or affiliated with the Committee of Union and Progress. For another thing, the new state inherited the most prominent colleges of the empire which trained army officers and capable bureaucrats such as the Civil Service Academy and the military academy.

It was in this context that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his supporting elites gave shape to their simultaneous efforts at nation-building and modernization. The support for the national movement during the years of the Turkish War of Independence had come mostly from provincial notables and clericals, landlords, some representatives of the professions, the bureaucracy, and army officers (Ahmad 1993). The Kemalists who gradually and tactfully emerged as the dominant faction among the various ones which had taken part in the Turkish War of Independence took the radical “Westernizers” of the Young Turks movement as their guiding principle, trying to make their society both “modern” and “civilized” which for them referred solely to their contemporary Western civilization (Zürcher 2007, 96). The new constitution drafted by the National Assembly in the new regime emphasized unrestricted popular sovereignty vested in the nation and promulgated a radical idea

of republicanism in line with that of the French Revolution (Ibid). However, the Kemalists made some radical choices to help shape the new republic's and its citizens' identities. For one thing, they decided that the European civilization was not divisible and it had to be adopted fully, with no attempt to harmonize it with Turkish culture. In this sense, both the high culture and the popular culture had to be westernized. Another main component of their ideology was a heightened emphasis on secularism with a concentrated attempt to destruct any power that religion or the clergy may have over state or society matters. While the abolition of the caliphate was the most visible step in this regard, unifying the education system and the introduction of a European-style family law were other measures that gave the state a monopoly over these fields in which the religious community had previously exercised considerable power. The issue of national identity was the most significant area for the Kemalists and they tried to create a Turkish nationalism based on a shared territory, Turkish language, culture and ideals with some emphasis on race as well (Zürcher 2007, 108). In the Kemalist version, the role of classes and class struggle were firmly rejected with an emphasis on the idea of 'populism' (*halkçılık*) or national solidarity, cohesion and unity and a homogeneous and united nation. The creation of a modern political party under the name of the Republican People's Party (CHP) was one of the other choices made by the Kemalists. The new party was introduced as a means of indoctrination and mobilization especially through its educational arm named People's Houses.

The ideological package that the Kemalists adopted included various ideals, most of which were taken from the Young Turks. The Young Turk ideals of scientism, materialism, social Darwinism and an emphasis on the value of being young together with "a state-centered view, a strong educational streak, elitism and distrust of the masses, activism...a belief in progress" (Ibid, 109; Sohrabi 2020,6) were among the most prominent parts of their ideology. They felt a devotion to the idea of change and were impatient regarding tradition which they saw as a huge barrier to social progress.

The authoritative, elitist, statist, secular and rapid program of modernization initiated by Atatürk and his supporting elites aimed at transforming Turkey into a

modern nation-state in a big leap. They believed that bringing about social and economic revolution was the purpose of political power. Such a nation-state was to be built based on secular and rational ideals with science and modern education serving as the means of creating a modern industrial economy (Ahmad 1993). They pursued their radical reforms through adopting a state that assumed full responsibility for social and economic development and the CHP which tried to win the people's allegiance to the new Kemalist ideology of progress produced and promoted by it. This ideology consisted of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolutionism. The new regime performed its project of modernization utilizing this ideological package.

The first element of the Kemalist modernization program was the creation of a Turkish national identity in a society in which such a notion was totally non-existent. This new national Turkish identity was created based on pride in the history and traditions of Anatolia, both of which the Kemalists claimed to have rediscovered (Ahmad 1993). There was also a heavy stress on the concept of linguistic community and cultural cohesion as factors for national unity as discussed in the works of Ziya Gökalp (Dumont 1984). In the same vein, there was a yearning for a hypothetical ancestral Turkish homeland called Turan, from which the Turkish nation was argued to have originated. The new nationalism based on a liberal definition of the nation bypassed the religious, ethnic and racial issues that had served as the basis of nation and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire (Ibid). This new Turkishness was also defined with an emphasis on secularism that set it apart from the rest of the Islamic world.

Another important aspect of the Kemalist modernization project was an intensive secularization drive aimed at uprooting the Islamic traditions and customs of the society to prepare the citizens for joining the modern European civilizations. In this regard, the Kemalists simply continued significant secularization measures undertaken by the Young Turks. The Young Turks had already removed şeyhülislam, the highest religious dignitary from the cabinet, the Sharia courts had been subjected to the control of the secular ministry of justice, the religious colleges (Madrasses) brought under the Ministry of Education, a new Ministry of Religious

Foundations had been created and put in charge of evkaf previously controlled by the ulema and the curriculum of higher madresses modernized and even the study of foreign languages made compulsory (Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 1993). The abolition of the caliphate was the most visible measure of a move toward secularization but by no means the only one. Pursuing the secularization of laws and the judicial system carried out under Young Turks was an important component of the secularization initiative. The Kemalist state omitted Islam as the official religion of the country from the new constitution and adopted the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code and a Commercial Code based on the German and Italian ones (Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 1993). This measure meant the last blows to the remaining vestiges of the authority of religion in issues such as marriage and family law. As another secularizing measure, in 1925 the state ordered all male Turks to abandon the traditional fez. The fez had for long embodied Muslim allegiance and community and its replacement with a European hat with a brim was designed to remove the symbols of Muslim identity and community from society. As other secularizing measures, Dervish orders were closed down and Gregorian calendar and international clock were introduced, in addition to changing the weekend from the Islamic one of Friday to Sunday, abolishing the separate religious schools and colleges and the special Sharia courts. Regardless of all the changes, the gulf between the elite and the mass of population remained wide with the westernized, secular culture of the elite contrasting with the indigenous culture of the masses associated with Islam (Ahmad 1993, 92).

Changing the Arabic script with Latin in the writing of Turkish was perhaps the most radical change in the way of secularizing the society and severing its links in one single stroke with its past Ottoman and Muslim identity. The change in the script had also another goal behind it. According to Yunus Nadi, who was among the most prominent publicists of the ideas of the new regime, the “script revolution” was meant to unite Turkey with Europe in reality and materially” (cited in Ahmad 1993, 82). This in turn meant a loosening of Turkey’s ties with the Islamic world to its east and forced the country to turn westward for ideas. Through this measure and the establishment of Village Institutes (1940), the early Republican elites also had the

aim of accelerating the process of literacy and education in the country which they achieved to a considerable extent.

Another important aspect of the modernization project had to do with the status of women and their participation in society. The Kemalists did not try to revolutionize the status of women fearing a major upheaval but tried to promote equal rights for women. However, they tried to introduce and promote the notion of the “liberated” modern women who could participate in society on par with their male counterparts. They did this through various measures with one being the beauty contests called Miss Turkey that tried to project the image of the modern, liberated, European-style woman as a symbol of the new republic. Moreover, more opportunities were provided to urban women to join the professions and pursue an active social life as teachers, lawyers and judges among others. Authorizing women to participate in the municipal elections of 1930 and granting them the right to run for office in 1934 further improved the lot of women. These measures helped a rapid improvement in the social and political status of Turkish women. However, they remained mainly limited to cities and rural women were not affected by them deeply.

Modernizing the economy and promoting industrialization composed another wing of the Kemalist modernization initiative. They emphasized economy as the basis of the modern state and vital to the success of the new regime and viewed a strong, balanced and independent industrial economy as vital for Turkey to achieve the goal of civilization (Ahmad 1993, 93). While at first the state limited its efforts to encouraging industry through passing new laws and introducing initiatives for private sector, it later changed gear toward statism and brought the economy and especially foreign trade under state control. Adopting statism meant that the state became the main actor in production and investment, providing help and subsidies to the private sector to grow and for a bourgeoisie class to emerge while carrying out economic ventures in cases that the private sector was too weak in addition to distributing projects across Anatolia in hope of closing the gap between the developed north-west and the underdeveloped provinces of Anatolia (Ibid). Although an infrastructure was laid and the process of industrialization was set in motion, the progress remained limited and Turkey still had a long way to go to possess an

advanced industrialized economy. Moreover, the almost complete neglect of agriculture and its potential made the program's achievements limited (Lewis 1961, 288).

The establishment of a modern political party under the name of the Republican People's Party (CHP) was another important aspect of modernization carried out by the Kemalist regime. The end of the Turkish War of Independence and the rich institutional legacy left to the new republic from the Ottoman era, gave the Kemalists many of the necessary institutions for running a state. Therefore, as they succeeded in consolidating their power and made their desired changes to the structure of the state, they launched the CHP which served as the instrument for institutionalizing the new republican regime in Turkey (Zürcher 2004). This was an example of creating a new institution which later came to have a significant role in helping the modernization project to be continue and sustained. Though the party was dominated by Atatürk and had limited powers in many respects, it helped prepare the modern Turkish Republic for the transition to the multi-party system that was to happen later. The party started to assume higher importance in the 1930s and played a more active role in the fields of education and propaganda by trying to monopolize cultural and social life in the service of making the masses aware of the Kemalist modernization program (Ibid, 110). The creation of the People's Houses as an off-shoot of the party was meant to extend the party's ideological reach to all the strata of the society, create social unity through the spread of the official party culture and ideals and also raise the level of education to prepare the masses to become modern (Ibid). However, the success of the People's Houses in encouraging a European lifestyle and culture among the various social strata remained limited and more than anything they became a meeting place for intellectuals, bureaucrats, professionals and teachers and "The People's Houses' greatest success was probably in helping to build a dedicated middle class cadre for the Kemalists in the towns, rather than in gaining mass support for the reforms" (Ibid, 107) and as instruments of mobilization and control for the party. The party also started a drive to eliminate all types of civil society organizations that were not linked to the party and had the potential for promoting opposing ideologies. Although created as an instrument of

control and propaganda to a large extent, the party provided a platform for capable politicians of the post-war multiparty democracy to gain experience and learn the subtleties of politics (Sohrabi 2020). Moreover, it gave a corporate identity to a section of the urban middle class that viewed itself “as the ‘enlightened’ vanguard of a social and cultural revolution” (Ibid, 111).

3.5. Modernization Paths and Efforts: Iran and Turkey in Comparison

The modernization of Iran and Turkey carried out as examples of alternative modernity under Reza Shah and Atatürk and their supporting elites in the period 1920s- 1940s followed paths that were at times convergent and at others divergent. Taking stock of the commonalities and differences helps shed light on the specific trajectory of modernization in each country and its successes and failures and provides us with independent variables and hypotheses to explain why their paths diverged.

3.5.1. Similarities

There are several points of similarity between the two cases that are worth mentioning here. First, the modernization projects in these two countries revolved around the dominant figures of the leaders, namely Reza Shah and Atatürk as the title of many of the scholarly works specific to each country and also the comparative ones show (For instance Özbudun and Kazancıgil 1981; Landau 1984; Ghani 2001; Atabaki 2007). Also the modernization drive in both countries took place in roughly the same period of time corresponding to 1920s-1940s. These men who were both hailed from the military and had an elitist understanding of society and change gave shape to the tenets of the modernization projects in their respective countries. As decisive leaders, they saw a wholesale adoption of Western values as the path that could save their countries from decline and help them reach civilization. These leaders’ emphasis on secularization and their efforts to destroy the power of the clergy in their respective societies is another point of similarity between the two. However, they remained utterly different in one aspect: while Reza Shah chose kingship and saw loyalty to himself as a must for the elites working beside him,

Atatürk chose to be the president of the republic, set up a party and put less emphasis on loyalty to himself than loyalty to the republic's ideals. Another point of similarity was the two leaders' struggles to end foreign interference in the dealings of their countries as they believed that without the abolition of the unequal trade terms and/or capitulations imposed on their countries, no robust state or economy would be possible (Zürcher 2007). While Turkey had abolished capitulations under CUP government in 1914 (Zürcher 1993, 120), Atatürk and his allies had to lead Turkey through a long and difficult war of independence and its aftermath to end foreign influence and establish Turkey's sovereignty. Meanwhile, Reza Shah had to fight for abolishing the capitulations which was finally materialized in 1927 and he also worked hard to keep Britain and Russia at bay.

Another point of similarity between the two cases is that both the Iranian and Turkish leaders and elites virtually used the ideological package of the constitutional revolutions that had happened before them. In the case of Iran, Reza Shah and his supporting elites continued the legacy of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) (Abrahamian 2008; Ghani 2001; Katouzian 2000; Sohrabi 2020) with its emphases on nationalism, modernization, secularization, rule of law, constitutional government and popular representation among others, with the last two being undermined in the process. As for Turkey, the ideas of the Young Turks and the second constitutional period (Dumont 1984; Hanioglu 1995; Zürcher 1993) that emphasized modernization, secularization, scientism, a materialist understanding of progress, social Darwinism, constitutionalism, elitism and others were adopted fully by the Kemalists with a more hawkish version of secularism that severed any links between Islam and society being practiced. In this sense, the modernizing efforts of the leaders of Iran and Turkey and their supporting elites, while being radical were limited and facilitated by a rich history of the desire for change and were also path-dependent.

A third point of similarity is the authoritative, elitist and statist version of modernization carried out in the cases of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras (Lewis 1961; Ahmad 1993; Abrahamian 2008; Amanat 2017; Keyman and Yilmaz 2006). Both Reza Shah and Atatürk and their supporting elites mostly rose from the

educated and west-oriented army and bureaucracy elites of their societies and some from the enlightened provincial notables. These people viewed themselves as the ones who had a mission for guiding the society through its journey of modernization in light of their superior knowledge and understanding of the Western civilization and culture that they saw as the only example for modernizing their societies. As a result, they did not view the masses as equals and made no serious efforts to convince the people that the version of modernization they were trying to execute in their societies was what suited their society and the people's needs the most. Throughout the two regimes' tenure in the 1920s- 1940s, the masses were viewed by the elite as unsophisticated and ignorant people who needed to be shepherded by the enlightened elite, with the result being that many of the cultural and social components of modernization did not take root among the various social classes and a wide gap emerged between the elites' modern and secular culture and way of life and the masses' continued traditional mode of living associated with Islam (Ahmad 1993, 92).

The heavy emphasis on secularizing the state and society was a fourth important point of similarity between the cases of Iran and Turkey. The Iranian and Turkish states pursued a concentrated effort at removing the symbols of Islam from the society, secularize laws and legal systems and education and limiting the power of the clergy over state and society. In doing so, they sought to create a secular national identity and secular citizens because as the elites viewed it, religion remained the main obstacle in the way of modernizing the society and joining the modern European civilization. In the elites' mind, as long as the people's ties to religion stayed strong, they could not wholeheartedly and genuinely embrace the tenets of modernity and join in building a modern society. Secularization of dress in Iran and Turkey followed an almost similar path, with the exception of the mandatory banning of the veil in Iran. Secularizing the laws and legal system also proceeded along similar lines with the introduction of civil codes and other regulations that did not correspond to Sharia, installing secular judges and severely limiting the power of clergy over the legal system. However, the main difference was that the Shia faith remained the official religion of the state in Iran's case while in

Turkey Islam was removed from the constitution altogether. Another point of difference regarding the two countries' secularization paths was that the power of the clergy had been severely limited in Turkey under the Young Turks (Lewis 1961; Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 1993; Özbudun 1996) and Atatürk and his elites performed the final blows. However, in Iran, Reza Shah and his allies started almost from scratch in this regard and in a short time tried to make radical changes and rapidly secularize the laws in addition to waging a heavy anti-clerical campaign in the newspapers and other public communication channels in order to limit the power of the clergy over people and society. Indeed, they had to squeeze the path taken by Turkey during several decades in this regard into a few years. Regardless of all the efforts by the Iranian state, the ulema in the case of Iran retained a considerable amount of power over the society and some over the state, while in Turkey's case their power was almost fully subordinated to that of the secular state.

A heavy emphasis on education was another important point of similarity between the two cases. As Atatürk and Reza Shah took over, the mass of the population were illiterate and unskilled. These leaders and their supporting elites saw educating the population as a means to creating literate and skilled citizens as necessary to making a modern and civilized nation. For this reason, they undertook the secularization and expansion of the public schools' system, invested in the establishment of vocational and professional schools, carried out literacy campaigns and redesigned the school curricula so as to introduce citizens to modern curricula and prepare them to be citizens of the future modern Iran and Turkey. The difference here is that the modern Turkish Republic inherited a much better and more extended system of secular schools and professional colleges than the Iranian state and started People's Houses as a way to educate the public. In the case of Turkey, the expansion of the network of schools to even the smallest villages was carefully designed as a concentrated effort to promote the Kemalist ideology and the idea of the "nation" which in turn would foster the "coalescing of loyalties around the nation idea and identification with the center" (Heper 1992, 156).

Promoting women's rights as equal citizens and trying to offer new social opportunities to them was another point of similarity in the two cases. The leaders of

both Iran and Turkey and their supporting elites viewed emancipation of women as key to the building a modern society. It was due to this that they tried to provide girls with equal educational opportunities to prepare them for a more active and equal role on par with their male counterparts in society. In the case of Iran, this meant the building of various girls' colleges and making elementary education for both boys and girls mandatory. In Turkey's case, this meant a transition to co-education in 1924 which provided girls an equal status with their male counterparts at schools. In Turkey, ratifying laws that authorized women to vote and run for office, the holding of Miss Turkey beauty contests and the promotion of the brand of liberated, modern woman were ways to give women new possibilities for participating in society. In Iran's case, the banning of veil, the promotion of women's societies and the ordering of men, especially the elite, to appear in public with their unveiled wives were meant to help women gain a better social and cultural status. The progress made in Turkey's case seems to have been more considerable while it could be said that aside from middle and upper-class women, the success of the reforms remained limited especially for women living in rural areas.

An emphasis on industrialization as an important pillar of a modern economy was another significant point of similarity between the cases of Iran and Turkey. Both leaders understood modernization to be possible only if an industrialized economy was put in place which could help the country join the ranks of civilization. In Iran's case, there was no significant legacy of industrialization or a strong infrastructure in place when Reza Shah took over. Aside from a few factories, some railway lines and a telegraph system, there was very little industrialization or infrastructure in place. Building the trans- Iranian railway was the most significant symbol of Iran's industrialization and it symbolized Iran's independence and self-confidence among other countries. However, despite all efforts, a significant industrial sector or class of entrepreneurs did not develop in Iran during Reza Shah's reign and almost all industrial projects were undertaken by the state. In the case of Turkey, the Kemalist regime inherited some important industrial factories and infrastructure from the Young Turks era with the efforts at creating a class of entrepreneurs having started in late nineteenth century. The Kemalists' etatist

economy built upon this legacy and achieved a much higher level of industrialization than Iran with various factories springing up across Anatolia through the state's efforts or its support for the private sector. The first vestiges of a new industrial class of entrepreneurs started to take shape in Turkey at this time and later helped to lift the country's economy (Ahmad 1993).

3.5.2. Differences

The first important difference in the two cases of Iran and Turkey is the institutional heritage of the two new states and its significance. Reza Shah and his supporting elites inherited a weak state with a very low level of centralization and an utterly underdeveloped army and bureaucracy. The late Qajar state could not project its power effectively beyond the capital and depended on various alliances with the semi-feudal local notables and the heads of various nomadic tribes to run the affairs of the country. These various centers of power meant that there could be no effective central planning and power for carrying out the reforms needed to modernize the state, army, bureaucracy and society. Reza Shah and his supporters centralized power and eliminated all rival power centers including local notables, heads of nomadic tribes and powerful Qajar dignitaries. In addition, they created a modern army and bureaucracy that could help push forward modernization of the country in the various social, cultural, economic and financial aspects. However, in the case of Turkey, the picture is totally different since the most important legacy of the Ottoman Empire for the Kemalist state was the legacy of a strong and centralized state that was autonomous of society and social forces/classes. The Ottoman state left a relatively modern army and an extensive network of civil bureaucracy including men highly experienced in running the affairs of the state to the republic under Atatürk (Özbudun 1996; Zürcher 2004). Moreover, the Ottoman state occupied a central and highly valued place in Ottoman political culture as it was cherished by the members of the Ottoman society for its own sake as an independent entity (Özbudun 1996, 133-134). This in turn meant the emergence of a political culture in which the legitimacy of a "generalizing, integrating and legitimizing" (Heper 1992, 148) interventionist state was accepted and the benevolent Ottoman "father state" (*devlet*

baba) was imagined to have the right to set a course for society and use the resources at its disposal to pursue it (Özbudun 1996, 148). The Ottoman state established its autonomy by making social groups impotent and effectively making it impossible for any mercantile or landowning economic class or any grassroots social class to emerge (Heper 1992, 145). Thus the power of the state elites was never seriously threatened or counterbalanced by any corporate, autonomous or intermediary social structures (Özbudun 1996, 136;). The Ottoman legacy of a strong and autonomous state later left its impact on and presented challenges to the modern Kemalist republic in specific ways. The absence of a nation-state tradition, the capacity of the state to accumulate and effectively use political power and the absence of a representative tradition in the Ottoman state (Ibid, 139) later framed the opportunities and limitations the Kemalist state faced. The Kemalists only needed to transform the existing state institutions and the central and cherished role of the autonomous state in shaping society to meet the needs of the new republic (Zürcher 2004). The Kemalists kept this long tradition of the strong, centralized and autonomous state largely intact and used it to project the power of their new state to the various corners of the republic and to push their modernization project forward to an extent that surpassed the most ambitious dreams of the reform-minded Ottoman state/elites (Özbudun 1996, 143). In summary, a great effort at state-building had to be undertaken in the case of Iran at the same time with running the modernization project while in Turkey's case, the state and the stage were already in place for pursuing the modernization project.

The nature of the two leaders' supporting elite or what is called the winning coalition in the Selectorate theory is another significant point of difference. The Iranian nationalist elite brought the Constitutional Revolution into fruition in an alliance with the grand mujtaheds of the time Tabataba'i and Behbahani. This alliance limited their power in introducing radical secular measures on the time of the revolution as the constant support of the non-reactionary section of the religious community remained significant to the constitutional regime's survival. Moreover, a significant portion of the Iranian nationalist elite had felt that there was no contradiction between Islam as a comprehensive social doctrine with claims about

the individual, state and society, and the western ideas that constitutionalism entailed and no serious discussions of the merits of Islam versus western science and culture had been put forward. While there had been another group in the constitutionalist camp who had sought outright adoption of western ideals they could never establish an ascendancy within this camp. Having such a legacy, Reza Shah had to depend on the clergy for his ascendance to power in the beginning of his reign and had them as part of his winning coalition. While he later tried to destroy their power, he always took note of their power over society and avoided outright confrontation with them. In the case of Turkey, the clergy had no role in bringing the constitutional revolution of Young Turks into fruition and indeed felt threatened by it as members of them had a role in the counter-revolution that followed. Moreover, the power of the clergy was to a great extent reduced and brought under the state during the Young Turks period and as a result they played no major role or had no tangible influence over the state under Atatürk and the state did not try to take note of their ideas or power over society. Moreover, Atatürk purged the more conservative members of his winning coalition and gave room for maneuvers to the radical modernist ones which helped him perform his most radical reforms.

The next important point concerns the idea of national identity. In the case of Iran, the borders had remained roughly the same for centuries and the composition of the population had been stable for centuries with a Persian majority and various large ethnic minorities of Turkic, Kurdish, Lur, Gilak, Turkmen, Arab and others living in the same territory for centuries when Reza Shah took over. At the same time the majority Shia population lived side by side with a considerable minority of Sunni Muslims who were mostly located in the border areas. A loose sense of belonging to the same country and motherland connected these various ethnicities while the nationalist idea of being the citizens of the same nation was rather new and rooted in the Constitutional Revolution Era. Anyhow, the bases of a shared national identity based on being members of the same nation was already in place in Iran. Meanwhile, the idea of Turkishness and belonging to the same Turkish nation was almost non-existent when Atatürk took over. The citizens of the new republic had formerly identified themselves as “Muslims” and “Ottomans” both of which were

incompatible with the liberal conceptions of nationalism rooted in the same language and cultural heritage needed for establishing a new republic. Atatürk and his supporting elites had to invent this sense of nationalism and national identity based on a mythical motherland for Turks called Turan which had supposedly given Turks a common language and cultural heritage. A significant amount of energy was put into creating this very national identity based on an idea of secular citizens by the Kemalists and nation-building was an integral part of the project of modernity in Turkey's case (Özbudun 1996; Keyman and Yilmaz 2006). As a result, the Iranian nation may have felt more attached to its assumed glorious language and history finding it more difficult to adopt western culture and ideals in a wholesale manner and to leave behind its ancient institutional heritage including the kingship for a possible move to a republican system. Indeed, Reza Shah tried without success to establish a republic in Iran with strong opposition especially from the ulema causing him to drop the idea. Meanwhile, the newly-formed "Turkish" national identity may have helped the nation and the people feel more at ease with adopting a new way of western life and the new republican regime since both were considered new beginnings for the country and the people. In this way, severing the link with the centuries-long Ottoman and Muslim identity and state and adopting the new secular and western identity and culture may have been easier in the Turkish case and of course depicted by the elite as the only way for the Turkish nation to survive in the post-World War I era. A change of the written script from Arabic to Latin that served as part of the national identity creation project was another significant point of difference with Iran since it tried to sever the people's link with their eastern Muslim and Ottoman past and force them to face west. Such a change was absent in the Iranian case and indeed much emphasis was put on what the elite promoted as the glories of the ancient Persian language and culture and their important role in Iran's national identity. Calling for a need to purify the Persian of the "decadent" Arabic words paralleled a similar sentiment among the elites in the modern Turkey (Perry 2004).

Another point of difference between the two cases was Reza Shah's decision to keep the ancient institution of kingship in Iran intact in contrast to Atatürk's

decision to declare a republic and create a modern party. Reza Shah's absolutist style of ruling meant the reverting of the democratic achievements of the Constitutional Revolution including a parliament and popular representation and people's chance for participation in the political life of their nation. It also meant a patrimonial system in which loyalty to the king replaced loyalty to the state as the main factor for serving in the state or army. This created an atmosphere in which capable civil servants and officers came constantly subjected to Shah's ire and were at many times eliminated. This curtailed the state's success in its drive for modernization as many of its best men were removed, jailed or even assassinated due to the Shah's whims. In the case of Turkey, however, the termination of the offices of the sultan and caliph and the declaration of a republic prepared the stage for the later transition to democracy. While it may be true that Atatürk had an almost absolute grip over the National Assembly and the CHP, the change to a new political system and order avoided the emergence of a patrimonial system and type of rule and opened doors for new ways of viewing and doing politics. The new "republic" and "party" created under Atatürk were places where the leading politicians of the upcoming multiparty democratic era learned their trade and allowed the population in time to participate in the social and political space. Indeed, in the case of Turkey a transition from personal rule to an impersonal institutional structure was materialized but in the Iranian case it was not (Keyman and Yilmaz 2006, 432).

The state-centric version of modernity promoted by way of nationalism in Iran and Turkey did not involve democracy and as a result the 'democracy deficit' has remained one of the main characteristics and problem areas of the modernization process in both countries" (Keyman and Yilmaz 2006, 436) and democratizing the state-society relations in both cases is a significant necessity. In Turkey's case, the Ottoman state had no representative tradition until the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Özbudun 1996, 144) and even the Ottoman Constitution did not envision democratic representation as being among its goals. Indeed, the opening up of the system was envisioned as being equal to the "liberation of the bureaucratic elite from the Sultan's personal rule" (Heper 1992, 146). In a similar vein, the Kemalist elites' understanding of democracy did not automatically translate into valuing

representative government. During most of the Republican period, democracy was envisioned by the elites to mean liberation from the absolutism of the majority “allowing the bureaucratic elite to decide alone what was best for the country” (Ibid). All said, however, for Turkey, geographical affinity to Europe for centuries and Turkey’s economic ties with European countries in addition to the existence of the EU near Turkey and the prospects of joining it “serves as an important external anchor for democratization” (Keyman and Yilmaz 2006, 436) that can help the democratization process in Turkey. However, despite some critical attempts by the Iranian elite like the nationalist interregnum under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddegh, Iranian modernization and democratization remain troubled by the yet unresolved dilemma between adopting Islam as the basis for running the government and the prospect of secularizing the state and confining Islam to the sphere of private life.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

4.1. Outline of the Chapter

The present chapter will provide a detailed account of the methodology utilized in order to conduct the research into the modernization trajectories of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras corresponding to the 1920s-1940s. The first major section will elaborate on the type of data used for the current study, the specific time period selected and the rationale behind it, and the sampling strategies. For these purposes, two state-sympathetic newspapers from Iran and two from Turkey have been selected and subjected to both systematic (probability) sampling for ordinary days and purposive (non-probability) sampling for some specific commemorative dates in order to gauge the debates and themes surrounding the modernization of these two countries in their foundation eras. In the next section, the specific methodological approach of the chapter is explained. Thematic analysis has been selected for the purposes of the current research in order to determine the major themes selected for the current research and their linkage to modernization theory followed by a discussion of the ways in which these themes will be analyzed.

4.2. Data Collection and Sampling Strategies

Four state-aligned newspapers published in Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s have been selected as the main sources through which the present study collects its data. Analyzing the front pages of the state-sympathetic Iranian *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* newspapers and Turkish *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* papers will provide deep and comprehensive insights into the ways in which the Iranian and Turkish regime and their supporting allies under the respective leadership of Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk waged their ideological campaign of modernizing their traditional societies during the 1920s-1940s.

4.2.1. Why Newspapers?

Newspapers have been selected from among all the available sources since they provide various significant avenues of opportunity for conducting a meaningful research into Iran's and Turkey's modernization trajectories. Newspapers are chosen as the main sources of the present study since as primary sources they provide one with the opportunity for a more in-depth and broader analysis and understanding of the dynamics of reform, modernization and development in Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras. Moreover, such an analysis can help address the mentioned gaps in the literature. For one thing, newspapers are relatively closer to the public than academic papers and books and were widely circulated and read among the people in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey (Abrahamian 2008; Ahmad 1993; Amanat 2017; Lewis 1961). Therefore, analyzing newspapers as primary sources that naturally focus on "history from below" helps us gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of the processes of modernization, the debates surrounding modernity and development and the features and conditions of the societies that the modern states of Iran and Turkey and their supporting elites tried to reshape and modernize. Secondly, newspapers are sites where the state and society meet (Conboy 2004; McNair 1998; Starr 2005). Thus, they are invaluable sources for assessing both the state/elites' understanding of modernity and modernization and the discourses generated by them in order to instill the values of modern culture, society and state in their existing traditional societies. Moreover, while these state-aligned newspapers remained mostly within the confines of official state ideology and propaganda, at times they provided windows into the effects of the modernizing reforms on ordinary people's lives and fortunes and their understanding and reception of the modernizing reforms undertaken by the state during the period of the current study. Thirdly, analyzing the elites' discourses in newspapers on modernization and democracy and the way in which they are depicted as being interconnected or causing/being caused by each other or not can provide new avenues for understanding the trajectory and pathology of democracy and democratization processes in Iran and Turkey since the time of the study at hand to the present. Analyzing the way(s) in which the state/elites understood and propagated their statist/elitist version of modernization

and the role they ascribed to people and their participation in the polity and society in such discourses may open new avenues for understanding the travails of Turkish democracy since its transition to a multi-party system and the virtual absence of tangible progress in democratization in the case of Iran. Finally, analyzing the front pages of the selected newspapers enables one to assess the specific features of modernization to which more space and emphasis was dedicated by the elites and the ones not extensively discussed by them. This will help one infer the features that the elites saw as paramount and integral to the process of modernization at the expense of other aspects. It can also help one infer the specific modern features and values to which the public showed stronger resistance and that the elites felt the need for trumpeting more frequently and much more strongly than other features.

The specific newspapers selected for the purposes of the current study, namely, *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* for the Iranian case and *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* for the Turkish case have been chosen due to their political and ideological proximity to and alliance with the regimes of their time. Indeed, they served as public communication channels through which the modernizing leaders and elites of Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s tried to instill their ideology of modernization and development in the mind of the masses.

4.2.2. Iranian Newspapers

In the Iranian case, the content of the newspapers was strictly controlled and censored by the regime. As a result, newspapers and periodicals which had a critical stance toward the government had a very slim chance of survival and were banned by the state in several occasions (Sadre Hashemi 1984, 29-30). Indeed, the Supreme Council of Culture controlled by the minister of culture assessed all the new requests for establishment of newspapers since 1924 (Ibid). Iranian state under Reza Shah did not establish any newspaper to promote its ideology. However, several newspapers supported the regime and promoted its ideology and were in turn backed by the regime. Of all the newspapers published in this era, three, namely, *Ettelaat*, *Koushesh* and *Iran* were closely aligned with the regime and remained in print for the whole or most of Reza Shah's reign and considered the top three important and

widely read newspapers of the day among the public (Ibid). Of these, *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* have been selected for the purposes of the current study since their publication continued with virtually no halt or state ban during the period, showing their careful alignment with and promotion of state-sponsored ideology. Moreover, a majority of these two newspapers' issues published in 1925-1941 during Reza Shah's reign is available in digitized format at the portal of the National Library and Archives of Iran (NLAI) at sana.nlai.ir, with 2,418 issues for *Ettelaat* and 2,712 for *Koushesh*, thus making it possible to conduct the research using a sufficiently large sample of data. However, in the case of *Iran* newspaper, publication of several articles criticizing Reza Shah and Pahlavi dynasty by Zeinolabedin Rahnema who served as the owner and chief executive of the paper reversed the paper's fortunes and caused a halt in its publication in 1936. Following the publication of those articles, Rahnema was imprisoned and the newspaper was taken away from him and transferred to a new person. The ban imposed on the publication of this newspaper for a while and the imprisoning of its owner shows how it had started to take an ideological stance not in line with the government priorities and preferences. In addition, less than 200 issues of this paper are available in digitized or hardcopy formats at the NLAI's portal and NLAI building respectively for the period of the current study spanning 1925-1941 for the Iranian case, making the available and accessible pool of data in this case relatively much smaller and less suitable to the purposes of the current study. For both of the aforementioned reasons, *Iran* newspaper has not been selected for the current study and *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* are the two newspapers used to assess the ideology of modernization promoted by the Iranian regime and its supporting elites under Reza Shah's modernizing regime.

4.2.2.1. Ettelaat Newspaper

Ettelaat Newspaper was established in 1926 and its first issue was published on July 11 of the same year. Abbas Masoudi served as the owner and chief executive and Markaz-e Ettelaat-e Iran Institute (Iran Information Center) was its publisher. This newspaper was published uninterruptedly from 1926 onwards covering the whole time period of the current research. It was arguably the most widely-read

paper of the time consisting of 8-12 pages and with the estimated print circulation in 1938-1939 being 11,500 copies and its staff numbering 62 (Sadre Hashemi 1984, Volume 1, 207). The newspaper enjoyed relative freedom during the heavy-handed reign of Reza Shah and this led to the suspicion that the paper and its founder were affiliated with the government (Encyclopaedia Iranica). *Ettelaat* usually included an editorial, mostly covered domestic news, reports of international developments translated from foreign news agency sources, the proceedings of the National Assembly of Iran, and articles and translations on various subjects (Ibid). Digital versions of a majority of the published issues of *Ettelaat* during the mentioned period are available at the online newspapers' portal of the National Library and Archives of Iran at sana.nlai.ir, with the issues for the years 1934, 1935, 1936, 1938 and 1939 missing. Thus, the total available population size for Ettelaat Newspaper was 2418 (N).

Ettelaat newspaper was dominated by Abbas Masoudi who was among the most renowned journalists and political elites of the time. Indeed, he has been called “the founder of new journalism in Persia and teacher of hundreds of professional journalists” (Encyclopaedia Iranica) due to his prolific journalistic career. At first, he worked with Shokrollah Safavi in *Koushesh* newspaper and later established *Ettelaat* which became the most prominent daily of the time. His journalistic success helped his political fortunes as well. He was selected as a member of parliament from Tehran for the tenth National Assembly of Iran (June 1935-June 1937) and retained his seat until the end of the fifteenth National Assembly of Iran (July 1947- July 1949). He was also a member of the Senate of Iran from Tehran five times for the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Senate of Iran for the years 1950-1960 and again from 1963 until his death in 1974. Masoudi also occupied the chair of deputy speaker from April 1954 until April 1955 and was among the senators assigned to the senate by Mohammad Reza Shah for the 5th and 6th Senate of Iran. During Reza Shah's reign, Masoudi succeeded in becoming the most important ally of the regime in the domestic journalistic sphere making him the only journalist accompanying Reza Shah and his delegation in their official state visit to Kemalist Turkey in June-July 1934. This was followed by Masoudi's election to the Tenth National Assembly of

Iran which marked his first term as a member of the parliament and since then Ettelaat came to be known as a semi-official newspaper. (Encyclopaedia Iranica). Ettelaat's editorial is published without the name of the author and the same is true about various columns on the front page. However, there are columns that are printed with the names of the authors. Some of the authors include Rahimzade Safavi, Hashemi Haeri, Jalal Riahi, Ms. Hormozi, Ms. Tarbiat, A. Shirvani, A. Khaje Nouri, Khalil Khan Saghafi, Said Nafisi, H. Shajareh, Yahya Khan Pouya, Ali Akbar Bamdad, Mohammad Bagher Hejazi and Mr. Rashed.

4.2.2.2. Koushesh Newspaper

Koushesh newspaper was established in Tehran in 1922 and its first issue was published in the December of the same year. Shokrollah Safavi served as the owner and chief executive of the paper for the whole period of the current study and even after that. The newspaper consisted of six pages and was among the top three significant newspapers of its era, together with *Ettelaat* and *Iran*, and enjoyed a wide readership (Sadre Hashemi 1984, Volume 4, 146). However, no exact figure for its circulation is available in the various consulted sources. *Koushesh* managed to remain in print for the whole period of time Reza Shah was in power and even beyond that without any interruptions. This demonstrates the newspaper's close alignment with the regime's ideology and the decrees of the shah. *Koushesh* included editorials on the various social, cultural, political, economic and other issues of the day accompanied by domestic news, reports of international developments and comprehensive coverage of the sessions of the National Assembly of Iran (Ibid, 147) with special coverage of the new and groundbreaking legislations passed during this area by the assembly. Digital versions of a majority of the published issues of *Koushesh* newspaper during the period of the current study are available at the online newspapers' portal of the National Library and Archives of Iran at sana.nlai.ir, with almost all the issues published during 1925-1941 being available. Thus, the total available population size for *Koushesh* was 2,712 (N). *Koushesh* had a pro-republican tone and severely criticized Qajar Dynasty for the ills of the time and hailed Reza Shah as the savior and leader of modern Iran. Its tone was starkly more

radical, pro-government and anticlerical than *Ettelaat* and included biting criticisms of tradition and at times Islamic rituals.

Much like *Ettelaat*, *Koushesh* newspaper was dominated by a central figure named Shokrollah Safavi. He was arguably one of the most prominent journalists during Reza Shah's reign and served as the head of Iran Media and Journalism Association during the era (Agheli 2021). Safavi and his newspaper *Koushesh* also served as a training base for many promising journalists of the day including Abbas Masoudi who later established *Ettelaat* as another significant newspaper of the era. It was his friendship with Abbas Masoudi that helped him be elected as a member of parliament from Bushehr for the tenth National Assembly of Iran (June 1935- June 1937), a seat that he retained until the end of the sixteenth National Assembly of Iran (February 9, 1950- February 19, 1952). He also served as a member of the Senate of Iran from 1963 to 1975 from Tehran. Safavi was among the top allies of Reza Shah's regime in the domestic journalistic circles and his close following of the official ideology of the regime and friendship and professional links with the owner of *Ettelaat* newspaper, Abbas Masoudi brought his newspaper and himself political and financial support and made his paper a strictly regime-aligned one. *Koushesh's* editorial is published without the name of the author and the same is true about various columns on the front page. However, there are columns that are printed with the names of the authors. Some of the authors include M. Farhang, Dr. Ali Khan Malek Afzali, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, Saeid Nafisi, Dr. Arab, Zabihollah Mansouri, Mohammad Reza Jalali, Ms. Mariz Showari and Enayatolah Zeini.

4.2.3. Turkish Newspapers

In the Turkish case, as the new regime consolidated its power and following the passing of the Law for the Maintenance of Order on March 4, 1925 its grip over the media tightened. Using the aforementioned law, the state closed down eight of the most important newspapers and periodicals in Istanbul as well as several provincial periodicals (Zürcher 1993, 173) and brought all the leading journalists from Istanbul before the Independence Tribunal in the east (Ibid). These measures effectively left the government-controlled *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* (later to be renamed

Ulus) in Ankara and *Cumhuriyet* in Istanbul as the only national papers. The selection criteria in the Turkish case is easier and more straightforward as *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* were directly established by the order of and worked under the close supervision and financial and political support of the state leadership and elites and the Republican People's Party. This in turn makes them invaluable to the current research which aims at reconstructing the totality of the ideological package of modernization promoted by the state and its supporting elites at the time. The digitized versions of both newspapers for the period under study are available for public access at www.gastearsivi.com while *Ulus* issues are also available at Turkish Grand National Assembly Archives and the ones for *Cumhuriyet* are accessible through the METU Library Database with a student ID.

4.2.3.1. Ulus Newspaper

Ulus Newspaper started publication with the name of "Hâkimiyet-i Milliye" on January 10, 1920. Hâkimiyet-i Milliye was established by the Turkish nationalists during the Turkish War of Independence in order to inform the public about the national struggle and Recep Zühtü Bey (who later served as an MP from Sinop in 1924, 1927 and 1931 and Zonguldak in 1935 respectively) was assigned as the chief executive of the newspaper and Nizamettin Nazif served as the editor-in-chief. Hakkı Behiç Bey (a member of the First Grand National Assembly of Turkey from Denizli) took care of the publication and distribution of the articles (Doğramacıoğlu 2007) and took note of Mustafa Kemal's ideas to turn them into articles while Mustafa Kemal perused the other articles as well. Some articles contain a star sign under them and are thought to be written by Atatürk himself. As of February 6, 1921, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur (chief representative of the Ankara government to Paris after the signing of the Treaty of Ankara between government of France and the Grand National Assembly of Ankara in October 1921), Nafi Atuf Kansu (General Secretary of CHP from 1945-1947 and an MP at the 3rd- 8th Grand National Assembly of Turkey) and Ziya Gevher Etili (an MP at 3rd-6th GNAT) served on the editorial board of the newspaper. After the War of Independence, Hâkimiyet-i Milliye continued its life as the semi-official organ of the Republican

People's Party. As of September 26, 1928, Latin letters were used entirely on the first page while Arabic letters were used in the other pages (Doğramacıoğlu, 2007). Since the research focused on the front pages of newspapers, the dates between September 26, 1928 and November 27, 1934 under the name of "Hâkimiyet-i Milliye" Newspaper were researched. The number of newspapers that are available for the designated period is 1817. In its early days, Recep Zühtü, Hüseyin Ragıp , Sabri Ethem Ertem, Ahmet Hakkı, Hamdi Osmanzade , Aşki Naili, İsmail Suphi, Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey, Nafi Atuf Kansu, Nasuhi Baydar, Ziya Gevher Eti, and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt were among the paper's renowned columnists. To this list some famous journalists and thinkers were added later including Mehmet Akif, Halide Edip Hanım, Dr. Adnan Bey, Müfide Ferit Hanım, Ahmet Ferit Bey, İsmail Müştak Mayakon, Yakup Kadri, Ruşen Eşref, Hamdullah Suphi, Mehmet Emin, İsmail Habip, Celal Nuri, İsmail Hami, Cemal Hüsnü Taray, Hayrettin Taran, and Vedat Dicleli.

The newspaper adopted the name *Ulus* as of 28 November 1934 with direct support from the Republican People's Party that served as its owner and also from Mustafa Kemal himself and continued its publication under this name until it was closed in 1953 (Doğramacıoğlu, 2007). Thus, the dates between November 28, 1934 and December 31, 1949 for which digitized versions were available were researched under the name of *Ulus* to cover the intended period of the research. The number of newspaper issues that are available for the designated period is 4,833. As a result, the total number of samples for this newspaper is 6,650 (N).

4.2.3.2. Cumhuriyet Newspaper

Cumhuriyet newspaper was established on May 7, 1924 as a result of the direct initiative of Atatürk by Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu, a confidant of Mustafa Kemal, together with Nebizade Hamdi, Zekeriya Sertel and Kemal Salih Sel. *Cumhuriyet* was launched in order to promote the ideals of the newly established Republic of Turkey after the successful conclusion of the War of Independence (Cumhuriyet.com). The newspaper started to publish in Latin letters as of November 1, 1928 in line with the directive by the state to change to Latin letters (Ibid). Nadi

had founded the newspaper Yeni Gün in support of Kuva-yi Milliye or Nationalist Forces and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey headed by Mustafa Kemal in the days of the Turkish War of Independence and served at 1st-6th GNAT as an MP and read the constitutional amendment that put into effect the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as the head of the Constitutional Commission. Nebizade Hamdi served as an MP at the 1st-6th GNAT. Zekeriya Sertel was put in charge of managing the paper and Artin Efendi was responsible for distribution of the paper that was launched to counter newspapers such as Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın)'s Tanin, Velid Ebüzziya's Tasvir-i Efkâr and Ahmet Emin (Yalman)'s Vatan which were significant papers of the time and which Mustafa Kemal saw as potential threats to the new regime. The first issue contained a presentation by Yunus Nadi and an interview with Atatürk and the newspaper was published in 8 pages for the good part of the current study's period. Yunus Nadi served as the editor-in-chief of the paper from 1924 to 1945 (Ibid) while sometimes Zekeriya Sertel, Yakup Kadri (an MP at 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 12th GNAT), Abidin Daver (MP at 6th GNAT), M. Nermi, Şükrü Kaya (MP at 2nd-5th TGNA and General Secretary of CHP from May 1935-January 1939) wrote the editorials. The newspaper's establishment at the initiative of Mustafa Kemal turned it into the official organ of the new regime and Republican People's Party and was a conduit for the new state's ideology. As a result, many of the leading elite supporters of the newly founded Republic of Turkey including Ziya Gökalp, Aka Gündüz, Hasan Bedreddin, Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Ahmet Rasim, Peyami Safa, Ahmet Refik, İsmail Habip, Abidin Daver, Cenap Şahabettin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Halit Ziya, Cevat Fehmi Başkut, Mümtaz Faik, Fuad Köprülü, and Halit Fahri served as columnists and writers for the newspaper (Emre Kaya 2010, 77). The second page of the newspaper was dedicated to pieces written by scientists and scholars. The paper is estimated to have enjoyed a circulation of 62,000 copies as of 1939 (Ertop 1973, 14). The newspaper remained in print continuously for the period of the current study (1920s-1940s) except for two short closures, first on October 29, 1934 for ten days and another one in 1940 for 90 days, due to an alleged violation of the state's editorial policy (Emre Kaya 2010, 78). The newspaper and its editor-in-chief Yunus Nadi remained loyal to CHP since the paper's establishment except for the 1943

elections cycle where Nadi and Abidin Daver turned to supporting Democrat Party since they viewed this party's stances toward World War II as being more in line with their own views. Nadi published several articles during the course of the second world war in support of Germany's war campaign. After Yunus Nadi's death on June 28, 1945, his son Nadir Nadi (an MP at 9th-10th GNAT) assumed the role of the editor-in-chief and remained in this post until the endpoint of the period of the current study which corresponds to the date of the effective passing of power from CHP to Demokrat Party on May 27, 1950 and even beyond that. While Nadir Nadi supported the Democrat Party in the transition period to the multi-party era (Emre Kaya 2010, 78) and his name was on the DP's list in the 1950 elections, he reversed course after 1954 and strongly opposed the DP from then on.

The available digitized archive of Cumhuriyet newspaper that is accessible to METU students and also the public starts from January 1, 1929. Therefore, the total number of issues that was researched spanned January 1, 1929 up until May 27, 1950 when the Democrat Party effectively assumed the office of the government marking the transition to the multi-party system. While some issues are missing in the online archives, the majority of them are available and the total number of available digitized issues for the period of the current study is 5,894 (N).

4.3. Time Period of the Study: Why 1920s-1940s

The current research on the front pages of the four aforementioned newspapers covers the period 1920s-1940s corresponding to the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey. The rationale for the selection of this specific time period lies in its unparalleled significance and enduring legacy for the modern nation-states of Iran and Turkey. The period marked the transition from traditional norms and forms of polity and state to modern politics and a move from Ferdinand Tönnies's concept of *Gemeinschaft* (community) and the personal traditional social interactions it entailed to one of *Gesellschaft* (society) and the impersonal modern interactions it gave rise to. It was in the same period that the secular and legal entity of "citizen" in Iran and Turkey replaced the definition of people as the "subjects" of the Qajar Shah or Ottoman Sultan and gave birth to the "modern" social and political individual.

Indeed, the period spanning 1920s-1940s is special since it included the most concentrated modernization and development efforts in the history of these two nations, coupled with the quantum leaps of modernization and development. The successes and failures of the ambitious modernization projects performed during this period and their immediate impacts have directly shaped these two nations' political, social, economic and cultural life in the contemporary time and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the timeframe is very much suited to the comparative approach of the present study since the foundation eras of modern Iran and Turkey and the modernization initiatives that were undertaken by the states/elites of the two countries in each case overlapped to a considerable extent. In Iran's case, the period covers 1925-1941 under the reign of Reza Shah and in the case of Turkey, it corresponds to the single-party era dominated by the leadership of Atatürk (1923-1938) and later İsmet İnönü (1938-1950). During this period, many of the main features of the modernization projects undertaken by these two nations' leaders and their supporting elites resembled one another and there was considerable influence and interaction between the two regimes and their supporting elites in the meantime.

4.4. Sampling

One of the most important requirements of reconstructing a representative picture of the ideas and ideology of modernization put forth by the elites on the front pages of the four selected newspapers is performing a well-planned and comprehensive sampling of the front pages. In order to do so, both probability and non-probability sampling methods have been utilized.

The non-probability sampling strategy includes checking two categories of dates which are of primary and secondary importance for the newly-established regimes of Iran and Turkey at the time of the current study. The dates of primary importance included five for Iran and four for Turkey. In the case of Iran, the following dates were of primary importance: Banning of Headscarf and Chador (January 8), Establishment of the First University (February 4), Anniversary of Reza Shah's Rise to Power (February 22), Reza Shah's Birthday (March 15) and the Anniversary of Constitutional Revolution and Establishment of the First National

Parliament (August 6). For Turkey, the dates of high significance regarding the establishment of the Turkish Republic have been selected. These include National Sovereignty and Children's Day (April 23), Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day (May 19), Victory Day (August 30) and Republic Day (October 29). In the cases of both Iran and Turkey, when the newspaper issues for these special dates were not available in the archive, the following day was examined since in each occasion a significant portion of the front page was dedicated to the themes of that special date both on the exact day of its anniversary and the following days. This category included 95 issues for the Iranian papers and 172 issues for the Turkish newspapers, bringing the total to 267.

The second category of non-probability sampling belonged to dates of secondary importance. These included election dates or opening dates for parliament and the dates for the Treaty of Saadabad and Reza Shah's visit to Turkey. In this section, the exact date of and also one day before and one day after the election or opening of the parliament and the signing of the Treaty of Saadabad were checked. These dates are 11 July 1926, 6 October 1928, 15 December 1930, 15 March 1933, 6 June 1935, 11 September 1937, 26 October 1939 for the opening of the 6th-12th National Assembly of Iran, 8 July 1937 for the Treaty of Saadabad and 16 June 1934 for Reza Shah's meeting with Atatürk and 28 June 1923, 1 September 1927, 25 April 1931, 8 February 1935, 26 March 1939, 28 February 1943, 21 July 1946 and 14 May 1950 corresponding to the general elections for the 2nd-9th Grand National Assembly of Turkey. For Reza Shah's visit to Turkey, the date of his meeting with Ataturk and five days before and after the visit were checked since it was a long and highly publicized visit to Turkey by Reza Shah. This category included 70 issues from Iranian newspapers and 64 issues from Turkish newspapers. Therefore, the total number of reviewed issues here is 134.

For the probability sampling part, systematic random sampling technique was applied to examine the newspapers. The decision for the number of issues to check in the probability sampling part rests on the logic of reaching a threshold of examining at least 5% of the total issues for each newspaper. For the Iranian newspapers *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* 95 plus 70 issues were already examined in the non-

probability sampling category, meaning an average of 82 checked issues for each in the non-probability sampling category. The respective samples of *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* contained 2,418 and 2,712 in total, therefore, reaching the 5% threshold would require checking at least 136 issues for each paper. Taking the 82 issues already checked in the non-probability sampling section into account, this means the need for checking 54 more issues in the probability sampling part for each paper to bring the total examined issues for *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* respectively to 136 each. Dividing 2,418 and 2,712 by 54, every 45th issue was checked for *Ettelaat* and every 50th issue for *Koushesh*. For the Turkish newspapers, *Ulus* (also including the issues under the name Hâkimiyet-i Milliye) and *Cumhuriyet*, 172 plus 64 issues were already examined in the non-probability sampling section, meaning an average of 118 examined issues for each paper in this section. The respective samples of *Ulus* (also including the issues under the name Hâkimiyet-i Milliye) and *Cumhuriyet* contained 6,650 and 5,894 issues in total. Therefore, reaching the 5% threshold would require checking at least 332 issues for each paper. Taking the 118 issues checked for each paper in the non-probability sampling part, there was the need for 214 more issues to be checked for each paper in the probability sampling section. Dividing 6,650 and 5,894 by 214, every 31st issue for *Ulus* (also including the issues under the name Hâkimiyet-i Milliye) and every 27th issue for *Cumhuriyet* was checked. In total, 272 issues were checked from Iranian newspapers and 664 for Turkey. As a result, a total of 936 front pages in total for the four newspapers were examined. The disparity between the 272 examined issues from the Iranian newspapers and 664 from Turkish newspapers is explained by the fact that the sample size for the Turkish papers is 2.4 times bigger than the one for the Iranian newspapers.

4.5. Research Method

The present research utilizes a qualitative methodology in order to assess the debates and points of discussion regarding modernization that find their place on the front pages of the four selected newspapers. Taking the aims of the current study into consideration and the focus on newspapers as the particular sources used to conduct

the research, it was decided that neither content analysis nor discourse analysis would be the best match for the aims of the present research. Using content analysis would make the scope of the research too narrow as the mere focus on the content and certain coding of words results in ignoring an important aspect of studying primary historical sources, that is the social construction of reality and generation of meaning by particular influential thinkers and organizations in a historical period. In the case of the four state-aligned newspapers selected for the current research, the state and their supporting elites used newspapers as public communication channels to generate and instill a specific ideology of modernization and the necessity of moving from tradition to modernity in the minds of the public. As such, a narrow focus on content analysis to understand the particular version of modernization presented by the state/elites in the cases of Iran and Turkey in their foundational eras would leave us with very partial, superficial and highly limited insights into how the state/elites' ideological package of modernization was generated in relation to the various aspects of society and social strata and how it was received by the society. Discourse analysis as another important variant of qualitative analysis would not be the best match for the aims of the current research either. Indeed, applying discourse analysis to the large sample of data selected for the present research would require time and resources which are beyond the means of this study and would be very hard to conduct. Moreover, discourse analysis would be too wide and stretch the research into issues and debates which are well beyond the original topic of modernization. Therefore, applying discourse analysis would best fit a much smaller sample of data and be probably good as the topic of a book rather than as the focus of a thesis at the master's level. Due to the aforementioned reasons, thematic analysis has been selected as the qualitative methodological tool for analyzing the debates and themes surrounding modernization propounded by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites on the front pages of the four selected newspapers during the foundation eras of these two nations. A brief look into thematic analysis and the reasons why it is selected for the current research would follow.

4.6. Thematic Analysis

4.6.1. What It Is and What It Does

Thematic analysis has been utilized in qualitative studies frequently, however, the acknowledgment that TA is a particular qualitative method in its own right is rather recent. Indeed, TA is still “a poorly demarcated and rarely acknowledged, yet widely used qualitative analytic method...” (Braun and Clarke 2006, 77). As a methodological tool that enjoys “theoretical freedom”, thematic analysis provides researchers with a flexible and useful tool for research “which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data” (Ibid, 78).

Thematic analysis has been defined variously by various scholars with the one by Boyatzis (1998) being among the most well-formulated definitions. According to this definition, TA is a method that helps the researcher identify, analyze and report patterns (themes) across a data set. A theme captures an important aspect or point about the research questions applied to the data set and “represents some level of *patterned* response or meaning within the data set” (Braun and Clarke 2006, 82). Moreover, thematic analysis minimally organizes and describes the data set in rather rich detail while frequently going beyond description of themes in order to interpret the various aspects of the research topic. All said, there is no ultimate and unique way of locating themes using thematic analysis and it has been interestingly argued that “there is no substitute for following hunches and intuitions in looking for themes to code in texts” (Dey 1993 cited in Ryan and Bernard 2003). However, this does not mean that in thematic analysis the researcher can adopt the “anything goes” approach. On the contrary, the researcher’s specific assumptions need to be made clear in order to shed light on the ways in which thematic analysis is applied and reaches its aims. The specific decisions and assumptions made in relation to TA in the current study are briefly explained here.

The first major decision for a TA analysis is to decide what counts as a theme. As previously mentioned, themes represent some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set and as such capture something of importance or “prevalence” in relation to the data set. In the present research, modernization is

taken to be the concept tracked on the front pages of the four newspapers with the major themes of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization” serving as the foundational themes for the current research. Each major theme in turn contains sub-themes that are repeatedly discussed and highlighted on the front pages of the four selected newspapers. These themes and sub-themes are directly linked to modernization theory in both the narrow sense positing economic modernization to lead to social and political modernization and the wide sense that takes modernization as a multi-faceted phenomenon working on various economic, social and political levels among others. The three designated themes and their subthemes mentioned below provide accounts of the various aspects or features that the states/elites of Iran and Turkey viewed as integral to the process of modernizing their respective countries, nations and societies. The subthemes of “industrialization,” “modern economic laws,” and “modern economic institutions” will be discussed under the theme of “economic modernization”. The sub-themes of “Promoting a western lifestyle and appearance,” “promoting women’s rights,” “modernizing education and educating the public” and “language reform” will be discussed under the major theme of “socio-cultural modernization”. Under the major theme of “political/legal modernization,” the present study will discuss “modern political system and parties,” “creation of a modern nation” and “modernization of laws and legal system”.

After deciding on what counts as a theme and the themes to track within the data set, a few other decisions need to be made which determine the assumptions of the research. Firstly, the present study will provide a somewhat detailed account of the debates and issues having to do with the “modernization” aspect of the data set rather than a rich description of the entire set in its various aspects. Secondly, the present study takes a “theoretical” thematic approach as its point of departure since it is driven by the specific interest in the “modernization” aspect of the data set and aims to provide a detailed analysis of this specific aspect of the data. This in turn means coding for the foundational research question “In what ways is modernization presented and discussed on the front pages of the four selected newspapers?” which is of central importance to the present study. Thirdly, the current research is one at

the latent level meaning that it “goes beyond the semantic content of the data” (Braun and Clarke 2006, 84) and tries to identify or examine “the *underlying* ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations- and ideologies- that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” (Ibid). The study of modernization in the present thesis aims at examining the state/elites’ underlying assumptions and ideas regarding modernization to provide insights into the specific ideological modernization package they were promoting and its specific features. Fourthly, espousing an analysis at the latent level means the present study presupposes a constructionist epistemology toward research. According to a constructionist approach, meaning and experience are “socially produced and reproduced, rather than inhering within individuals” (Burr 1995 cited in Braun and Clarke 2006). Therefore, the thematic analysis conducted within a constructionist framework tries to theorize the “sociocultural contexts, and structural conditions, that enable the individual accounts that are provided” (Braun and Clarke 2006, 85). What the present research does is to examine newspapers as public communication channels that provide part of the sociocultural contexts and structures inside which the Iranian and Turkish state/elites constructed and performed their vision of modernization.

The specific version of thematic analysis selected for the current study enables the provision of a rather detailed account and interpretation of the debates and issues surrounding the processes of modernization in Iran and Turkey in their foundational eras across a large data set, has a theoretical approach based on the interest in and focus on the “modernization” aspect of the data set in line with modernization theory, goes beyond the semantic level of data to unearth the latent ideas and assumptions of the state/elites about modernization and as a result of its constructionist epistemology makes it possible to view the meaning and experience of modernization in our two cases as socially produced and theorize about the sociocultural contexts and structural conditions that enabled the specific version and vision of modernization promoted by Iranian and Turkish states/elites. Moreover, the theoretical freedom and flexibility that TA provides to the researcher enables one to reach a middle ground between CA and DA since thematic analysis is not “wedded to any pre-existing theoretical framework, and therefore it can be used within

different theoretical frameworks” (Braun and Clarke 2006, Ibid) such as that of modernization theory that serves as the theoretical basis of the present study. TA helps avoid the fault of staying at the level of a shallow and superficial focus on the content (CA) which is far from suitable for the present study that tries to map the ways in which the ideological package of modernization and its various aspects are socially constructed by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey and the ways in which this ideological package is embedded in the sociocultural contexts of its time. Thematic analysis also makes it possible to conduct a considerably rich, complex and enlightening interpretation of the various aspects of the data that moves beyond mere description to provide rather deep insights into the social construction of the ideological package of modernization promoted by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey. Meanwhile, it avoids DA’s too-wide approach which is not manageable and which requires time and effort that is beyond the means of the present research.

4.6.2. How Thematic Analysis is Utilized in This Study

Thematic analysis is a flexible qualitative method of analysis characterized by its theoretical freedom and as such leaves considerable initiative and room for creativity and maneuver to the researcher to conduct the study. As a result, few systematic guidelines or suggestions for doing thematic analysis have been provided in the literature. One of the most straightforward and well-articulated set of guidelines for conducting TA is provided by Braun and Clarke (2006) who propose a process consisting of six phases. The six phases consist of familiarizing oneself with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes and producing the report (Ibid, 87).

Table 1. Phases of Thematic Analysis. Reproduced from Braun and Clarke (2006).

| Phase | Description of the process |
|---|--|
| 1. Familiarizing yourself with your data: | Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas. |
| 2. Generating initial codes: | Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. |
| 3. Searching for themes: | Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme. |
| 4. Reviewing themes: | Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic 'map' of the analysis. |
| 5. Defining and naming themes: | Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme. |
| 6. Producing the report: | The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis. |

The above table and its phases work as the foundational guidelines for the process of conducting thematic analysis in the present study. However, more accurately speaking, the result of following these stages will be seen in the final report that will make up the fifth chapter of the present thesis. In the final report, the aim is to provide a “concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive and interesting account of the story the data tell- within and across themes” (Ibid 93) in order to provide a deep understanding of the meaning and implications of the themes and the assumptions underlying them in relation to the various aspects of the modernization process pursued ideologically and pragmatically by the states/ elites of the modern Iran and Turkey in the foundational eras of these two nation-states. This report will put forth extracts of data categorized under the three aforementioned major themes and their respective subthemes. These extracts will be embedded in an analytic narrative that will try to make and support the argument that the process of modernization categorized under the *three major themes* of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization” pursued in Iran’s and Turkey’s foundation eras had been a two-pronged approach carried out at both the “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels with almost equal intensity and yet varying degrees of success.

The two levels of modernization called “pragmatic” and “ideological” in this study are utilized to address the processes of modernization carried out to modernize the “hard” infrastructure of Iran and Turkey in the mentioned era and the “soft” one

in the world of ideas. The “pragmatic” level refers to processes such as industrialization, establishing new economic, legal and political institutions, reforming the already existing state institutions like bureaucracy and governing structure, passing new laws to modernize the country’s economic and legal systems and institutions, modernizing and extending the public education system and health system and other reforms that primarily resorted to changing the physical landscapes and real-life situation of the country.

The “ideological” level refers to processes that took the world of ideas and the ideological context of the society as their primary point of focus. In this vein, efforts by the state/elites to instill the values of modern western culture, society and politics in the minds of their domestic audience represents “ideological” modernization. For instance, promoting the ideas of “republic,” “nation,” “Western lifestyle,” “language reform,” “importance of modern education,” “women’s rights” and “the importance of democracy and political parties” count as features of the “ideological” level of the modernization projects undertaken by the state/elites of Iran and Turkey. However, it should be noted that categorizing modernization processes as belonging to the “pragmatic” or “ideological” level does not mean that those processes purely and solely belonged to one of the two categories and had nothing at all to do with the other category. It means that there was a significantly stronger emphasis on the “pragmatic” or “ideological” aspect of modernization in a specific process or that one of the two aspects was more highlighted in a specific process. For instance, building a national railway system in the context of Iran entailed dedicating real manpower and money to executing the project and properly speaking belonged to the “pragmatic” level of modernization, however, it also stood as a symbol of Iran’s revived entry into the “modern” world and carried ideological overtones as well. Another point to take into account here is that certain modernization processes required equally strong emphasis and serious effort at both levels of modernization in order to be executed successfully. In such cases, both pragmatic and ideological aspects of the process will be elaborated on. For instance, the issue of language reform in Turkey had a highlighted pragmatic aspect including the change to Latin alphabet and the effort by the state to teach the new alphabet to

the public through a national network of schools, state employees, intellectuals and journalists. At the same time, it entailed an equally strong ideological aspect that included efforts by state-supported linguists and elites to fabricate a history and genealogy for the Turkish language through the Sun Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teorisi) that had the ideological aim of creating a unique and historical identity for the nascent Turkish nation and republic.

It could be argued that based on the close reading of the newspaper samples, the elites of the two countries had very much recognized the fact that these two levels of modernization are interconnected and in order to take their countries and societies to the ranks of modern nation-states, they needed to pay serious attention to both “ideological” and “pragmatic” sides of the modernization process. Moreover, it will be argued that in order to understand the success or failure of the “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels of modernization and the processes of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” “political/legal modernization” pursued under these two overarching levels by the states/elites of the two countries as presented on the front pages of the four selected newspapers, one needs to move beyond the mere content of the data sample. Indeed, the particular strategies pursued by the state/elites to introduce “ideological” and “pragmatic” modernization into Iran and Turkey in their foundational eras together with the economic, political and sociocultural contexts and structures of the time and the respective historical legacies of the two nations specially with regards to the Constitutional eras preceding the period of the current study are the major factors that help explain the relative success or failure of modernization in either country. The analytic narrative will also utilize the insights gained from the thematic analysis of the four newspapers to elaborate on the similarities and differences in the ways in which the “ideological” and “pragmatic” aspects of modernization were pursued by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey. This will in turn lead to putting forth a deeper comparative understanding of the trajectories of modernization in the two cases and the reasons behind the successes or failures of the various aspects of modernization and later democracy in each case in the covered timeframe of the study and the period following it in a comparative sense.

CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

5.1. Outline of the Chapter

The present chapter builds on the theoretical and methodological frameworks developed in the previous chapters to elaborate on the empirical findings of the present study. The chapter starts with a brief restatement of the relevance of the Modernization and Selectorate theories to the present study and in particular its empirical aspect. In the second part, the empirical findings are explained in the form of a narrative that aims at reconstructing the specific ideological package of modernization promoted by the Iranian and Turkish elites on the front pages of the four state-aligned selected newspapers. The report will use thematic analysis with a focus on the specific “modernization” aspect of the data set. Tracking and discussing the overarching themes of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization” sets the stage for acquiring deep insights into the specific assumptions and ideas underlying the Iranian and Turkish elites’ version of modernization. This is in turn complemented by discussing the particular sub-themes for each of these three overarching themes. For “economic modernization”, the subthemes of “industrialization,” “modern economic laws,” and “modern economic institutions” are elaborated. “Promoting a western lifestyle and appearance,” “promoting women’s rights,” “modernizing education and educating the public” and “language reform” will be discussed as the subthemes under the major theme of “socio-cultural modernization”. Finally, “modern political system and parties,” “creation of a modern nation” and “modernization of laws and legal system” will be addressed under the overarching theme of “political/legal modernization”. Through analyzing the three aforementioned overarching themes and their subthemes, this report will be provided in the form of an analytic narrative that will try to make and support the argument that the process of modernization

pursued by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in their foundation eras had been a two-pronged approach carried out at both the “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels with almost equal intensity and yet varying degrees of success. It could be argued that based on the close reading of the newspaper samples, the elites of the two countries had fully recognized the fact that these two levels of modernization were interconnected and in order to take their nations to the ranks of modern nation-states, they needed to pay serious attention to both “ideological” and “pragmatic” sides of the modernization process. Moreover, the analytic narrative will help embed the ideological package of modernization promoted by the Iranian and Turkish elites in the economic, political and sociocultural contexts of their time and provide deeper insights into the historical continuities and ruptures of these two nations’ foundation eras with their historical heritage, in particular the constitutional eras preceding the advent of the modern nations of Iran and Turkey. Finally, the analytic narrative will compare the modernization process in the two nations with the ambitious goal of shedding light on the similarities and differences in the ways in which the statist/elitist projects of modernization were pursued in Iran and Turkey. The purpose of such a comparison is to put forth a deeper comparative understanding of the trajectories of modernization in the two cases and the reasons behind the successes or failures of the various aspects of modernization and later democratization in each case in the covered timeframe of the study and the period following it.

5.2. Relevance of Theoretical Tools to Empirical Methods

Modernization theory refers to a body of books and articles published by scholars working in various academic fields including political science, economics, political economy, sociology and history among others. These scholars viewed their intellectual project as one that recreated and continued the ideals of the Enlightenment in developing and underdeveloped countries. Their main concern was the process of modernization and the distinction between modern and traditional societies which they defined in an antithetical manner. Modernization theorists viewed the modern society as being “cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of change, and characterized by a complex division

of labor” (Gilman 2007, 5). Meanwhile, they presented traditional society as being “inward-looking, inert, passive toward nature, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically simple” (Ibid). Therefore, they felt it as incumbent on them to help formulate the principles by which underdeveloped and developing countries could go through a wholesale transformation of society, politics, cultural norms and individuals in order to reach “modernity”. Indeed, modernization theorists believed they had discovered “the common and essential pattern of development defined by progress in technology, military and bureaucratic institutions, and the political and social structure” (Gilman 2007, 3). These processes would supposedly help individual and social modernity to be materialized while also enabling the introduction and consolidation of modern values, ways of life and procedures in a society.

Modernization theory was an interdisciplinary and diffuse field of study and hence its various scholars hypothesized the features and processes underlying modernization differently. However, a number of processes including industrialization (transition from agrarian to industrial society), urbanization, centralization, bureaucratization, secularization, extension of education to all levels of society, technological advancement, emergence of mass media such as newspapers, rising income levels, introduction of advanced transportation technologies and political democratization have been frequently mentioned by modernization theorists as being integral to modernization of countries and nations (Gilman 2007; Lerner 1958; Marsh 2014; Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). They viewed these processes as enabling a society to move beyond the traditional socio-political and economic paradigms and catch up with modernity and all its ideals. Underlying their vision of modernization were certain stated and unstated assumptions that modernization theorists took for granted. For one thing, they propounded that modernization was “a global and irreversible process, which began with the Industrial Revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century in Europe” (Knöbl 2003, 96) and which would concern the whole world as it proceeds. Moreover, they viewed modernization to be a historical and teleological process that necessarily leads from traditional to modern societies. As a third assumption, they

believed that the move toward modernity in distinct societies will follow a more or less uniform, linear and convergent logic. Another important underlying idea in their work is that in the modern societies of the west, secular, individualistic and scientific values are predominant, while the traditional societies of the “third world” exhibit the dominance of values such as “ascriptive”, “particularism” and “functional diffuseness” (Knöbl 2003, 97) which serve as strong barriers to development. A fifth assumption is that modernization is “an endogenously driven process to be localized within societies” (Knöbl 2003, 97), meaning that a society’s trajectory of modernization is decided by the mechanism and forces inside a country. Assuming a causal or correlational link between economic development and democracy is the sixth major assumption of modernization theory and arguably its most discussed and contested one. These are solely the most salient assumptions of modernization theory and the six points mentioned here do not constitute an exhaustive list of all the possible points. Through the empirical part of the chapter, an effort will be made to foreground the modernization processes highlighted by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites on the front pages of the four selected newspapers. This will in turn help unearth the underlying assumptions behind the package of modernization propounded by the aforementioned states/elites. Comparing the processes and assumptions highlighted by Iranian and Turkish states/elites against the notions put forth by modernization theorists will help assess the veracity of the processes of modernization formulated by modernization theory and in the process refine its notions and ideas. In addition, this will enable one to assess and better understand the real particular trajectories of modernization in the cases of Iran and Turkey and by doing so shed light on the particular way(s) in which modernization takes place in various countries and societies.

The other theoretical pillar of the current study is the Selectorate theory put forth by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) which tries to hypothesize the way(s) in which political leaders make their decisions and policies in order to stay in power and by doing so affect the prospects of development in a society. The selectorate theory serves as one of the two theoretical backbones of the current study for several reasons. The current study is mainly concerned with the ways in which the discourse

of modernization was created and promoted by the elites in Iran and Turkey. In order to reach its objectives, it analyzes state-aligned newspapers. Using the notions of “selectorate” and “winning coalition” provides theoretical tools for tracking the members of each leader’s winning coalition and the ways in which they tried to reshape the society and keep the incumbent leader in power by promoting certain modernizing themes, ideas and discourses through their establishment of and writing in newspapers as channels of mass communication. The notion of winning coalition elaborates on the role of the members of the “winning coalition” that help a leader rise to power and to whom the leader answers. This winning coalition includes members of the elite who hold key positions of power and who have considerable power over the resources of the society and nation. Indeed, the newspapers served as platforms through which the winning coalition dispersed their vision of modernization to the various corners of their societies and to all the members of the selectorate. Thus, the Selectorate theory is particularly well-suited to studying modernization in the cases of Iran and Turkey since a rather small group of elites joined hands with charismatic leaders in order to transform their respective countries/nations from traditional into modern ones. Moreover, utilizing such a theory helps us recognize the members of the winning coalition in the cases of Iran and Turkey and the way(s) in which they were connected to each other and to the leader. Additionally, the selectorate theory’s notions of the “challenger” and its characterization of “rigged-election autocracies...characterized by small winning coalitions and large selectorates” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 8) are very much applicable to the cases of Iran and Turkey. Using these notions to analyze the ruling elites’ discourses on political opposition, parties and democracy as promoted in the newspapers serves a windows to understanding the impediments to political democratization in our two cases. This will in turn help us understand why effective opposition figures and parties as challengers to the incumbent leaders could not gain a foothold in the foundation eras of Iran and Turkey regardless of the introduction of some formal mechanisms of democracy into these two countries. Utilizing modernization and selectorate theories will provide insights into the ways in which the leaders/elites of Iran and Turkey in the foundation eras both continued the

historical and institutional legacies of these nations and created ruptures with them in order to move the modernization initiatives forward.

5.3. The Road Map for Empirical Analysis and Findings

Thematic analysis serves as the methodological tool through which the front pages of the four selected newspapers will be analyzed in order to delve into the particular modernization ideology propounded by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in the foundation eras of their nations and to compare them. The overarching themes selected for this purpose include “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization,” each of which would be discussed separately in the empirical findings section. As mentioned before, each overarching theme has several sub-themes which will be addressed in some detail and in relation with the overarching theme they are connected with. The final report will argue that the modernization project carried out by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey constituted a two-pronged approach performed at both “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels with almost equal intensity and yet varying degrees of success. This in turn will lead to the argument that the leaders/elites of these two nations had fully recognized the fact that these two levels of modernization are interconnected and in order to take their respective countries and societies to the ranks of modern nation-states, they needed to pay serious attention to both the “ideological” and “pragmatic” sides of the modernization coin. Moreover, it will be argued that in order to understand the success or failure of the “ideological” and “pragmatic” levels of modernization and the processes of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization” pursued under these two overarching levels by the states/elites of the two countries as presented on the front pages of the four selected newspapers, one needs to move beyond the mere content of the data sample. Indeed, the particular strategies pursued by the state/elites to introduce “ideological” and “pragmatic” modernization into Iran and Turkey in their foundational eras together with the economic, political and sociocultural contexts and structures of the time and the respective historical legacies of the two nations specially with regards to the Constitutional eras preceding the period of the

current study are the major factors that help explain the relative success or failure of modernization in either country. The analytic narrative will also utilize the insights gained from the thematic analysis of the four newspapers to elaborate on the similarities and differences in the ways in which the “ideological” and “pragmatic” aspects of modernization were pursued by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey. This will in turn lead to putting forth a deeper comparative understanding of the trajectories of modernization in the two cases and the reasons behind the successes or failures of the various aspects of modernization and later democracy in each case in the covered timeframe of the study and the period following it in a comparative sense.

5.4. Discussion of Empirical Findings

5.4.1. Economic Modernization

One of the most urgent issues that the states and elites of Iran and Turkey faced early on in their foundation eras was fixing an economy that was plagued by various domestic and foreign ills. These two nations inherited traditional economies mostly dependent on agriculture and production of raw materials with financial and taxing systems that remained underdeveloped and economic capitulations made to foreign powers that highly limited the ability of the state to be truly sovereign over its economy. Moreover, there was no industrial sector in these economies in the proper sense of the word and industrialization was mostly limited to the establishment of a few factories, mostly catering to the needs of the military, while the level of foreign trade remained low and these countries exported raw materials and imported modern Western goods. While some preliminary measures of economic reform and modernization aimed at overhauling the taxing system and creating an industrial sector had already been undertaken in the late Ottoman era by the CUP administrations, they remained very limited in their scale and impact. The situation was direr in the case of Iran since a central state was missing and as a result a central taxing system was non-existent and nothing even remotely close to the start of an industrialization drive could be seen.

The states/elites of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras undertook the economic modernization initiative on the back of such an economic heritage as one of their first priorities. They fully understood the importance of creating a robust economy for the survival of their regimes. In the present study, the overarching theme of “economic modernization” will be discussed under the subthemes of “industrialization,” “modern economic laws,” and “modern economic institutions”. In turn, the subthemes will each be addressed in relation with the “pragmatic” and “ideological” levels of modernization in order to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which the states/elites of Iran and Turkey utilized each of these subthemes on the front pages of the four state-aligned newspapers in order to push the modernization initiative forward.

5.4.1.1. The Contours of Economic Modernization Discussed in Newspapers

Broad as it is, economic modernization and its significance were discussed from various vantage points on the front pages of the four selected newspapers. The Turkish newspapers published editorials and news reports related to economic modernization on issues as diverse as job creation, importance of processing raw materials for exports, the government’s task to assume the central role in the industrialization process via etatism (*devletçilik*), investment in domestic industries, the significance of reforming the national finance system, the importance of creating new specialized banks to develop the domestic economy, creating a balanced modern budget as the basis of economic modernization, modernizing agriculture, making Turkey’s trade balance against Western countries positive, boosting government savings, developing Turkish economy’s tourism sector and supporting national currency among others. Another facet of the debate on economic modernization had to do with editorials and news reports that covered the economic issues and institutions of the developed countries. There is a plethora of editorials and news reports specially in relation with the Great Depression and the various conferences held and stances taken by the economically powerful countries to weather the storm of the financial crisis. The impacts of this financial crisis on Turkey and its economic

development fortunes are also discussed at length. The wide range of the issues discussed is not surprising given the feeling among the Turkish elites that a new era had dawned and it required fresh beginnings and reforms in every conceivable field.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, the editorials and news pieces covered in relation to economic modernization include the importance of modernizing the country's imports and exports, boosting the government's revenues and financial balance, the significance of marine trade and shipping, creating a modern and well-functioning taxing system, the significance of reforming the traditional agricultural sector, supporting the national currency and establishing new banks to support the economy among others. The issue of the Great Depression and the decisions by major economic powerhouses of the West to address the issue is another major economic topic covered in the Iranian newspapers. The impacts of the crisis on the Iranian economy and currency and its development prospects are also discussed at length in various editorials and news reports. The range of economic issues discussed in Iranian newspapers is more limited than the Turkish ones but is still considerable. This has to do with the fact that Iranian elites presented and viewed the new regime and era as a fresh beginning in the various aspects of life and society including economic issues.

5.4.1.2. Industrialization

The necessity of transforming their dominantly agrarian societies into industrial ones was seen and depicted by Iranian and Turkish leaders/elites as the cornerstone of the economic modernization aspect of the general modernization initiative in each country. Comparing their countries with the industrially advanced countries of the West, they saw a big gap that separated them from such countries. The Iranian and Turkish elites each addressed the issue of industrialization in their own specific ways which will be covered below.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, the issue of industrialization was highlighted in several different ways. One of the most frequent techniques used by the Iranian newspapers was to run photos of newly established industrial plants and factories on their front pages. For instance, the news of the opening of a textile plant

in Chalous in northern Iran is published on top of the front page of *Koushesh* on Mordad 20, 1316/August 11, 1937. Of the two photos published here, according to its caption, one depicts the prime minister and members of the cabinet together with the speaker of the national assembly and senior MPs waiting in front of the entrance to the plant for the arrival of Reza Shah and crown prince Mohammad Reza to officially launch the production lines. The other photo seems to show Reza Shah and crown prince examining the plant's machinery, however, the quality makes it difficult to assert it with certainty.



Figure 1. *Koushesh*, 11 August 1937



Figure 2. *Koushesh*, 11 August 1937

The importance of the event and similar ones to the Iranian regime is obvious by just looking at the list of people attending the event. The caption of the photos makes the importance of the opening of new factories and industrialization to Iran more clear as it reads “Every single fellow Iranian citizen is filled with joy when reading the news of the launch of this type of institutions. Every one of such institutions is a step forward in providing for the public’s needs and making our country independent...silk fabrics are among the most important goods imported by our country and now under the auspices of the grand king of Iran, Chalous textile plant will provide for domestic demand for this product. Moreover, a good number of the youth and specially the educated girls are put to work in this plant and are grateful for this to Iran’s savior (Reza Shah) for emancipating Iranian women from the depth of ignorance and enabling them to commute the path of modernization and progress”. The symbolism of the event is striking as it depicts the opening of this

new factory as a major step on the way toward the “pragmatic” or on-the-ground modernization of Iran while integrating into the narrative the element of women’s emancipation which is part of the “ideological” modernization aspect and depicted as necessary to Iran’s modernization. A report of “Iran Goods Expo” held in early June 1941 and published on Khordad 12, 1320/ June 2, 1941 on the front page of *Ettelaat* supports the point that industrialization was seen as a central piece of the state’s modernization project. Two photos of the new sugar production and textile production plants are accompanied by a report that goes over the details of the recent progress made in the country in establishing industrial plants, drawing attention to the “development of carpet weaving industry in the recent years which demonstrates the development and progress made in this national industry in the recent years”. This is followed by the figures showing how the introduction of industrial carpet weaving machinery has helped carpet production to increase by 42% from 1938-1940, hailing the industrial plant’s role in reviving Iran’s traditional carpet weaving which had been a manual craft for centuries. Reza Shah’s several-hours-long visit to the expo is highlighted as he meticulously visited the different pavilions including the minor ones and asked the heads of various state-established or state-supported industrial plants about the companies under their control, showing how serious the Shah took the importance of industrialization.

A second way of highlighting the importance of industrialization in the case of Iranian newspapers included editorials that discussed the various aspects of this phenomenon together with suggestions aimed at helping push the industrialization drive forward in Iran. In a series of editorials by a certain “Mr. Rahimzade Safavi” in *Ettelaat* the various shades of the industrialization drive in Iran are discussed at length. In one of these editorials dated Esfand 23, 1311/March 14, 1933, the author discusses the importance of developing steel and iron ore industries as the foundational industries to modernizing the economy. He goes on to stress the importance of steel industry saying “steel industry is the main asset for development and the mother of all industries. Unless the steel industry is established in the country, no other major industry can be fully established and there would be no certainty about the country’s future.” The author goes even further claiming that

“every single citizen of the country and the state should feel it incumbent on them to help develop the steel industry if they want to have an independent and free country,” thus connecting the importance of industrialization to national sovereignty. Another piece on the front page of *Koushesh* dated Mordad 16, 1319/August 7, 1940 discusses the passing of a new law on the establishment of industrial institutions and their significance for the economy. It emphasizes the importance of such institutions for preparing citizens to develop the economy. It concludes by pointing out that “Such institutions are key in introducing capable artisans and industrialists to the country and it goes without saying that such institutions which are the offspring of the new glorious era of Iran will help the people’s skills and capabilities to be activated.” Hence, industrialization is depicted as being key to the development of the country’s economy and its citizens. All in all, in the case of Iranian newspapers, industrialization is primarily depicted as a key milestone in the “pragmatic” level of modernization while it is also argued that it would help women or citizens to develop personally and as such is depicted to have an impact on the individuals in line with the “ideological” level of modernization as well.

In the case of Turkish newspapers, industrialization is a frequent theme and its importance for modernizing the domestic economy is highlighted. One of the frequent ways to present industrialization as an integral part of the modernization drive was to print photos of the newly launched factories and also symbolic images drawn to represent the new Turkey’s progress. On the front page of the *Ulus* issue dated August 30, 1940 celebrating Zafer Bayrami (Victory Day), there is a big drawing depicting a woman in a western-style long red dress representing Turkey with the Turkish flag hanging behind her head.



Figure 3. Ulus, 30 August 1940

In the bottom right corner of the drawing, a cluster of wheat is depicted under the woman's left hand while the left side of the drawing is totally dedicated to the symbols of industrialization with a train on the move and symbolic depictions of factories in operation. The symbolism is significant in that it intertwines the fortunes of modern Turkey to the progress of industrialization in the country. Another issue of *Ulus* published on October 29, 1948 on the anniversary of Cumhuriyet Bayrami (Republic Day) once again demonstrates the vital importance of industrialization to Turkey's modernization and beyond that to its sovereignty. A collage of the photos of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü and a drawing covers the whole page. In the center of the drawing, the figures of three soldiers representing Turkey's land, navy and air forces are presented with military airplanes flying overhead, representing the importance of the military to Turkey's sovereignty and survival. However, a good portion of the background is dedicated to symbols of industrialization. Aside from a small space in the bottom left side of the drawing depicting mechanized agriculture, the rest of the background presents symbols of Turkey's industrialization drive. The drawing of a train together with construction vehicles building a bridge accompanied by representations of industrial plants in operation and a commercial port signify the importance of industrialization to modern Turkey and its future prospects.



Figure 4. Ulus, 29 October 1948

An issue of *Cumhuriyet* printed on October 29, 1933 features a big collage of Atatürk and a drawing. Atatürk is depicted in top center like a sun. On his left, there is a small photo with the figures 1923 depicting decrepit houses and roads symbolizing Ottoman Turkey while on his right, there is a small photo with the figures 1933 depicting several factory chimneys in operation and a new bridge symbolizing the transformation of Turkey to an industrial country.



Figure 5. Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1933

However, the most salient aspect of the drawing is a big train on the move as the most significant symbol of industrialization. The symbolism of industrialization and its significance to Turkey's sovereignty and survival is repeated in the similar drawings and collages printed on the front pages of the Turkish newspapers specially on the anniversary of the Republic Day. On such occasions industrialization is always depicted together with military prowess as the pillars of the new Turkish Republic. Similar to Iranian newspapers, photos of the opening ceremony of new factories attended by senior state officials are presented on the front pages of the newspapers and their words on the significance of industrialization are printed as well. In all these drawings and photos of the opening of new factories, the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization is highlighted in the industrialization process. However, this is always connected to the "ideological" aspect as industrialization is depicted to be indispensable to modern Turkey's survival and development.

Another method of highlighting the significance of industrialization in Turkish newspapers is publishing of editorials discussing industrialization's various aspects and significance to the modern Turkey. An editorial on the front page of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* published on March 4, 1932 illustrates the importance of industrialization and the necessity of the government's interference to push the process forward. Falih Rıfkı who is the author of the piece discusses the necessity of the state's support for Turkish industrialists. He goes on to point out that "In our idea, in regards with establishing and investing in industries the state is the biggest industrialist. The state is the organization which would prepare rational plans for industries, reform the old ones and finish the incomplete projects. In order to achieve this feat, the element of government control is necessary. Therefore, it would be vital to set up a plan to lay the foundation for developing Turkey's industries and waste no time in doing so." The editorial emphasizes the vitality of industrialization to the new republic and depicts the state as the main force behind the industrialization drive or what was called etatism (*devletçilik*). An issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated January 10, 1930 adopts a similar tone emphasizing the importance of industrialization to modernization of the new Turkish Republic while calling on the government to help create an indigenous industrial class of entrepreneurs. In the column named "Is it not

right (Turkish: *Doğru değil mi?*)”, the author whose name is not mentioned goes over the state’s plan for industrializing the economy and the central and controlling role assumed by the state in the industrialization drive. He continues by pointing out that the small industries are being hurt because they are unable to compete with their state-sponsored rivals. The author concludes by pointing out that “We believe that in order to draft and examine an industrial plan, much attention must be paid to the situation of the private factories and industries and the many advantages, tax exemptions and financial aids granted to the state-owned factories must also be granted to these small private industries to enable them to compete with the state-owned ones”. While the tone of the two pieces published by *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on the importance of industrialization is different, they both take industrialization to be a must for the development of the Turkish economy and depict the government as the main entity in charge of the task in line with the etatism policy. However, the piece in *Cumhuriyet* addresses the importance of helping develop a class of private industrial entrepreneurs, side by side with the state-owned industries. Thus, in the case of Turkish newspapers, there is a concentrated effort to depict (in drawings and photos) and present (in editorials and columns) the need to industrialize the country’s economy as a major factor for the country’s survival and modernization with the emphasis on the “pragmatic” level of modernization intertwined at points with the “ideological” level. From the ideological aspect, industrialization is presented as being indispensable to the development of the new modern Turkish nation and its sovereignty.

Comparing the Iranian and Turkish newspapers’ depiction of the importance of industrialization as an important piece of the economic modernization package reveals several points. Firstly, industrialization has received significant emphasis on the front pages of the four examined newspapers by the elites of both countries as they depicted this process as significant to the “pragmatic” aspect of modernization. However, there is also a latent “ideological” aspect to depictions of industrialization as the progress made in this respect is variously presented as causing or being linked with such concepts as national sovereignty, women’s emancipation and freedom.

Secondly, in the case of Turkey, one can see how the winning coalition of the leader who write frequently in the newspapers back up the state policy of controlling the economy (via etatism) as an integral part of the industrialization process. This policy meant that the state distributed specific private goods in the form of high positions in the state-sponsored industries and financial rents to the members of the winning coalition. Such a policy manipulated the public good of industrialization in a way that private benefits were funneled to members of the winning coalition and by doing so guaranteed the survival of the regime and its leader. In the case of Iran, the state sponsored creation of certain industries and owned various factories, however, no official policy of central control and planning of the economy existed and efforts at industrialization remained limited and scattered. Therefore, the Iranian newspapers did not seriously discuss the concept of a statist economy and in a very general manner called for the need to industrialize the country's economy.

Finally, the discussions of industrialization presented on the front pages of the Turkish newspapers are more frequent and cover more aspects of the issue in line with the state's more concentrated efforts at industrializing the economy compared with the Iranian state. Iranian state's efforts at industrialization are more scattered and not well-integrated which is reflected in the newspapers' lower level of enthusiasm and energy dedicated to the concept in comparison with Turkish newspapers.

5.4.1.3. Modern Economic Laws

The leaders and elites of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras had understood the significance of overhauling and modernizing their respective country's economy as a necessary tail of the modernization process. To do so, introducing new economic laws and modernizing the already existing ones were undertaken as a major initiative by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey in the mentioned era. This process was discussed and presented on the front pages of the selected newspapers in various ways.

One of the most salient ways of promoting the theme of "modern economic laws" was printing the new economic laws passed by the national assemblies on the

front page of the newspapers and discussing their details and significance. Such a measure had the aim of informing the public about efforts made at modernizing economic laws since the majority were uninformed about the way modern economies and economic laws worked. There was an educational objective in this effort as well since the elites believed that training citizens in the modern economic methods and jargons was the requirement for making the transition to a modern society. The issue of *Ettelaat* dated Aban 15, 1307/November 6, 1928 named “Reforming the Economic Situation” discusses the importance of passing new economic laws in order to reform and modernize the economy. The author argues that increasing national wealth and boosting the economy is a must for modern Iran. He goes on to posit that reforming Iran’s outdated taxing system is the first and necessary step to modernize and improve the economy. He continues by arguing that passing any new tax law would require putting the higher share of the tax burden on the well-to-do people living in cities and the wealthy business men and property owners who benefit the most from the country’s financial resources and assets without paying their fair share of taxes at the expense of farmers. He concludes by positing that “The only way to overcome such discrimination is to pass a new capital gains tax. Such a law would distribute the country’s budget among the citizens in a fair manner...Therefore, we expect the seventh national assembly to take this big step in the path toward economic reform and overhaul the old laws by passing a new law on capital gains tax. This will help create a system in which every citizen pays his fair share of the taxes boosting government revenues and benefitting from public resources accordingly.” The emphasis on the need for introducing modern economic laws as the basis for other reforms is clearly stated in the editorial and it is even argued that such modernizing efforts are necessary to produce economic and social justice.

The importance of modern economic laws to the overall modernization project undertaken by the state is discussed in more detail in the issue of *Koushesh* dated Esfand 29, 1308/March 20, 1930 which elaborates on the newly passed bill on capital gains tax and its significance to economic modernization. The editorial starts by arguing that “A country that is keen on treading the highway of development and progress and a nation that is willing to reap the benefits of civilization and social life

must readjust its administrative affairs to match the needs of civilization and to make all the aspects of its life connected to each other in a disciplined manner like a machine.” The rhetoric is quite revealing from the start since the newly passed law and similar ones are depicted as enabling the nation to join the ranks of civilization and modernity. The author goes on to argue that “Such a new path requires spending money on reforming administrative structures...and the lack of necessary revenues in the annual budget keeps us from being able to perform meaningful reforms in health system, education, judicial system and many other arenas.” During the rest of the article, the author supports the government’s new capital gains tax bill, calling it necessary to raise the revenues for performing modernizing reforms and promoting it a tax that is in line with a just and fair society. The author discusses the details of the bill and even calls for exemptions to be granted to civil servants and teachers due to some reasons. Thus, the author tries to both educate the public in the new economic laws and also depict them as key to carrying out reform and modernization in various aspects by the state. All in all, in the case of Iranian newspapers, the elites writing the articles present the issue of reforming economic laws and passing new, modern economic laws as the basis for modernizing the economy. In their articles, they emphasize the importance of these new economic laws to set the stage for the “pragmatic” aspect of modernization to proceed and for the realization of the increase in national wealth and the revival of national economy to become possible. However, there is also an emphasis on the “ideological” aspect and the social benefits of such measures on the society as their by-product is depicted to be an increase in the well-being of the public and justice in society. The elites argue that this is made possible as modern economic laws help the state pursue the modernization drive at full speed, with the economically less advantaged majority of the population being the main beneficiaries of economic reforms and modern economic laws.

In the case of the Turkish newspapers, the necessity of passing modern economic laws and reforming the already existing laws are discussed in several ways. One of the most frequent ways was to print the new economic legislation passed by the national assembly and discuss its strengths and weaknesses. As in the

case of Iran, there were both educational and political reasons behind such an effort. For one thing, the Turkish elites aimed at raising the level of economic knowledge of the masses to help them catch up with the definition of a modern citizen that the elites had in mind. Such a citizen had to have at least fundamental knowledge of the workings of economy and could join in the national initiative for building a modern economy. The political reason behind such a measure was to consolidate the position of the new state, its leader and the winning coalition and to promote the ideology of modernization they tried to disperse among the people. As an example, the *Ulus* editorial dated July 7, 1937 by Kemal Ünal discusses the newly passed law on contracts. He starts by arguing that in the Ottoman regime, the whole burden of taxing was on the farmers which in addition to being unfair, caused the financial base of the government to be weak. He posits that “With the advent of the Republic, the national economy gained a fresh resilience and the new taxes gave it a fresh start. As the industrial contracts and credit tools became more widespread in modern Turkey, new taxes were introduced, among which the tax on contracts is the most recent one.” He goes on to elaborate on the changes made to the previous laws in order to create the new one and provides a comprehensive review of the details. He concludes by arguing that “raising the percentage of the tax on contracts and widening the tax base (in the new version) is a positive measure and the constant revision and reforming of the tax demonstrates that the path taken (by the assembly) is a good one.” It can clearly be seen that the importance of reforming and modernizing economic laws is highlighted in this editorial. Indeed, such measures are presented as a must for boosting the national economy and making the tax burden fair for everyone. Highlighting the failure of the Ottoman state in this regard and giving credit to the republican system for achieving such a feat is another significant point as the elites tried to convince the readers that the economic modernization effort undertaken by the modern Republican state was necessary to Turkey’s survival. On another issue of *Ulus* dated December 27, 1942, the editorial by Falih Rıfkı named “The time when the state is asking us to do our duty” discusses the new bill regarding tax on wealth (*Varlık Vergisi*) approved by the national assembly, which targeted affluent citizens of the time -including many minority citizens. He starts by

positing that “The tax on wealth is not just a tax aimed at ameliorating the effects of the big crisis, it is the most correct and fair measure that can be taken in this time of distress. It is a big test for the wealthy fellow citizens who would like to do some financial sacrifice for their country.” The rhetoric is indicative of the stance taken by the elites toward modern economic laws. Once again the author presents the new tax as a pro-justice reform that results in the improvement of the living conditions of the masses and also puts forth the idea that it is not a mere legislation but a test of doing duty to one’s nation and state. He goes on to argue that “The tax on wealth... is not simply a call on urban businessmen, industrialists and those who possess high income. Since the establishment of the new state, this is the first time that it is the turn for businessmen, industrialists and those who possess high income to do their financial sacrifice.” He continues by pointing out the sacrifices made by the villagers and farmers in the time of the War of Independence and compares the situation of the contemporary situation of the Turkish Republic to that of the War of Independence, positing that the same mentality and level of sacrifice is required but this time by the well-to-do city dwellers. The conclusion of the editorial is all the more revealing. He concludes by arguing that “By doing their duty, the large prosperous urban classes do not simply pay their financial debt to the state... We are now in a big struggle in this homeland and for all of us who live in this country, we are in a struggle for survival and honor. If cooperation, unity in working and sharing in financial matters are materialized in the end, we will be able to finish this struggle with success through our unity.” The rhetoric is a recapture of the elites’ depiction of reforming laws and passing modern economic laws as part of the national struggle for survival and honor. As such, it once again connects the economic modernization drive to the survival of the nation and its honor.

Another avenue through which the elites highlighted the importance of modernizing economic laws to the overall modernization project carried out by the state was through editorials that took a general and more theoretical stance toward modernizing economic laws and explained their necessity for the country. In this vein, the *Cumhuriyet* editorial on December 14, 1937 by Yunus Nadi, the significance and necessity of modernizing economic laws and its connection with the

country's and nation's future are discussed at length. He discusses the issue of savings and the government's economic policy making. The initiative for increasing savings is depicted to be the top priority on the state's and nation's agenda and it is argued that the big international financial crisis has taught the nation a good lesson that "the big crisis helped us to take big steps in the economic war and to proceed far. It helped us understand the meaning of the nation's economic rights. National economy is nothing less than all the tasks a country has and its whole life." Thus, the importance of economy to the survival of the nation is emphasized in order to set the stage for arguing the need for modernizing economic laws and structures. Nadi mentions the issue of national currency devaluation that had taken place eight years ago as having had big psychological impacts on the people and argues that the Republican regime's reform of economic laws helped settle the issue. "Since eight years ago, our government and our nation have demonstrated a very strong unity in their economic journey and this has helped us make considerable progress that we look up to with satisfaction and as a good example." Once again, there is an effort to prove that the state's and nation's economic fortunes are integrated and economic reform is of national importance and significance. However, the author does not stop here and posits that "If one asks us what our biggest success was (in light of the national currency crisis and its aftermath), we would definitely answer that the most important achievement was that we could improve our economic education and understanding." The importance of economic reforms and new economic laws is depicted to go beyond financial gains and result in a modernization of the individuals' mentality and their understanding of the modern world. The Turkish elites viewed this as being indispensable to the process of modernization. Nadi concludes by emphasizing the effectiveness of the state's reform measures in saving the value of national currency saying "...every nation's imports and exports potentials must be matched with its level of civilization. Industrialization is the top requirement for reaching the civilization of the 20th century." In summary, the editorial establishes a link between modern economic laws and measures and the nation's fortunes and survival and includes the assumption that modernizing economic laws is a necessary step toward modern civilization. In another interesting

editorial by Yunus Nadi published on *Cumhuriyet*'s front page on May 11, 1929 named "The economist nation" (*İktisatçı Millet*), he discusses the importance of reforming and modernizing economic laws in addition to the necessity of training a nation that has a good understanding of modern economic laws. He covers a range of economic issues for which modern laws need to be passed including import/export, government savings and the like, going even as far as proposing the establishment of an economic parliament that would be the body in charge of reforming the existing economic laws and making economic policy. However, he posits that for the Turkish Republic to be successful in its economic struggle, there is the need for an "economist nation" (*İktisatçı Millet*). "In order to fix and boost the national economy, in line with the state's performance of its duties, every one of us as members of this nation must do their own duties...Included in these duties is the need for the creation of cooperatives by people that provide the necessary financial resources to make the export of goods easier in a more disciplined manner and to increase their savings through austerity in order to funnel their savings into efforts for boosting the national economy. The importance of savings is arguably the most important task that the members of the nation have toward the national economy." The editorial is very significant since it moves beyond the effort to integrate the survival of the nation and its economic fortunes to the state's economic reforms by arguing that the members of the nation must do their "duty" in this process of economic revival and modernization. To sum up, in the case of Turkish newspapers, the elites working as part of the leader's winning coalition made a concentrated effort to present the case for reforming and modernizing economic laws to be not merely a step toward a better economic life but one that aims at creating a society which is more just. In addition, the elites tried to align the nation with their economic modernization initiative by arguing that taking part in it is a "duty" that each member of the nation has toward the nation and also the state. However, the success of these efforts by the elites in the winning coalition seems to have been limited as they viewed the masses who made the majority of the electorate as passive receivers of state and elites' orders in the modernization drive and not as qualified, active participants in shaping it.

Comparing the Iranian and Turkish elites' presentation of the case for modernizing economic laws on the front pages of the selected newspapers reveals some interesting points of convergence and divergence. For one thing, the emphasis on the social impact of such reforms with a particular emphasis on justice is prevalent in the editorials written by both the Iranian and Turkish elites. Doing so, they tried to convince the people that the reforms by the state served as a public good provided to the nation by the leader and his winning coalition and not as a private good that would enrich certain influential political and economic actors who were aligned with the state. For another thing, the range of areas covered in relation to modernizing economic laws by the Turkish elites is wider than the ones discussed by the Iranian ones. The issues of savings, taxes, industrial policy and financial and monetary policy among others are discussed by the Turkish elites, while in the case of Iran, calling for the necessity of reforming economic laws remains mostly limited to taxes and import/export regulations.

As a last point, in the case of Turkish newspapers, there is a concentrated and strong effort to call on members of the nation to take active part in the process of the reform of economic laws by presenting it as their duty to the nation and through establishing a link between such reforms and the nation's existence and survival. In general, the elites of both countries presented the case for modernizing economic laws as an important ingredient in the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization that would cause tangible improvement to the economic well-being of the masses. However, there is also a secondary and latent emphasis on the "ideological" aspect of modernization which is visible in the arguments by the elites for viewing economic legislation reform as an effort that guarantees the nation's survival and helps its members to acquire an understanding of modern economy and economic laws.

5.4.1.4. Modern Economic Institutions

The issue of establishing new economic institutions was highlighted by the elites in both Iran and Turkey since such institutions were seen to be important pillars of the economic modernization drive. From various types of specialized banks to modern financial and economic tools such as stock exchange halls and insurance,

these modern economic institutions were depicted as being the means through which the domestic economy could be modernized. While there is some convergence in the issues covered in this regard by the Iranian and Turkish elites, there are also points of considerable divergence. This was due to the fact that the economic institutions established in the late Ottoman era served as an acceptable basis for the later efforts of the Turkish Republic to establish modern economic institutions. In the case of Iran, the national economy was much more traditional in every sense and there was no foundation to build the fundamental economic institutions needed for a modern society on it. Therefore, the topics and levels of discussion in regards with establishing modern economic institutions in the two cases may be considerably divergent.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, the need for establishing new economic organizations is emphasized in various editorials. The front page of *Ettelaat* on Esfand 20, 1312/March 11, 1934 includes a column by Mr. Rahimzade Safavi in which he discusses economic reform. He starts by arguing that in order to perform any reforms to enable the country to develop economically, it is necessary to create a basic plan of reforms. He then goes on to mention the modern economic organizations and tools that he views as being indispensable to the overarching plan. "One of the most significant parts of this general plan has to do with establishing of stock exchange halls and brokers. Therefore, it is mandatory for any Iranian citizen who likes the country's progress to ask the state to create these organizations. And it is the state's duty to make sure that the regulations it drafts for these organizations facilitate their operations and are in line with the accepted trade laws." The establishment of stock exchange halls is presented as a very important ingredient of modernizing the economy and calling for it is depicted to be the citizens' duty. Safavi goes on to explain the way traders buy and sell stocks and the supervision committee that monitors the deals. This shows how underdeveloped the Iranian economy was at the time with no stock exchange hall and also the fact that the masses did not have the fundamental knowledge needed for understanding modern economic organizations.

Another point that he discusses is the establishment of modern trading companies. He goes on to mention that the prerequisites for the establishment of some such companies have been prepared in the various provinces through the state's encouragement by businessmen and traders. He mentions the advantages of such companies positing that " If we imagine that a hundred small companies are established in a city each with the starting investment of 100,000 toman...then many people would be involved in running the affairs of the hundred established companies and through this many people would come into contact with the cycle of trade and will be trained in it... this will result in the introduction of numerous business people who are well trained and knowledgeable about trade and economy and who are all trained in the realities of economy." The author depicts the establishment of new economic institutions like trading companies as a way to boost the economy. According to the author, this also serves as a training ground for citizens of a modern society who should necessarily master the knowledge of modern trade and economics.

On another issue of *Ettelaat* dated Esfand 2, 1309/February 21, 1931, the editorial discusses the importance of insurance and insurance companies to the modern economy. The author starts by arguing that "Insurance is about to become one of the essential aspects of the economic life. And so it is worthwhile to discuss it to some extent here in order to enlighten the public about it." The mere fact that the modern institution of insurance was not yet familiar to many Iranian citizens at the time gives a good sense of how urgent the need for establishing modern economic institutions and educating the public about them was for the elites. The author continues by providing an overview of the various types of insurance premiums. He argues that "Insuring the traded goods is nothing new, however, in other countries, almost all sorts of things and creatures now have their specific type of insurance premium. Houses, furniture, institutions, jobs, industries, farming, animals, machinery and even human beings are all subjected to insurance." It is obvious that the modern institution of insurance was fully new to the author's audience and aside from the traditional type of insurance on traded goods, the other types were not known to the audience of his day. He goes on by emphasizing the importance of

establishing modern insurance companies that provide all types of modern insurance premiums and gives examples of foreign companies that provide these types of insurance premiums. As the editorials reviewed here show, in the case of Iran, the elites had to help create modern economic institutions from scratch since there was no infrastructure left from the previous regime for them to base the new modern economic institutions on. At the same time, they had to educate the masses about these new economic institutions in order to prepare them for being citizens of a modern economy. The emphasis on the “pragmatic” aspect of modernization is very much highlighted here and the establishing of these new economic institutions is presented as a necessary step for modernizing the economy and boosting the economic lot of the majority of the population. There is also an emphasis on the educational, “ideological” aspect of training the citizens to be members of a country with a modern economy.

In the case of Turkey, the discussion of modern economic institutions has its own shades and is pursued in its own specific ways by the elites. In particular, there are various calls by the elites for establishing specialized banks that were and are very common in modern countries and economies. In his editorial dated April 17, 1935 on the front page of *Cumhuriyet*, Yunus Nadi argues for the necessity of establishing a bank to support rural areas and farmers. The editorial starts by arguing that “It is necessary to establish a bank for the villagers using the revenues that are collected in the village funds...organizing the condition of the rural areas in a better way is a really urgent matter for the well-being of our country and nation.” The author goes on to call on the state to make the economic issues related to the rural areas its top priority and even suggests establishing a labor office in various villages to help the rural economy. He concludes by stressing the necessity of establishing a specialized bank for the rural areas positing that “ If paying attention and giving priority to the issues of rural areas had become the fundamental law of running the country, a special bank with an investment of a million lira would have been established and this organization would have been dedicated to their affairs quickly...nowadays all of us would probably agree with the point that this is not an impossible task and it is the basis for Turkey’s advancement.” As can be clearly seen

in the editorial, the author knows the importance of establishing specialized banks to modernizing and developing the economy and in particular emphasizes the significance of modernizing the rural economy to boost the national economy in turn.

In another editorial dated March 7, 1934, Yunus Nadi calls for the establishment of a “bank of housing and reconstruction” while discussing the issue of immigration of people from former Ottoman provinces into the new Republic of Turkey. “The issue of providing housing for the settlement of migrants who move into our country has for long been an important issue...Since a long time ago, we have come to the conclusion that to overcome this issue in an easy and effective way, it would be necessary to establish a bank of housing and reconstruction.” The author goes on to mention the various advantages of establishing such a bank and the mechanism by which an annual budget should be dedicated to such a cause. He argues that such a measure provides both the state and the migrants with an orderly and predictable process and helps the newly established republic to increase its low population. “If taken, such a measure would serve the benefits and the dignity of the immigrants and will solve the housing and reconstruction problem in Turkey...This way, the immigrants will easily be settled in prepared villages and will start their productive efforts without wasting any time afterwards. This will be beneficial to both the country and the immigrants. Thousands of economic and social advantages arise from this measure that are obvious and need not be explained at length here.” As in the previous editorial, the suggestion for establishing a specialized bank as a modern economic institution is depicted as being the solution that would help resolve historical problems in regards with the rural areas and the immigrants.

In summary, in the case of Turkey, the discussion of establishing modern economic institutions by elites is mostly focused on establishing modern specialized banks that would help solve historical problems. The “pragmatic” aspect of modernization is very much highlighted in this case with some cursory mention of the social benefits of establishing such institutions. In comparison, Iran’s economy in the period of focus for the present study was much more traditional and backward, without any economic and financial infrastructure upon which the modern economic institutions could be established. Therefore, the elites covered a wide range of issues

such as stock exchange halls and insurance industry that were new to the Iranian state and the masses alike. However, in the case of Turkey, the basis for various modern economic and financial institutions were laid in the late Ottoman era with the Republican regime building on the already laid foundations. Therefore, the Turkish elites of the Republican regime discussed the more recent and advanced modern economic institutions such as the specialized banks.

In summary, the overarching theme of economic modernization received considerable emphasis by the Iranian and Turkish elites of the time since they understood the significance of producing tangible improvements in the economic life of their nations in order to guarantee the regime's survival and have the masses on their side. There was a strong emphasis on the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization in all the three subthemes of economic modernization including "industrialization," "modern economic laws," and "modern economic institutions". However, the elites of both countries knew full well that economic modernization and its various incarnations including new kinds of taxes would not be easily accepted by the masses. As a result, there was a latent emphasis on the "ideological" aspect of modernization as the elites presented the economic modernization drive as being essential to the survival of the nation and to creating a more just and economically better society for the citizens. Moreover, they tried to train the citizens in the details of modern economics and its procedures in order to prepare them to join the state's devised plan for economic modernization. In terms of the Selectorate theory, the elites of a rather small winning coalition in both Iran and Turkey tried to sell the economic modernization drive to the majority of the selectorate who were left out of the decision making process. They did so by presenting economic modernization as a duty for every citizen and relating it to the national survival. However, the main beneficiaries of the economic modernization drive in both cases seem to have been members of the winning coalition who benefited from the private goods distributed by the state in the form of subsidies, rents and budget allocation to the industries, companies and modern economic institutions controlled by the elites of the winning coalition.

5.4.2. Socio-cultural Modernization

The importance of modernizing the social and cultural spheres in order to perform a full-fledged plan of modernization was fully recognized by the Iranian and Turkish elites. The elites of these two countries most of whom had studied in European countries or visited them understood the importance of the need for modernizing society and culture for the general project of modernization to take root in their respective countries and nations. As such, they discussed various ideas and points in relation to the measures needed to modernize these spheres. The new regimes of Iran and Turkey had inherited deeply traditional societies in which Islam had a prominent role and except from a small modern, secular elite, the majority of the population looked up to tradition and Islam as the pillars of their social and cultural life. This had led to a wide cultural gap between the elites who saw Islam as an impediment to modernization and the masses who felt Islam to be the basis of their individual and social life. The Iranian and Turkish citizens at the time had little information of life in the European countries and considered European culture and manners to be decadent and in contradiction with the teachings of Islam. Therefore, giving up their own way of life for the European lifestyle was anathema to the masses while the elites viewed this as a necessary step on the path toward modernization. It was in such an atmosphere that the Iranian and Turkish elites tried to bring their plan for socio-cultural modernization into fruition. This specific aspect of modernization was arguably the most complicated and challenging for the Iranian and Turkish states/elites to execute and gave rise to the most heated debates and complaints among the public.

It was in such a context and on the back of several decades of mostly failed attempts at introducing Western culture and mores to their societies that the Iranian and Turkish elites undertook the initiative to modernize the societies and citizens of their respective countries/nations. They rightly believed socio-cultural modernization to be the facet of modernization process that was necessary to ensure their nations' integration into what they thought of as the modern civilization. As a result, they ran a concentrated and extended campaign to instill modern values and ideals in their societies and in the minds of the citizens. In the present study, the overarching theme

of “socio-cultural modernization” will be discussed under the subthemes of “promoting a western lifestyle and appearance,” “promoting women’s rights,” “modernizing education and educating the public” and “language reform”. In turn, the subthemes will each be discussed in relation with the “pragmatic” and “ideological” levels of modernization in order to gain a deeper understanding of the way in which the states/elites of Iran and Turkey utilized each of these subthemes on the front pages of the four state-aligned newspapers in order to push the modernization initiative forward.

5.4.2.1. The Contours of Socio-Cultural Modernization Discussed in Newspapers

Socio-cultural modernization covers a very broad range of issues and ideas that were discussed by the Iranian and Turkish elites on the front pages of the four selected newspapers. The issues discussed in this regard on the front pages of the Turkish newspapers included the need for modernizing national culture, language reform, westernizing the dress code and lifestyle, youth culture, music, theatrical pieces and literature as significant aspects of a modern culture, importance of modernizing social mores, state’s campaign of educating the public (*millet mektepleri*), reforms made to the education system, women’s emancipation and education, the significance of cultural events, the role of universities and higher education in society, the institution of People’s Houses (*Halk Evleri*) and children’s education and rearing among others. In the case of Iranian newspapers, the elites discussed the importance of universities, Persian literature and language reform, women’s emancipation and the need for male-female equality, unifying and westernizing the dress code, public education and literacy, modernizing the domestic education system, training teachers, the state-sponsored organization established to promote the state’s desired social and cultural ideology (Parvaresh-e Afkar Organization), music, importance of theatrical pieces and the need for modernizing social norms among others. The range and breadth of the issues covered in regards with sociocultural modernization by the Iranian and Turkish elites is considerable and it proves how seriously they treated the need for social and cultural

modernization as a major step on the path toward individual and social modernization.

5.4.2.2. Promoting a Western Lifestyle and Appearance

The elites of Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras had well understood that modernization is a multi-faceted process that required a wholesale transformation of the social and cultural arenas. They argued for the focal importance of modernizing their societies and their individuals in line with Western culture and lifestyle as a stepping stone on the path toward joining the ranks of modern countries and nations. Therefore, they dedicated considerable time and energy to the initiative for introducing modern lifestyle in all its various aspects to their societies since they believed that their traditions and respective histories were major impediments to the process of modernization. The Iranian and Turkish elites did so by discussing the issue from various perspectives which were mostly similar but had their differences as well. The differences existed due to each country's and nation's particular historical legacy and the socio-cultural context of the time. A discussion of the elites' promotion of a Western lifestyle and appearance follows.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, one of the most prominent issues discussed in regards with promoting a Western lifestyle and appearance was the elites' concentrated campaign of backing the state's decree to modernize the dress code. The aspect of this issue having to do with women's rights would be discussed under its own particular subtheme of women's rights later. In this vein, they presented the project of banning traditional clothes and imposing a unified dress code on the population as a revolutionary and hugely influential measure that would help the Iranian society and individuals join the ranks of modern Western societies and individuals. One of the ways through which the elites controlling these newspapers tried to push the Westernization of the dress code forward was by publishing announcements of the adoption of the Western dress code by the various social strata and guilds. In an example of such announcements, the issue of *Ettelaat* dated Mehr 14, 1307/ October 6, 1928 includes the following announcement on its front page. "Public celebrations in honor of the unified clothes and hats: In honor of unity and

unification, the butchers' guild is changing to modern unified clothes and will wear the glorious Pahlavi hat from this moment on. To celebrate this important occasion, a public celebration would be held on Monday the 8th in Sahm al Dowleh Garden. We humbly ask the state employees, members of parliament, media managers, businessmen and members of various guilds to join us in this joyful and glorious occasion." The exaggerated rhetoric and the decision to hold a public celebration for the change of clothing and dress code reveals the amount of importance the elites dedicated to Westernizing the dress code. As a side point, the people who are invited to this "public" celebration are all members of the higher urban social classes. This demonstrates the fact that the acceptance of the new changes made to the dress code remained limited to these classes and did not penetrate deep into the various social classes. Another strategy was the publication of editorials that argued for the necessity of modernizing dress code as a key milestone in the path toward joining the ranks of civilized and modern countries. The editorial of *Koushesh* dated Khordad 21, 1314/June 12, 1935 discusses the issue of the state's decree for the change from traditional turbans to modern hats. The author starts by positing the need for human beings to accept and implement changes in line with the progress and development of society and norms. "Throughout history, societies and nations have experienced various changes in all the different facets of life and none of the contemporary peoples still live according to their forefathers' customs. Each new generation has made major changes to life and created new customs in the path toward social evolution." Such a rhetoric reveals the fact that the Iranian elites viewed the change in the dress code as an important aspect of promoting Western lifestyle. The author goes on to posit that change is an indispensable component of civilization and adjusting oneself to new times is a necessary measure. He maintains that "the capacity for accepting and undertaking change is the condition for survival." He posits that the advances in science and the intellectual interaction among nations have made the nations' tastes in various subjects similar to each other and "...clothes and hats have become absolutely uniform in the countries throughout the world. The contemporary nations that have decided to tread the path of civilization, while distinct from each other...indeed try to build on the tools and ideas that other nations

introduce. Nowadays, the dress code, foods and habits of the civilized nations have become uniform with minor differences.” The author clearly posits that various nations take almost the same path toward modernization and civilization and that if a nation would like to join the ranks of civilized countries, it must assume all their modern features including the dress code. The author concludes by likening the change in the dress code to the other modernizing reforms in social manners and calls on the individuals to practice the social norms of modern societies.

As another distinct way of working to modernize lifestyle, the Iranian elites discussed the need for reforming and modernizing particular social norms and manners in their articles. For instance, on the *Koushesh* editorial dated Farvardin 31, 1307/April 20, 1928 the author discusses the importance of reforming the public’s social norms and mores as part of reforms to cities and citizens. The author starts by positing that “Urban reforms are among the important factors in reforming public mores and directing their thoughts toward the path of progress and civilization...having emphasized such points in the past, it would now be necessary to go over the importance of establishing theaters and watching theatrical pieces.” The author presents the issue of going to theaters and watching plays which is a staple of modern Western societies as a key component for reforming public morality. He elaborates on the history of plays and theatrical pieces and the way in which the Greeks and Romans used this art form to train the citizens of their societies in social manners and norms. He continues by arguing for the importance of theatrical pieces to the modern nations saying “Nowadays, the civilized nations place importance on plays and the Western authors are busy writing literary and didactic pieces and it is common for authors who are high-ranking poets, scientists and historians to bring these literary and didactic pieces to life in theaters...However, in our country theatrical pieces are not paid their due importance since the public has not yet digested the benefits of progress...this is while plays can serve as unique tools to demonstrate the vicious sides of old habits and the causes of the public’s decadence and misery.” It is clear that the author depicts building theaters and watching plays as one of the symbols of the Western lifestyle to be necessary for

reforming public mores while at the same time arguing that the old traditions and customs are to blame for the backwardness of the nation and individuals.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, the “ideological” aspect of promoting a Western lifestyle and appearance is highlighted as it is argued by the elite that adopting the Western civilization in its totality is necessary for a nation and a society to become modern. Reforming and modernizing the socio-cultural sphere is indeed presented as the basis for the consolidation of the modernization process in the Iranian society. However, the “pragmatic” aspect is also important since the state’s decree to unify clothes and hats also had the aim of transforming the appearance of people and the country to look like modern Western countries. The elites of the winning coalition who had studied in or visited European countries and acquired Western lifestyle and clothes tried to reshape the whole of the selectorate based on their vision of a modern society. Therefore, they tried to present the change in dress code as a public good that would benefit every member of the nation.

In the case of the Turkish newspapers, promotion of Western lifestyle and appearance and the need for modernizing the traditional dress code and way of living received considerable emphasis. One of the techniques through which the elites have tried to promote Western lifestyle and appearance was through publishing photos and drawings of Turkish men, women and children in Western clothes on the front pages. The aspect of this issue having to do with women would be discussed in the particular subtheme dedicated to women’s rights. For instance, the drawing on the front page of *Ulus* dated April 23, 1947 related to the National Sovereignty and Children’s Holiday depicts a male and female child in Western clothes with Turkey’s flag behind them.



Figure 6. Ulus, 23 April 1947

Children depicted in Western clothes signifies that Turkey's future depends on westernization and future generations would adopt the Western lifestyle. A similar drawing appears on the front page of *Ulus* issue dated April 23, 1948. In the drawing which is located in the center of the page, a male child in Western clothes is holding the number "23" in his hand while the word "Nisan" is at his feet, representing the National Sovereignty and Children's Holiday. Again, the symbolism is quite significant as it depicts Turkey's future and the fate of its future generations to lie with a full acquisition of Western lifestyle and dress code as the way toward joining the modern Western civilization. Another example is the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated April 23, 1938 which depicts a teenager boy scout in Western clothes with the Turkish flag behind him. The symbolism is similar to the previous ones since it signifies that Western lifestyle and clothes will enable Turkey and its future generations to join the ranks of modern countries. There are also drawings that depict Turkish couples in Western style clothes casting their votes with the symbolism of adopting Western lifestyle coupled with the Western political concept of voting. The issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated February 8, 1935 depicts such a couple in Western clothes casting their vote with the Turkish flag in the background, while the issue dated July 21, 1946 depicts a similar couple from a different angle.



Figure 7. Cumhuriyet 8 February 1935



Figure 8. Cumhuriyet 21 July 1946

The drawings suggest that the adoption of Western lifestyle and clothes is the necessary step for Turkey to be able to reach the level of modern Western countries.

Another way of promoting Western lifestyle and appearance was discussing the way(s) through which social norms and mores could be reformed and modernized. On the front page of *Cumhuriyet* issue dated January 6, 1939, Nadir Nadi discusses the importance of culture and cultural events to modernizing social norms. The editorial starts by discussing the new decision to construct a concert hall in Istanbul which has given rise to some heated debate about whether it is a priority for the city to have such a building. Taking on from here, the author goes on to discuss the importance of things like going to concerts and watching plays as being as important as any effort to improve people's economic well-being and argues for the significance of such cultural events for modernizing social norms and individuals. "There is no Turk who would disagree with the notion that for a civilized nation, concert halls and theaters are as important as daily food...there are no civilized and cultured countries where people allocate only secondary importance to art." The author emphasizes the importance of going to concerts and theaters which are the symbols of Western lifestyle and argues that they are as important as daily food, in order to highlight the importance of acquiring a Western lifestyle. On the front page of the *Ulus* issue dated May 19, 1935, Zeki Mesud Alsan discusses culture and the importance of reforming culture to modernize the society in the

editorial called “Cultural Integrity”. He starts by describing the necessity of cultural integrity for a society and states that a culture is fed by both internal and external sources. The author then elaborates on the roots of culture and mentions that “One of the most important roots and maybe the most important is national confidence. The higher a nation’s confidence is, the greater is its will to live and its ability to materialize this will. And in order to achieve this, it is of utmost importance for the nation to know itself well and to be well aware of its possessions, strengths and special features.” The author discusses culture as the root of national identity and a nation’s understanding of itself and argues that knowing and improving a society’s culture is the only way for a nation to make progress. It is in the same vein that he calls for going beyond internal cultural resources to borrow from Western culture to reach modernity. “In order to materialize cultural integrity, taking advantage of international resources is as important as national sources and it is important to borrow from European techniques and features...To boost the level of public culture and improve the national ideals, we should pay attention to both the national and international needs and necessities.” This shows how subtly the writer of this piece has included the need for adoption of Western culture inside a piece which calls for cultural renewal and reform.

Covering the news of the opening of Halkevleri (People’s Houses), which used to be places for training people in modern social norms and ideas was another facet of the effort to promote Western lifestyle and appearance in the case of Turkey. News of the opening of these institutions in various cities were covered at length on the front pages of the newspapers and they were hailed as places where citizens’ ideas could be modernized. There are a couple of editorials on the importance of these institutions as well with the one published on the front page of *Ulus* on February 20, 1939 being an interesting example. The *Ulus* issue of this date is almost fully dedicated to Halkevleri celebrating the seventh anniversary of their opening. The author named N. A. Küçüka takes the prime minister’s speech for the anniversary as the starting point in order to elaborate on the significance of these institutions. He starts by mentioning that “Halkevleri were launched in 1934 in order to spread the social ideas of the People’s Republic Party to the public and to boost

the people's level of culture and to help people absorb the principles of the revolution...". The ideological focus on reforming and modernizing people's culture and spreading the state's modernization ideology to the public is clear from the tone of the editorial from the start. He continues by mentioning the need for Halkevleri to pay attention to the needs of the particular cities they are established in and stresses the point that these institutions provide opportunities for all types of social activities for those who would be interested to work in the ideological frame set up by the revolution. He continues by pointing out that the prime minister's speech about Halkevleri is a very clear and strong directive for all people in regards with this institution and concludes by highlighting the effects of Halkevleri on the population. "In a short time the Turkish nation has come to know its potentials, improved itself and moved in a determined manner toward a higher level of civilization and this has happened under the effect of the enlightened revolutionary members of the nation." The rhetoric shows the fact that the elite had well recognized the significance of waging an ideological battle in favor of modernization and adopting Western lifestyle and appearance and viewed the Halkevleri institution as the culmination of their efforts to reform and modernize individuals and society.

All in all, the Turkish elites promoted the issue of adopting Western lifestyle and appearance in both direct and indirect ways on the front pages of the newspapers since they believed that this "ideological" aspect of modernization was key to the overall project of modernization including its "pragmatic" aspect. It could be argued that their success in making considerable progress in convincing the masses to adopt Western lifestyle and appearance remained limited as the majority of the population felt a strong and deep-rooted commitment to their traditions and viewed Western culture as a non-Islamic and decadent one (Mardin 1973, 184-185). The elites of the winning coalition in the case of Turkey tried to present adoption of Western lifestyle and appearance as being a major step toward modernizing Turkey and presented such an adoption as being indispensable to the future path of their nation and country. However, it seems that the members of the selectorate outside the winning coalition remained hesitant to see such an adoption as a public good and as a result mostly rejected it.

Comparing the cases of Iran and Turkey in regards with promoting Western lifestyle and appearance, one can posit that the elites of both countries had fully absorbed the significance of this issue for the overall process of modernization and tried very hard to convince the public to join them. In the case of Iran, the change in the dress code has received a lot of hype and the superficial modernization of appearance has been hailed as a big step toward modernity. However, in the case of Turkey, the change in dress code has not been discussed widely and instead Western appearance has been promoted indirectly through drawings and photos published on the newspapers' front pages. Meanwhile, the need for modernizing social norms and mores has received particular attention in the case of Iranian newspapers with a similar level of emphasis being placed on reforming and modernizing the public culture in the case of Turkish newspapers.

5.4.2.3. Promoting Women's Rights

The issue of women's rights and the state/elites' initiative to improve women's social status is a major part of the efforts to perform socio-cultural modernization in the Iranian and Turkish societies of the time. At the time, women remained mostly marginalized and absent from the social sphere with the exception of some women of the higher social classes. In the case of Turkey, a few minor steps had been taken in the late Ottoman era to improve the women's condition but such efforts remained very limited in their scale and impact. In the case of Iran, things were direr for women, in which women and girls remained mostly confined to the space of the house. The legacy of tradition and Islam had created a culture in which women were subservient to the will of men and did not have access to their basic rights. In order to help improve women's condition in their respective societies and to work toward women's emancipation, the states/elites of Iran and Turkey utilized their own particular strategies with both similarities and differences.

In the case of Iran, the subtheme of promoting women's rights and women's emancipation received a lot of attention and space on the front pages of the newspapers. The Iranian elite tried to materialize a revolution in the masses' ideas of women and to create an atmosphere in which women could actively participate in the

social arena. One way of doing this was to publish reports and photos of women associations' meetings and girls' schools in various cities on the front pages of the newspapers. The issue of *Koushesh* dated Esfand 24, 1314/March 15, 1936 features photos of women's national association in Mashhad with women in Western clothes and hats while *Ettelaat's* issue dated Tir 17,1316/July 8, 1937 features a photo of girls and women in Western clothes and no headscarf attending the music lessons of the women's national association.



Figure 9. Koushesh 15 March 1936



Figure 10. Koushesh 15 March 1936



Figure 11. Ettelaat 8 July 1937

Such photos are frequently printed on the front pages of the newspapers in order to promote women's rights and participation in society and present an image of a modern Western women who has equal rights compared with men and who can pursue an active social life in contrast to the traditional image of women as being only capable of handling household chores.

Another strategy of promoting women's rights was through writing editorials that focused on the various issues related to women such as the role and status of single women in society, marriage and women's rights in marriage, women's education, women's manners and a range of other issues. Such editorials aimed at bringing the issues related to women to the public's attention and by doing so promote the importance of women as the ignored half of the society. The issue of *Ettelaat* printed on Esfand 25,1310/March 16,1932 elaborates on the issue of single

women in society under a column that is titled “Women in Society”. This column appeared on the front page of *Ettelaat* for a period of time and covered the various issues related to women, however, the name of the author was not mentioned. In this specific issue, the author starts by emphasizing the importance of marriage for women and argues for the passing of laws that encourage marriage, in addition to calling on the authors, teachers and social scientists to remind women of the importance of marriage. However, she continues by stressing the need to support single women positing that “In order to support them in future, there is the need to provide quality education to girls and set the stage for them to be able to find suitable jobs such as those related to fine arts, medicine and public services.” The argument is by itself revolutionary by the standards of the time since the majority of people thought of women as either daughters or mothers and did not recognize the rights of women as women. The author particularly emphasizes the importance of women’s education as the only way through which they can be lifted out of their miserable condition in society and points out the historical legacy of leaving women out of the educational system altogether. She believes that there is no ban on women’s education in Islam and that Islam even calls for educating women. “In Iran, based on the teachings of Islam and the constitution, public education is equally provided to both boys and girls and there is no discrimination between the two in this regard. If our girls have not been able to take part in higher levels of education, it is not due to any religious or legal ban but because of the insufficient educational facilities and the lack of female teachers...however, gradually some female teachers and also male teachers qualified to teach girls are trained and the state will help this endeavor. Moreover, girls’ high schools will be established and it would also be possible to have co-education as some of the girls are already studying together with male counterparts to become doctors and dentists.” By positing that there is no contradiction between the teachings of Islam and women’s education, the author is trying to find a middle ground through which he/she can convince the masses that women’s education and the rights of women, particularly single women in society must be paid attention to and respected.

Finally, there are editorials that celebrate the incident of the banning of veil by the state as bringing about women's emancipation and creating equal rights for them in society. The editorial of *Koushesh* published on Dey 18, 1315/January 8, 1937 celebrating the anniversary of the banning of the veil discusses the issue of women's emancipation and role in society. The editorial starts by arguing that the banning of veil was effectively the start of women's entry into social life and posits that the wearing of the veil caused them to have no access to their social rights. The author goes on to enumerate the various problems that wearing of the veil caused for women and hails Reza Shah as having created a social revival in general and a revival of women's role and rights in society. "No one could imagine that Iranian women possessed such high levels of skill and virtues and could equal the ranks of men in knowledge and speech. During the past year (since the ban on wearing veil), Iranian women have demonstrated the fact that they really deserved such an opportunity and their participation in social affairs is both good and timely... Women can take part in social affairs and set up an economically good life... and now we can proudly argue that under the shadow of the grand ideas of the great shah, Iran has reached such high levels of morality that it can boast of being first regarding moral issues based on the highest levels of civilization." The conclusion demonstrates how the Iranian elite perceived of the state ban on veil as enabling women to participate in social affairs and have equal rights with men. Indeed, the Iranian elites presented the ban on the veil as a major step toward women's emancipation. In general, the issue of promoting women's rights is taken very seriously by the Iranian elite and is a major part of their efforts at socio-cultural modernization since they had accurately understood the importance of women's emancipation and rights as a major component of modernizing the individuals and society.

The "ideological" aspect of modernization is very much emphasized in the case of promoting women's rights. However, there is some emphasis on the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization as the banning of veil was actually enforced in society. Moreover, women's associations and girls' schools were established to empower women which were part of the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization. Therefore, in the case of promoting women's rights, the "ideological" aspect of

modernization is highlighted while there is also some emphasis on the “pragmatic” aspect of modernization as well.

In the case of Turkish newspapers, the issue of promoting women’s rights is discussed in a number of different ways. Printing photos of Turkish women in Western style was one of the ways through which women’s rights and participation in society were promoted. Photos of Turkish female athletes in Western sports clothes are printed on the front page of *Cumhuriyet* dated August 20, 1933 while the photo of women taking part in municipality elections appears on *Cumhuriyet* issue dated October 18, 1934 and one related to girl scouts appears on October 28,1941.



Figure 12. Cumhuriyet, 20 August 1933



Figure 13. Cumhuriyet, 18 October 1934 **Figure 14.** Cumhuriyet, 28 October 1941

The photo of women taking part in the meeting of women’s association features on the issue of *Ulus* dated April 30, 1941 while the photo of women students being awarded their Ph.D. degrees appears on January 10,1944 on the front page of the same newspaper. Another major initiative through which women’s social role was emphasized was the beauty contest run by *Cumhuriyet* and the photos of the contestants who were young girls. Such images feature on the front page of numerous issues of *Cumhuriyet* with the front page of the issue published on January

10, 1930 being almost fully dedicated to the event for selecting miss beauty in Turkey and the photo of Turkey's representative selected as miss beauty in the international contest being printed on the front page of the newspaper dated August 29, 1932. The beauty contest was designed so as to give women the confidence to take part in social life in addition to promoting an image of the modern Western woman. Such measures were hoped to promote women's rights and help create equal rights for women in society.

In the case of Turkish newspapers, there are few editorials or columns wholly and directly dedicated to the role of women in society and their rights or the significance of their participation in society. However, one of the interesting columns in this regard is the one published on the front page of *Cumhuriyet* dated February 7, 1935. The column penned by Abidin Daver titled "The day of joy and pride for Turkish women" discusses the upcoming elections and the list of candidates by Atatürk which includes women candidates too for the first time. The list includes the names of 17 women who would be the first women running as candidates for an election in Turkey. This event is presented as the culmination of the efforts to emancipate women. "The Turkish woman feels joy and proud today since ten years ago a large cloth covered her figure, a veil covered her face, she was in a cage and confined to the harem and she was hidden from the world like a shameful thing...ten years later, you exited the harem, broke down the cage, threw away the cloth that covered you and tore down the veil." After pointing out the reforms made to women's appearance, he goes on to highlight the measures taken by the new republic to empower women. "The republican regime placed you next to men...whatever was taught to men was taught to you as well. Whatever men did you did them as well. Whatever men could do you could do as well...Turkish women feel happy and proud that during a period of ten years Atatürk gave them a freedom that is even higher than the one enjoyed by the French girls." The author emphasizes the steps taken by the Republican regime to emancipate women and argues that women have reached full emancipation and can enjoy equal rights with men. The rhetoric and the points argued demonstrate the amount of effort put by the elites into establishing equal

rights for women in the society and enabling women to participate meaningfully in the social life.

All in all, in the case of Turkey, the “ideological” aspect of promoting women’s rights has received much attention with various strategies used to change the traditional idea of women being subservient to the will of men. In the Turkish case, the “pragmatic” aspect of promoting women’s rights has received its share of treatment through measures that were taken to improve women’s life conditions and through granting them such rights as being able to run as political candidates for office.

In comparison, both the Iranian and Turkish elites fully understood the importance of women’s emancipation for the modernization of their respective societies and spent considerable time and energy to grant women equal rights and enable them to participate in social affairs. However, the editorials and columns dedicated to the issues related to women in general and more particularly to women’s emancipation on the Iranian newspapers are more numerous than the Turkish case. In those editorials and columns, the Iranian elites tried to convince the masses that women’s participation in society is a must for every modernizing nation and that it will bring various benefits to the society. In the Turkish case, the beauty contests run by *Cumhuriyet* newspaper were aimed at promoting the image of an emancipated Western-looking woman that has replaced the traditional Turkish woman. By doing so, the Turkish elites hoped to substitute this image for that of the traditional women confined to the space of the house and covered in traditional and Islamic clothes. However, in the case of Iran, the state decree banning the veil was aimed at forcing through the change in women’s lifestyle from above. The elites tried their best to justify this decree as the dawn of women’s emancipation and the granting to them of equal rights with men. The enforcement of the ban on veil created considerable resistance among the public and had limited impact on women’s emancipation. This was due to the fact that aside from women belonging to the upper classes of society, the other women did not change their appearance or find a chance to participate in social affairs. In both cases, members of the Iranian and Turkish leaders’ winning coalitions tried to present the promotion of women’s rights as a public good that

would improve women's lot in society. However, the enforcement of the ban on veil by the Iranian state gave the elites outside the winning coalition such as the ulema and traditionalists a chance to build some basis of public support for themselves that they could use later.

5.4.2.4. Modernizing Education and Educating the Public

The importance of education and educating the public was one of the major points in the overall modernization project undertaken by the Iranian and Turkish elites. They strongly believed that extending public education to all the members of the nation and modernizing the education system and ideology in line with the requirements of modernity would be the decisive step that can help their nations join the ranks of modern Western nations. As a result, the issues related to education were discussed extensively by both the Iranian and Turkish elites on the front pages of the newspapers.

In the case of Iran, one of the ways through which education was addressed by the elites was to highlight the importance of educating the public to reform society and modernize it and the individuals. The issue of *Ettellat* dated Mehr 16, 1307/October 8, 1928 discusses the importance of the public education system and the need for establishing new schools and expanding education to the various corners of the country. The editorial starts by arguing that "Extending public education is one of the significant issues which has attracted the attention of various nations and is the most important pillar of every nation's progress and happiness. The grandeur of the powerful states is gained as a result of education and science and even though they are not dependent on other nations in this regard, they try to increase their inventory of knowledge every day." The author clearly posits that extending education to the various corners of society and increasing the level of people's knowledge through it is the basis for any progress and modernization. He goes on by pointing out the Eastern countries' efforts to educate the public and points out that in Iran the initiative has started. "Since the start of the modernization era in Iran our country has paid attention to increasing and extending public education and the sending of one hundred and ten of the youth to Europe so that they can digest the Western

civilization is an example of this initiative.” The author continues by pointing out the new unified curriculum designed for schools and unifying the educational syllabi of the domestic schools with the foreign ones existing in the country as examples of the new initiative to boost public education. However, he states that the most important problem stopping the domestic education system from moving forward apace is the low number of schools in the country and calls on the state to construct more schools in order to make it possible to educate the masses of the people since the author believes that “while the number of students studying at schools has been multiplied in the past few years, the schools and the schooling system have not been able to keep up with the increase and it could be argued that being educated at school which is the most important cause of progress and civilization is not developed in our country.” The rhetoric clearly shows the level of importance assigned to schools and education as the basis to help the country’s development and its modernization.

There are various other editorials that emphasize the importance of extending public education to all the various classes in society and argue for its significance to the modernization of the country. There are, however, those editorials that focus specifically on the importance of higher education as the important pillars of modern education. Such editorials are usually published to celebrate the anniversary of the establishment of the first university in Iran on February 4, 1935 which is called the “Day of Culture”. The issue of *Koushesh* dated Bahman 16, 1317/February 5, 1939 discusses the importance of education to a modernized country. The author starts by mentioning that this day is celebrated due to the start of the operations for establishing the first university in Iran by Reza Shah and argues that a university is ranked as the highest level of educational organizations. He continues by stressing the role of the shah in reforming and modernizing the country’s educational system and its contrast with the preceding era. “The children studying at schools and the youth studying at high schools and universities have heard it from their parents that prior to the present era of Iran’s grandeur, there was no educational organization and the Iranian youth had no possibility of following the path of progress...these children and young people know that now and in the shadow of the modern culture in the country the highway of progress is open to them.” The rhetoric clearly emphasizes

the significance of public education to the modernization of the country and its future. He concludes by pointing out that the young people trained in the new education system will be those who will help Iran in its path toward success in the future since they are brought up as children with the love of the nation and the shah. He concludes by saying that “The feelings and excitement shown by students in the celebrations of the Culture Day revolved around showing gratitude to the great king of Iran to whom we owe the new culture of Iran and the training of the youth.” The author’s conclusion demonstrates the elites’ depiction of public education as the basis for the society’s modernization and as being indispensable to its future. All in all, in the case of Iran, the emphasis on the “ideological” aspect of modernization in regards with education is fully highlighted by the elites as they argue for the vital importance of it in taking the country to a new age of success and the level of modern countries. There is also a secondary emphasis on building schools and universities in line with the “pragmatic” aspect of modernization since the country’s educational system was highly underdeveloped at the time.

In the case of Turkey, the emphasis on the importance of education and educating the public received considerable emphasis from the elites. The Turkish elites had fully recognized the focal importance of educating the public as a necessary step toward modernizing the country and saw the educational system as the main mechanism through which they could instill their ideology of modernization in the minds of the public. One of the ways through which the Turkish elites tried to highlight the importance of education and its modernization was to discuss the significance of high schools in helping the nation make progress. In the issue of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated September 23, 1931, Falih Rıfkı discusses the significance of the institution of Darülfünun to the new Turkey. The author starts by providing a brief history of this institution before the establishment of the new republic arguing that it provided low-quality education and was close to being closed down when the new republican regime revived it. The author, however, points out the importance of investing in such high schools in order to help uplift the country’s level of education and provide for its educational needs. He posits that “Whenever Darülfünun asked to receive budget from the state, it received much less than it

needed. We could not even provide a salary to the teachers in order to give them freedom of mind in order to focus merely on science and education...we need to redeem and revive Darülfünun from both financial and non-financial aspects...the problems and issues of this institution must be assessed and all those who are responsible for reviving this institution must do their share and cooperate in its improvement.” The author clearly states the importance of educational institutions such as Darülfünun for the development of Turkey in the future and posits that without such institutions, no progress and modernization would be possible for the country and the nation.

Another aspect of education addressed by the Turkish elites was the importance of universities and higher education. They viewed universities as the culmination of the efforts to reform and modernize the country as they had seen first-hand the key role that Western universities played in helping modernize their countries ideologically and pragmatically. In the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated October 23, 1937, Yunus Nadi turns to the condition of Turkish universities and the importance they have for the national education and the country in general. He starts by positing that the quality of higher education in Europe is better than Turkey and that is why many of the enlightened Turkish citizens pursue their higher education in Europe. “Since a long time ago, after finishing their high school studies, the qualified Turkish graduates left for Europe in order to pursue their studies at European universities. And up until now there are Turkish youth who are studying at European universities.” After going over this, the author turns to the words of a professor named Yusuf Kemal, a member of the first constitutional assembly of Turkey, in order to compare the condition of university education in Turkey with Europe. He tells the story of this professor who after visiting European higher education institutions understands the deficiencies in his education in Turkey and is shocked to figure out how direly he is in need of learning. He goes on to argue that what Turkey needs is a fundamental overhaul of the higher education system in order for the country to be able to catch up with Europe and European civilization. “We do not simply need an institution that is a university in just name and its structure. We need an institution of knowledge that can be a good match for its European rivals in every

aspect. In order to reach such a goal, we need to make great sacrifices...” The author then goes on to elaborate on the features that such a university should have positing that the practice of recruiting foreign professors should not and cannot go on forever and that the knowledge produced at a Turkish university should be localized and produced by domestic scientists. He provides other suggestions to make it possible for Turkish students and scientists to be able to have a full experience of learning at universities and produce knowledge. He calls for new laws to be passed that make the learning of Turkish by the foreign professors obligatory so that they work with Turkish students and scientists and help production of knowledge in the country. Another suggestion he makes is to translate the books and pamphlets to Turkish so that students can understand them easily and the knowledge can be passed to more people. “Aside from the lessons of the faculty of medicine, all the other lessons must be translated into Turkish. This way, a lesson that takes 45 minutes to finish would only take 20 minutes. There is no need to talk about the other advantages of such a measure... we would leave it to the readers to think of the many great thinkers and scientists during history who learned their lessons through translated books...” He concludes by restating the need for reforming Turkish universities saying that “The principles that we are now following in our universities would not help increase our domestic skills and qualifications. Whether the foreign professors are as responsible as we are, however, is another topic.” The author’s concerns and suggestions for reforming and modernizing Turkish universities so as to make them work as real centers of knowledge production and learning just like their European counterparts shows the significance of the Western institution of university in helping the country develop and move on the path toward modernization.

Another aspect of education that is emphasized in Turkish newspapers is the issue of military schools. The photos of military schools and their graduates frequently appear on the front pages of Turkish newspapers. This shows the importance dedicated to such schools as part of the new education system in the country. For instance, the *Ulus* issue dated August 30, 1943 features the photo of the graduates of the 110th cycle of war schools with an emphasis on the importance of such schools. As other examples, the issues of *Ulus* dated August 30, 1945 and the

issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated July 4, 1943 feature photos and reports of war schools and their activities. In general, war schools are depicted to be important educational institutions that are among the best examples of the state initiative to modernize education. All in all, the issue of modernizing education and the necessity of educating the public are discussed on the front pages of the Turkish newspapers by the elites with the emphasis being mostly on high schools and universities as the main components of Turkey's leap toward modernization and modernizing the social and cultural arenas. The elites viewed the schools and universities as the main centers of modern education and used them as channels through which they could spread their vision of modernization to the masses. The "ideological" aspect of modernization is very much highlighted in relation with modernizing the educational system and extending it to the whole population while there was also an emphasis on the "pragmatic" need for restructuring and reviving some educational institutions such as Darülfünun. The issue of primary education and literacy is also addressed by the elites but under the subtheme of shifting to Latin alphabet. This will be treated separately in the next section which covers language and its modernization.

In comparison, the variety and frequency of the issues in regards with education discussed on the front pages of Iranian newspapers is higher than those discussed on Turkish newspapers. Indeed, in the case of Iran, the public education system was almost non-existent and this helps explain the extensive time and space dedicated by the Iranian elites to highlight the importance of education in the country's development and progress. In the case of Turkey, the public education infrastructure left from the late Ottoman era was considerably more extensive and stronger than Iran and as a result the discussions were mostly concentrated on high schools and universities. As another thing, both the Iranian and Turkish elites viewed the educational system as their most effective and important tool in spreading their ideology of modernization to the masses and to improve their social base. The Iranian and Turkish elites of the winning coalition the majority of whom had studied in European countries believed that reforming and modernizing the education system along modern Western lines in addition to extending the public education system would guarantee that the majority of the selectorate left out of the winning coalition

would support the leader and the current regime, making it very difficult for any challenger to emerge and gather social support. The public good of extending public education was among the important things distributed to the masses by the leaders/elites of Iran and Turkey at the time and this provided the two countries with a good number of educated and skilled citizens who helped push the modernization drive forward later on.

5.4.2.5. Language Reform

As the states/elites of Iran and Turkey launched their initiative of modernizing their respective countries and nations, they figured out that they needed to reform and modernize the language of their people in order to weaken the influence of tradition and highlight the importance of a modern identity to their people. However, the measures they took in this regard differed from each other considerably. In the case of Iran, the supposed past glories of the Persian language and literature were hailed as the starting point for a modern Iran. In the same vein, foreign and particularly Arabic words were seen as invaders which had damaged the purity and grandeur of Persian language. Therefore, a campaign of coining Persian words in order to replace foreign and Arabic ones was promoted and followed by the elites with a lot of energy and passion with its culmination being the establishment of the Persian Language Academy that was in charge of protecting and purifying Persian language.

In the case of Turkey, the reform effort was taken to a higher level by the leader/elites who decided that the script had to be changed from Arabic to Latin. Such an effort aimed at severing the links between the newly established nation and its Ottoman/Islamic past and to enable it to join the ranks of Western countries which used the Latin script. Meanwhile, a state-supported campaign was started which tried to present Turkish language in a new light as one with a very ancient history and as the forefather of many other languages. As a third component of the campaign, the project of purifying the Turkish language from foreign and particularly Arabic words was launched. This project aimed at substituting new Turkish coinages for Arabic

and to some extent Persian words in order to restore a pure identity to the Turkish language.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, the historical glory of the Persian language is emphasized by the elites and it is presented as an authentic source for the country and nation's modern revival. The issue of *Koushesh* dated Mehr 16, 1307/October 8, 1928 covers Persian language and its contemporary condition. The author discusses the fact that many foreign words have found their way into the Persian language and in particular calls attention to the French and English words which started to be used in the Persian language. He posits that changing the transcript is not a priority for the Persian language. He elaborates on the two common views regarding the new foreign words entering the Persian language saying "Some believe that Persian must be purified and the ancient purely Persian words should be promoted and used again. Some on the other hand believe that foreign words which are mostly international ones will not create any problems for our mother tongue." The author dismisses the ideas of the first group as being impractical and reminds the reader that "The continuation of the present condition with the invasion of the foreign words will result in the downfall of our national language and we must not treat our historic mother tongue which has a glorious history with indifference." Resorting to the what he calls the glorious history of Persian language, the author argues for protecting it against foreign words and states the necessity of "drafting dictionaries based on the contemporary Persian language and corpus...and the foreign words must be subjected to the Persian grammar and pronunciation." The author's tone represents the anxiety with which the elites of the time viewed the introduction of foreign words into the language and their call for protecting and modernizing the Persian language. In a similar vein, the *Koushesh* issue dated Khordad 14, 1314/June 5, 1935 discusses the issue of Persian language and the Persian Language Academy's efforts to modernize the language. The editorial starts by stating that the Persian Language Academy is a higher education institution and a scientific and literary center. Then, the author elaborates on the methods to be used by this institution in order to protect and purify the Persian language. "Collection of Persian words would first be done by searching through historical books...since these books and pieces are treasure chests

of vocabulary and literature...studying such books will give us many suitable words which can gradually be integrated into everyday language.” The author clearly recaptures the main task of the Persian Language Academy that is to use the historical sources of the Persian language in order to reform and modernize it. He concludes by stating the necessity of protecting and reforming Persian language. “In order to improve the national language, Persian words must be given priority and the use of foreign words which has recently become popular must be avoided...therefore, it is mentioned in the Persian Language Academy’s statute that unsuitable foreign words must not be used.” The rhetoric of this editorial and the previous one demonstrates the Persian elites’ call for reforming and purifying the Persian language by using its long history and supposed glory. In the same vein, the new coinages introduced by the Persian Language Academy were printed on the front pages of the newspapers in order to promote their use by the public. For instance, the issue of *Koushesh* dated Azar 16,1318/December 8, 1939 includes a long list of Arabic words used in the Persian language and their Persian substitutes proposed by the Persian Language Academy. Such substitutes are meant to protect the language from the invasion of foreign words and provide it with a historical basis of reform and modernization rooted in the Persian language. All in all, the effort at reforming Persian language is based on the objective to give the nation a sense of pure Persian identity and worth which would help boost the overall project of modernization by the state through embedding it in Iranian language and culture.

In the case of Turkish newspapers, the language reform initiative is broader and pursued in a more energetic manner by the elites. The change from the Arabic to Latin script and the need for substituting foreign words in the Turkish language with new Turkish coinages go hand in hand in the articles discussing the issue of language reform. The lower half of the *Ulus* issue dated April 23,1935 is dedicated to a guide to the new Turkish substitutes suggested for the foreign words used in Ottoman Turkish.

| Osm anlıcadan Türkçeye Karşılıklar Kılavuzu N.30 | | |
|--|---|---|
| 1 — Öz türkçe köklerden gelen kelimelerin karşısına (T. Kö.) belirtilmiş (alâmeti) konmuştur. Bunların her biri hakkında sırası ile uzmanlarımızın (mütâhhası) yazılarını gazetelere vereceğiz. | | |
| 2 — Yeni kelimenin karşılıklarını iyi ayırılmaması için, gereğine göre, Fransızcadaki yazılışını, ayrıca örnekler de konulmuştur. | | |
| 3 — Kökü türkçe olan kelimelerin bu günkü işlenmiş ve kullanılan şekilleri alınmıştır; Aslı ak olan hak, aslı ügüm olan hüküm, türkçe "çek,, kökünden gelen şekil gibidir. | | |
| <p>M</p> <p>Ma (lak: ih) = Su = (Fr.) Eau</p> <p>Mai cari = Akarsu = (Fr.) Eau courante</p> <p>Mai rakat = Durgun su</p> <p>Maç = İki kula = (Fr.) Avec</p> <p>["Maç - a, ile boylayan süler biraz ağırlıdır.]</p> <p>Maşir = Köprüler</p> <p>Maada = Başka</p> <p>Maalesef, maalesef = Yazık ki, casfe</p> <p>Örnek: 1 — Maalesef dediğini yapamadım — Yazık ki dediğini yapamadım.</p> <p>2 — Maalesef söyleyeceğim ki sıranız yerine vaktinizdir — Eselle söyleyeceğim ki sıranız yerine vaktinizdir.</p> <p>Maali = Yücelikler</p> <p>Maalîfihre = Kıvançla, onur bilerek, övünçle</p> <p>Maakkerah = İstemiyerek</p> <p>Maah-umaniye = Seve seve, seve istiyiye</p> <p>Maarif — 1 — Kültür, 2 — Bilimler</p> <p>Örnek: 1 — Maarif Vekâleti = Kültür Bakanlığı.</p> <p>2 — Maarifin bir memlekette terakkii = Bilimlerin bir ülkede ilerletilmesi.</p> <p>Maay = Aylık = (Fr.) Appointment</p> <p>Maayyehâ = Artıya, çok çok, den daha çok</p> <p>Örnek: İstediğini maayyehâ verdi = İstediyince çok çok verdi.</p> <p>Mahûl = Arka, öte, sonra = (Fr.) Sola</p> <p>Mahûl var = Arka var, sonra var</p> <p>Mahûl = Geçit</p> | <p>Mahya = Ara, sıralık</p> <p>Örnek: Mahyanındeki dostluğa güvenerek = Aramızdaki dostluğa güvenerek.</p> <p>Mahallîfihay = Övünük</p> <p>Örnek: Atatürk, türk tarihinin mahallîfihaydır = Atatürk, türk tarihinin övünüğüdür.</p> <p>Mahûd = 1 — Tapacak (En genel anlamında)</p> <p>2 — Yaradan (Hâlık anlamında) = (Fr.) Créateur</p> <p>3 — Tanrı (Allah anlamında) = (Fr.) Dieu</p> <p>4 — Oğuz (Kadim meclis anlamında) = (Fr.) Le Truc - pulant</p> <p>5 — İdi (Rak anlamında)</p> <p>6 — Kulaç (Hudâ anlamında)</p> <p>7 — Çalpaç</p> <p>Mahûd = Allah (müslimânın mahûdu) = (Fr.) Allah</p> <p>Mahûd = Yahûva (Yahûdîlik mahûdu) = (Fr.) Jéhova</p> <p>Mahûd (esatir mahûdu anlamında) = İlah = (Fr.) Dieu</p> <p>Örnek: Marx, mütahhâde harb ilâhının adıdır = Marx, mütahhâde harb tarikatının adıdır.</p> <p>Mahûde = Tanrıçık = (Fr.) Déesse</p> <p>Örnek: Venüs, kadın ilâhıdır = Venüs, güzelin tanrıçığıdır.</p> <p>Mahûd (sancım) = Pat, idâl = (Fr.) Idéol</p> <p>Ubihiyet = Tanrılık = (Fr.) Divinité</p> <p>İlahî = Tanrısal = (Fr.) Divin</p> <p>Örnek: İlahî bir hüküm = Tanrısal bir hükümlük.</p> <p>Mühâd = Tanrısal = (Fr.) Athé</p> <p>İlahîd = Tanrısalık = (Fr.) Athéisme</p> <p>Tellih etmek = Tanrılamak = (Fr.) Déifier</p> <p>Örnek: Eski insanlar abartı ve şenâretle e-derlerdi — Eski insanlar şenâret ve şenâretle tanrıladılar.</p> <p>Tellih = Tanrılaşma = (Fr.) Apothéose</p> | <p>Macera, serüvenç = Serüven = (Fr.) Aventure</p> <p>Örnek: Macerale bir hayat geçirdi = Serüvenli bir hayat geçirdi.</p> <p>Madame = Oldukça</p> <p>Örnek: Madamelüyyet — Hayırsız vusûşa</p> <p>Mademki = De, da</p> <p>Örnek: Mademki böyle yaparsanız, niye başka türlü size verdim? = Böyle yaparsanız da, niye başka türlü size verdim.</p> <p>Madde = Madde (T. Kö.) = (Fr.) Matière, article</p> <p>Madûl = Madûğ = (Fr.) Matériel</p> <p>Madet (Bak: adalet)</p> <p>Madem = Madem</p> <p>Madur, valide = Anna, ana</p> <p>Madrub (madrub) = Döğülmüş, dangaşlanmış</p> <p>Madud = Sayık</p> <p>Madum = Yok</p> <p>Madun = Ast</p> <p>Madurk = Üst</p> <p>Madul = Oynak, oynak yeri</p> <p>Madihal = Günüldeki</p> <p>Madizimiy = Kalpdeki</p> <p>Madiv = Başlık, başlıksız</p> <p>Madur = Kovak, mağur</p> <p>Madun = Aldanık</p> <p>Madut = Insurance</p> <p>Örnek: Rilekassın madutü alda = Arkadaşların insancım alda.</p> <p>Madur, mazlum = Haksızlığa uğrayan, kıyı</p> <p>Madut etmek = Yarıkmak</p> <p>Madul = Yenik, yenilen = (Fr.) Vaincu</p> <p>Mağlûbiyet = Yenilme, yenilim = (Fr.) Défaite</p> <p>Mağnum = Kapanık, sıkımlık, üzgün, gamlı = (Fr.) Triste, sombre</p> <p>Örnek: 1 — Mağnum hava = Kapanık (sıkımlık) hava.</p> <p>2 — Mağnum insan = Gamlı (üzgün) insan</p> <p>Mağrîh = Batı</p> <p>Mağrûk (Bak: garik) = Batmış, bozulmuş, batık = (Fr.) Naufragé, noyé</p> <p>Mağrur = Gururlu (Bak: gurur)</p> <p>Mağrur oluk = Gururlanmak</p> <p>Mağrûb = Kapık (Bak: gash)</p> <p>Örnek: Malî mağrûb = Kapık mal</p> <p>Mağrûb = Karık = (Fr.) Mâlungé, talûfâ</p> <p>Örnek: Mağrûb yağ = Karık yağ</p> <p>Mağr = Beyin</p> <p>Mağ = Ay</p> <p>Mahabet = Aybırlık</p> <p>Örnek: Ordumuzun mahabeti dığman yıldırı = Ordumuzun aybırlığı dığman yıldırı</p> <p>Mahâl = Yer</p> <p>Mahalle = Uram</p> <p>Mahallî, mevâlî = Yerel = (Fr.) Local</p> <p>Örnek: Mahallî idetler = Yerel idetler</p> <p>Mahallî tahafiz = Korunak</p> <p>Maharet = Bıvıcık, uad = (Fr.) Adresse, habîl¹¹</p> <p>Örnek: El işlerinde çok maharet var = El işlerinde çok beceriği (uzatıldığı) var.</p> <p>Mahasin = Güzellikler, güzellikler</p> <p>Mahsun (Bak: hapshane) = Hapsedi</p> <p>Mahûb, mahûbe = Sevgili, sevilmek</p> |

Figure 15. Ulus, 23 April 1935

The front page includes a piece by Falih Rıfkı on the culture war that is being waged to protect and reform the Turkish language. The editorial written to celebrate the National Sovereignty Day and commemorate the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey goes over the events that culminated in the successful completion of the Turkish War of Independence and the peace and sovereignty that Turkey is enjoying under the new republican regime. He then goes on to state that a new cultural war has started. "This year, we are in a cultural war and we must emerge victorious from it... a language that has forgotten its resources during a period of ten to twelve centuries needs to recover its brevity and maturity. From a perspective, revolution means the change in big things and from another perspective means the change in all and everything. If a nation keeps the energy and pace of the moment it was created, it can change not just history but its fate as well."

The emphasis on the need for language reform to modernize the nation and the comparison between the language reform initiative and the war of independence is very revealing as it shows that the Turkish elites regarded language reform on par

with national sovereignty and as a major component in the modern Turkey's future. The issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated February 19, 1935 discusses the topic of the change to the Latin script and the effort to substitute Turkish words for foreign ones in order to make the Turkish language pure. The editorial by Yunus Nadi starts by mentioning the initiative for reforming and purifying Turkish and the establishment of the Turkish Language Association but argues that no tangible progress has been made so far. He makes some suggestions for reforming Turkish language. "First of all, we should unify the various dialects spoken by the people in one unified language that would be used by everyone...one of the most important conditions for purifying the language is to match the written and the spoken language of the people...it is true that the issue of reforming the language needs all the people and scholars to do it in a united manner so that we can do it in a sufficient way...purifying the Turkish language cannot be done in one day. This is such a necessary task that in order to emerge from it in a successful way no difficulty would intimidate us." The author's call for reforming and purifying the Turkish language in line with the people's language reflects the elites' initiative of modernizing the language by using its historical legacy. It also shows the way the elites depicted the language modernization project as one that also helped the nation building process and gathered the members of the nation around the state.

Another way of promoting the language modernization drive in the case of Turkey was publishing reports of the workings of the Turkish Language Association and the pseudo-scientific hypothesis called Sun Language Theory (Güneş-Dil Teorisi). This theory proposed that all human languages were descendants of one proto-Turkic primal language. The theory which was extensively reported and commented on by the Turkish newspapers was aimed at building a historical origin for the Turkish language that could work as a unifying factor for the Turkish nationality promoted by the new republican regime. For instance, the issues of *Ulus* published on January 31, 1936 and March 6, 1936 and the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated September 29, 1936 include diagrams and explanations of the theory with comprehensive analysis that gives the theory a scientific appearance.




Figure 16. Ulus, 31 January 1936



Figure 17. Ulus, 6 March 1936



Figure 18. Cumhuriyet, 29 September 1936

The theory was widely discussed in Turkey at the meetings of the Turkish Language Association at the time and for some time served as a significant factor in the state's language reform initiative.

Finally, one of the issues that the Turkish newspapers focused on in regards with Turkish language and the change in alphabet was the national schools (*Millet Mektepleri*) campaign aimed at teaching the new Latin alphabet to the masses with the overarching objective of increasing literacy in the country in a short period of

time. The campaign was a national effort to make the masses familiar with the new Latin alphabet and in which state employees, academicians, political figures and other educated people served as teachers. The issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated January 1, 1929 and the *Ulus* issue dated May 6, 1929 cover the topic and report on its importance. The *Cumhuriyet* issue features a drawing of a woman in Western style representing Turkey pointing toward a building on which the words “Millet Mektebi” are written and toward which the masses of the people are heading.



Figure 19. Cumhuriyet, 1 January 1929

The newspaper is also celebrating this day as the “Holiday of Education” (Maarif Bayramı) since it is depicted to be the start of a national campaign to educate the public. Such a campaign aimed at teaching the people the Latin script released by the state and severing their links with the Arabic script and the Ottoman past.

All in all, in the case of Turkey, the language reform plan received an extended amount of attention by the elites since it was viewed by them to be an integral part of the “ideological” aspect of modernization. The language reform plan as part of the “ideological” aspect of modernization was thought to be able to create a feeling of pride in the shared national history and a starting point for a shared national Turkish identity. The “pragmatic” aspect of the project included campaigns such as “Millet Mektebi” and the new Turkish substitutes proposed for foreign words

used in Turkish that were aimed at making the Turkish language look and sound more like a Turkic language.

In comparison, the Iranian and Turkish states/elites both spent a lot of time and energy in the effort to reform their languages. The similar point is that they both tried to resort to the historical legacy of their languages, both real and imagined as the starting point for their language reform drive. This meant using their historical linguistic resources to come up with substitutes for the foreign words used in the Persian and Turkish languages. However, on a deeper level this was meant to serve as the basis for building a sense of national identity and self-confidence that could serve as the basis for modernizing the language and lead to the establishment of a modern national identity that would help the overall modernization drive move forward. The difference in the two cases was that the Iranian elites saw the Persian language and literature as sources of pride and never took the idea of changing the script seriously since they thought that it would sever their link with what they assumed to be a glorious past and legacy. However, in the case of Turkey, changing the script was actually meant to cut the ties between the modern country and nation of Turkey and its Ottoman past in addition to giving Turkey a way to integrate its future with that of the European countries by using the same Latin script as them.

In summary, the overarching theme of socio-cultural modernization received considerable emphasis by the Iranian and Turkish elites of the time since they recognized the focal importance of reforming and modernizing the social and cultural life of their nations in order to ensure the establishment and consolidation of the modernization initiative by the state at both the social and individual levels. There was a strong emphasis on the “ideological” aspect of modernization in all the four subthemes of socio-cultural modernization including “promoting a Western lifestyle and appearance,” “promoting women’s rights,” “modernizing education and educating the public” and “language reform”. The elites of both countries fully understood the importance of waging a full-scale ideological war in order to modernize the social and political spheres and convince the masses to join the overall modernization drive. However, the elites also paid attention to the “pragmatic” level of modernization since performing socio-cultural modernization and each of the four

subthemes discussed required efforts in real life such as building new schools, changing the transcript, enforcing a new dress code, banning the veil and the like. The elites presented each of the four discussed subthemes as being essential to the state's overall modernization drive and in the path toward producing a modern society and individuals. In terms of the Selectorate theory, the elites of a rather small winning coalition in both Iran and Turkey tried to convince the majority of the selectorate who were not part of the decision-making process of the merits of the socio-cultural modernization of their respective societies. In order to do so, they presented the new reforms as being vital to the nation's and the country's success and improvement in the future. The socio-cultural modernization package presented by the state was, however, not a public good that everyone would sign up to and as a result, most of the oppositions and challenges to the new regimes of Iran and Turkey took place as a result of this aspect of modernization.

5.4.3. Political/Legal Modernization

Modernizing the political and legal spheres of their countries was viewed by the elites of Iran and Turkey to be a major component of the modernization process. Therefore, in their discussions of modernization on the front pages of the selected newspapers, the Iranian and Turkish elites paid considerable attention to the issue of political/legal modernization. The regimes of Iran and Turkey had inherited political and legal structures from their predecessors that were both limiting and enabling in their specific ways. In the case of Iran, the institution of kingship had been the norm for several centuries with various dynasties having replaced one another. As the last dynasty before Reza Shah seized power, Qajar kings and their administrations, however, lacked the elaborate governing structure that would enable them to project their power into every corner of society and were mostly sovereign in name only. In addition, no such thing as a regular standing army existed and the army consisted of contingents from various tribes and the Cossack Brigade which was the only military unit that had been set up along modern army structures. They ran the country and its various tribes through installing princes in different parts of the country and by intermarrying with the powerful tribes of the country. A centralized governing

structure did not exist in Iran by the time Reza Shah took over in 1925, nor was there a central bureaucracy or taxing system that could be used to run the affairs of the country. In the legal sphere, the record was as disappointing with a judiciary system which mostly consisted of religious courts controlled by the ulema providing very limited access to the system by the masses. The civil, criminal and trade laws among others were either very basic or non-existent altogether with the arbitrary decisions made by influential figures in the political system replacing the rule of law.

In the case of Turkey, the story was considerably different as the Ottoman state had already set up a strong centralized governing system coupled with a powerful bureaucracy that ran the affairs of the country. The Ottoman state could project its power into many parts of the empire and had a regular standing central army that could be used in times that challenges arose to the central power. As such, the Ottoman state had left an elaborate structure of state and state institutions to its successor that was improved and extended by the republican regime. However, the establishment of the “republic” and the abolishing of the caliphate were the most radical political modernization measures undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk and his supporting elites. These measures were considered revolutionary at the time and caused major challenges to the newly established regime later on. In terms of the legal system, the CUP governments of the second constitutional era in Turkey had introduced some reform measures to the legal system, trying to minimize the power of the ulema while establishing the infrastructure for secularizing the legal system. They had also undertaken the first steps in reforming and secularizing laws and regulations which were later continued and completed under the republican regime.

It was in such a context that the Iranian and Turkish states/elites undertook their political/legal modernization drive as part of their overall modernization plan. They believed that political/legal modernization was a part of the modernization process that would make sure that modernization would be consolidated in their respective countries. Therefore, they dedicated time and attention to political/legal modernization in order to reform the structure of governing and the administration of laws. In the present study, the overarching theme of “political/legal modernization” will be discussed under the subthemes of “modern political system and parties,”

“creation of a modern nation” and “modernization of laws and legal system”. In turn, the subthemes will each be discussed in relation with the “pragmatic” and “ideological” levels of modernization in order to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which the states/elites of Iran and Turkey utilized each of these subthemes on the front pages of the four state-aligned newspapers in order to push the modernization initiative forward.

5.4.3.1. The Contours of Political/Legal Modernization Discussed in Newspapers

Political/legal modernization covered a considerably broad range of issues that were discussed by the Iranian and Turkish elites on the front pages of the four selected newspapers. The Turkish newspapers included discussions of the new republican system and its merits, nation, national sovereignty, the national assembly, nationalism, elections and voting, parties and their importance, opposition parties, state-society relations, bureaucracy, passing of new laws, judicial system and justice among others.

The Iranian newspapers covered discussions of nation, national sovereignty, state-society relationship, the institution of kingship, parliament proceedings, elections and voting, nationalism, passing of new laws, judges and the judiciary, rule of law, bureaucracy and several others. The range and breadth of the issues covered by the Iranian and Turkish elites regarding political/legal modernization is significant and provides interesting insights into the way these elites viewed the political/legal modernization side of the overall modernization project. The insights gained from assessing this particular side of modernization could prove very helpful in understanding the later experiments and struggles of the Iranian and Turkish regimes with political and legal reform and democracy.

5.4.3.2. Modern Political System and Parties

The modernization project that the Iranian and Turkish elites had undertaken was a comprehensive and all-encompassing effort to modernize the various aspects of their countries and nations. They had accepted that in order to modernize their

respective countries, they had no choice but to adopt the whole package of Western ideas, values, structures and mindset. As part of this package, they witnessed the emergence of republics and constitutional regimes throughout Europe which shattered the institution of kingship or highly limited its powers, trusting power instead with assemblies that ran the affairs of the country. Moreover, these new systems of power sharing gave birth to political parties that tried to serve as the link between the state and the people and to function as platforms where politics could be pursued in a systematic and planned manner. Moreover, these parties served as a place where elites could discuss and give shape to the social and political agenda while also being conduits for people's demands. Therefore, the Iranian and Turkish elites understood the importance of these new political ideals and dedicated time and energy to discussing them. However, in the case of Iran, the discussions regarding the establishment of a republic belong to the transition period between the Qajar dynasty and the coronation of Reza Shah. Indeed, before becoming the king of Iran, Reza Khan Pahlavi had put forth the idea of establishing a republic in Iran which was enthusiastically discussed by progressive newspapers and elites of the day. Ultimately, the idea was dropped due to the strong opposition from the ulema and the conservative elites and Reza Khan Pahlavi was given the title of shah and became the king of Iran. That is why no discussion of the republic and the republican regime can be found in the two Iranian newspapers for the period of the current study. Moreover, aside from short-lived experiments with establishing minor political parties by the state elites during the first years of Reza Shah's reign, no serious effort was undertaken in this regard. Indeed, Reza Shah was suspicious of political parties and ordered the closure of the few minor ones established by the state elites during the first years of his reign. As a result, discussions of parties are absent from Iranian newspapers in the period under study. This is a very significant contrast with the case of Turkey and its implications will be discussed at the end of the section.

In the case of Turkey, the discussion of modern political systems and parties was given a high level of emphasis as the state/elites felt the urgent need to demonstrate the merits of the new republican regime and the state-established Republican People's Party, and to some extent modern political parties in general, in

contrast to the Ottoman system. Therefore, discussions of these issues are common on the front pages of the selected Turkish newspapers.

The issue of the Republic and its significance to the modern Turkey and its survival was discussed and emphasized ceaselessly by the Turkish elites on the front pages of the two selected newspapers. The issue of *Cumhuriyet* published on October 29, 1931 celebrates the anniversary of the establishment of the republican regime in Turkey and features photos of Atatürk on top of the page and the line “We send our regards with respect and humbleness to the grand Gazi who established the republic,” thus emphasizing the central role of Atatürk in establishing the new republican regime. The editorial by Yunus Nadi starts by going over the dire situation in the late Ottoman times when Turkey’s sovereignty and identity were about to be lost totally. He posits that “the Turks resisted and saved themselves from the dangers and regained their national independence and established it in the form of the republic. More accurately speaking, although the republic was formally announced later, this independence itself was the republic.” It is clearly visible how the author equates Turkey’s sovereignty and independence with the “republic” itself. He continues by going over the history of the War of Independence and the role played by the Turks and the leadership role of Atatürk. He emphasizes another point as being a key component of the republic saying that “Indeed the republic is the movement that arose out of the nation’s determination to establish its independence during the war of independence. This republic is the end point of the national movement and its objectives.” Trying to present the establishment of a republic as the desired end to the war of independence aims at presenting the choice of the regime as one that was made by the people themselves and not the leader and the elites running the state. The *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* issue dated October 29, 1932 by Falih Rıfkı builds on the same kind of rhetoric about the republic. Celebrating the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the republic, he emphasizes the significance of the republican form of government and starts by positing that “We the Kemalist revolutionaries cannot view the republican form of government to be like any other form of government. We view it as the Anatolian revolution that established our nation and as the new beginning for the Turkish history. This history would be

unthinkable without the republic.” The rhetoric is even more direct than the previous editorial as it states clearly that the war and revolution for national sovereignty was indeed the war and revolution to establish a “republic” in Turkey. Rıfki concludes by arguing that “The republic is not simply one of the rights of the Turkish nation, it is the nation’s will to survive...the word “republic” in the Turkish vocabulary can be defined using two words: revolution and independence.” The author equates the republican regime with the nation’s sovereignty and survival and presents it as the ultimate goal that the nation has strived for.

The numerous editorials published on the issue of establishing the republic, particularly those published on the Republic Day adopt a similar tone. The elites writing these pieces try to present the establishment of the republic as the desired objective of the masses taking part in the war of independence from the very beginning. By creating such a narrative, they hoped to pursue several goals. First, they wanted to establish a popular basis for the republican regime and to sever the people’s several-centuries-long ties to the Ottoman imperial system. Second, they intended to establish a link between the state and the people by arguing that the choice of the republican regime was not one that was made by the leader and the elites but by the people and the state together. This was supposed to mean that the people had a say in the government and were also responsible for their own part to do their duty of being loyal to the state and following its decrees. Finally, they aimed at creating the idea that Turkey’s sovereignty and independence would be possible only under the republican regime and no other form of government. By doing so, any rival narratives and forms of government were depicted as being unable to help the Turkish nation sustain its independence and sovereignty.

The issue of parties is discussed on the front pages of the two selected Turkish newspapers with a particular emphasis on the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which was established by the new republican regime. There are also some pieces on political parties in general and also opposition parties and their roles. However, the majority of the editorials in regards with parties emphasize CHP and its role in the state structure. The news of CHP’s activities and its meetings are frequently covered by both of the Turkish newspapers with more attention and space

dedicated to the party in election cycles. One of the most interesting examples of promoting CHP and its role in the new republic is the front page of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated October 29, 1933 which celebrated the Republic Day. The CHP flag with its six arrows is depicted on the front page with these expressions written underneath it “We are republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular and revolutionary” (Cumhuriyetçiyiz, milliyetçiyiz, halkçiyiz, devletçiyiz, laikiz, inkılâpçiyiz) which represent the main ideological pillars of the party. The party’s vision is clear from its slogan as it tries to promote the republican ideals by serving as the state’s propaganda arm while establishing a link with the masses through its populist stance. The role and importance of CHP to the modern Turkey is discussed in the editorial of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated April 23, 1931 by the author whose name is written as Siirt Mebusu Mahmut. Discussing the upcoming elections and its importance, he goes over the importance of the elections and then turns to the role of the CHP as a key part of the new republican regime. “The Republican People’s Party is a revolutionary party. This party has taken as its duty the responsibility of the country’s administration and the responsibilities related to a big revolution.” As the rhetoric shows, the CHP is presented as the party that has the goal of protecting the revolution and running the country which shows its aims of being both the propaganda and the administrative arms of the state. The *Ulus* issue dated March 26, 1939 provides another look into the way the Turkish elites supporting the regime viewed CHP. The editorial by Falih Rıfkı discusses the elections and the new MPs that will be selected to the parliament. Discussing the importance of the new national assembly, he goes over the history and role of the CHP. “Our party has the history of having given the Turkish Republic its existence and has a leader that has won the trust of all the population. There is something as important as both of the aforementioned points and that is to complete the establishment of a civilized and modern country and society.” As the rhetoric demonstrates, CHP is seen as equal with the Republican regime to which the modern Turkey owes its existence and as the organization that is carrying forward the project of modernizing the country and society. All in all, there was a concentrated effort on the part of the elites to present CHP as being the party that had materialized the republic’s establishment and the

new Turkey's sovereignty and as being the only party that could legitimately carry forward Turkey's modernization and development. The emphasis on the populist stance of the party was also aimed at establishing a link between the state/elites and the population as a mechanism to build an energized social base for the party. This would in turn enable the party to spread the state's propaganda among the masses and instill its vision of modernization in their minds.

Opposition parties were also given some coverage on the front pages of the Turkish newspapers. However, the coverage remained minimal and aside from the issues related to the last years of the single-party era, there was not much discussion of the significance of opposition parties. The state-aligned elites' stance toward opposition parties is generally skeptical and negative and while they sometimes admit the need for the existence of opposition parties, they immediately state the need for prioritizing the state's and the country's condition over the right of the opposition parties to criticize the ruling government. Discussing the election of independent MPs to the new parliament on the editorial of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated April 18, 1931, Yakup Kadri turns to the issue of opposition and opposition parties. After elaborating on the role of the CHP in the new parliament, he turns to the opposition. "In a country, in a national assembly, the existence of opposition is a strength. However, this strength at any cost must not become a tool for factionism and strife by those who may use it to fulfil their ambition of obtaining positions of power...as we remember in the different periods of the opposition, there was not a unique and clear promise or theory. When we compare ourselves with other democracies, we feel happy that the opposition in our system enjoy this kind of relief and loud voice." The rhetoric clearly demonstrates the state-aligned elites' stance toward the opposition expecting opposition figures to be docile and stay committed to the regime run by the dominant party and be always aligned with the demands of the ruling CHP.

Late in the single-party era, the newspapers started to give some coverage to the Demokrat Party which assumed increasing significance specially after the 1946 elections. However, the critical and skeptical tone toward the opposition remained in place. For instance, on the front page of the *Ulus* issue dated November 6, 1949

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın compares the opposition parties in the US with those in Turkey and argues that the opposition in Turkey is incapable of doing its job in the modern sense. “In our country, the opposition understands the meaning of freedom as the absence of any laws and any rule of law. They believe that as long as there is freedom (in the sense that they understand it), they can say and write anything they like. Even when they are asked about what they have said and written, they turn this into a tool for making a fuss and attacking the state.” The author accuses the opposition of being non-professional and lawless figures who just use the occasion to attack and weaken the state without having any discipline or clear theoretical stance. The rhetoric again shows the state-aligned elites’ expectation of a meek and state-aligned opposition. This sheds some light on the pathologies of democratization in the upcoming multi-party era as the CHP and then Demokrat Party as the party running the government could never accept the existence of the opposition as a necessary component of democracy and always viewed it as an existential threat.

In regards with the modern political institution of parliament, both the Iranian and Turkish newspapers give the national assemblies of their respective countries some coverage both in the form of news reports and editorials. In the case of Iranian newspapers, the proceedings of the national assembly are regularly covered on the front pages of both *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* while special attention is paid to the new laws passed by the assembly. In such occasions, the script of the law is usually reprinted on the front page with some analysis and commentary. Aside from this, there are almost no pieces on the importance of parliament per se with scattered mentions of the parliament in some editorials. In the case of Turkey, the proceeding of the national assembly and the new bills passed by it are regularly covered by the two selected newspapers. As in the case of Iran, whenever a major bill is passed, the next day’s front page features the script of the law together with some analysis and commentary. However, in contrast with the case of Iran, there are some editorials on the importance of the parliament and its role in the new republic. For instance, the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated April 23, 1937 which celebrates the opening of the first Grand National Assembly of Turkey provides a look into the importance of parliament to the new republic and the way the Turkish elites viewed it. The editorial

by Yunus Nadi starts by reviewing the situation of Turkey following the first world war and the various dangers to its sovereignty including the presence of foreign forces on its soil. Nadi continues by mentioning how the Turkish nation resisted the plans for the partitioning of the country and the subsequent emergence of Atatürk as the hero who led the national struggle. He posits that the establishment of the first Grand National Assembly was the highest incarnation of national unity. Then he goes on to say “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was the assembly that transferred sovereignty to the people and announced and consolidated this principle from the start...the same assembly gave the establishment of a new country to the people and fought with all the foreign powers...” The rhetoric shows how the national assembly was seen as the incarnation of national sovereignty and unity and the organization which helped Turkey survive, enabling the establishment of the new Turkey. In line with the elites’ view of the new republic as the system that guaranteed the survival of the Turkish nation and its sovereignty, the same is posited about the national assembly which was seen as the organization which incarnated the power of the Turkish nation and helped it regain its sovereignty and independence.

In summary, the subtheme of modern political system and parties was discussed at length in the case of Turkey while it was mostly absent from the Iranian newspapers. The Iranian state kept the institution of kingship and as a result, modern political system and parties did not find a way into the editorials written by the elites on the front pages of the Iranian newspapers. However, in the case of Turkey, there was an extended campaign to convince the public of the merits of the republican system and the party established by the new state, namely the People’s Republican Party. The elites viewed these measures of political modernization as being necessary for national sovereignty and the successful execution of the modernization plan. There was a high level of focus on the “ideological” aspect of modernization in regards with these measures of political modernization as the state/elites tried hard to win the battle of ideas against a long tradition of political administration by the imperial Ottoman state with its concentration of power in the hands of the emperor who served as the caliph too. However, the effort at creating the republican regime structure, the new party and parliament were done along the lines of the “pragmatic”

aspect of modernization that had tangible results in the lives of the masses. The new republican regime and its leader/elites severed the link between politics and religion by establishing a republic and a political party along modern lines and by minimizing the influence of religion over society and state. In terms of the Selectorate theory, the leader and his winning coalition tried to win the confidence of a large selectorate, the majority of whom had no effective power in the decision-making process and were merely called upon to support the decrees of the state and its supporting elites. The large selectorate and the small winning coalition that emerged in the republican regime set up the stage for the proto-democratic system that emerged in the late years of the single-party era and reached some maturity in the multi-party era. Moreover, the change to the republican system was meant to sever the links between people and the Ottoman state's legacy and avoid any serious challenger to the regime or its leader to emerge.

5.4.3.3. Creation of a Modern Nation

The issue of creating a modern nation was among the most important issues discussed by the elites of Iran and Turkey in the foundation eras of the two countries. They tried to mold modern nations out of the ashes of the regimes that preceded them. In the case of Iran, the new state/elites had to create a nation out of the various tribes that had lived within almost the same borders for centuries. However, the identity of being the citizens of the same country and sharing the same historical narrative as a member of the "Iranian" nation had to be created by the state/elites during the reign of Reza Shah. The Iranian leader and elites resorted to Iran's ancient history and the Persian language that they viewed as being incarnations of Iran's glorious past as the tools through which to create the modern Iranian national identity. In the case of Turkey, the project of building a nation was even more challenging and complicated. The newly established Republic of Turkey that was set up within the borders of the former Ottoman state was much smaller than its predecessor and its population was more homogenous, with a majority that were Muslim and spoke Turkish as their native language. However, the population had identified with the Ottoman state and sultan/caliph for centuries and viewed

themselves as Muslim Ottoman subjects. Indeed, the idea of a being members of a “Turkish” nation founded on a secular belief in the separation between state and religion was totally new and radical to the majority of the people. Atatürk as the leader of the new republic and his supporting elites resorted to history and language to create the new bases of the Turkish national identity to replace the centuries-old identification of people with Islam and the sultan/caliph as the major pillars of their identity. Taking such a need into account, the Turkish elites tried to create a historical narrative of an ancient Turkish motherland in addition to promoting the Sun Language Theory (Güneş-Dil Teorisi) which enabled the public to view the Turkish language as an ancient language with a very significant place among world languages. The “language” aspect of the modern idea of nation was discussed in the language reform subsection, therefore, the present section will focus on the general idea of nation put forth by the Iranian and Turkish elites and its various features.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, there were a few different ways through which the Iranian elites tried to promote a modern national identity. One such way was to resort to Iran’s ancient history and represent it as a glorious time which was weakened and made decadent through the influence of the Arab culture after the Arab Invasion of Iran. In this vein, *Ettelaat* newspaper features a column by Saeed Nafisi, one of the most prominent scholars of the time, that retells the ancient history of Iran for the contemporary audience. Such columns and similar ones put forth an image of a historical glory that had been lost for some time following the Arab Invasion of Iran and is now revived under the new regime. Indeed, such an effort created a historical link between Iran’s past and present and provided for a domestic source and narrative to push the contemporary modernization initiative forward. In other words, the Iranian elite tried to present the creation of a modern nation and national identity as a revival of an ancient Iranian historical identity that had always existed and that had been corrupted by the Arab influence in the past few centuries.

There are also a few pieces that directly address the issue of Iran’s ancient history and its relevance to the nation’s contemporary situation. The issue of *Ettelaat* dated Esfand 1, 1319/February 20, 1941 features such a piece written by Mohammad Bagher Hejazi. The column’s opening sentences demonstrate its argument. “The

ancient nation of Iran is among the nations that is well-regarded in history and civilization...and the history of our civilization which is 2,500 years long has earned it a place among world civilizations...Iran has always been one of the pillars of civilization and the signs and artifacts left from ancient times prove that this ancient country had had an important role in the development of the old human civilization.” The rhetoric demonstrates how the elites of the time presented Iran as a country that had been one of the major pillars of the ancient civilization, having had a prominent role among other countries at that time. Hejazi goes on to mention the powerful Iranian dynasties of the ancient world and their splendor and importance on the world stage. He concludes by mentioning that Iran has always recovered from dark times and emerged stronger. “Whenever the armies of evil have made the skies of our homeland dark, a courageous son of this nation has emerged as the new king of the nation and lighted the torch of civilization again in this country...His honor Reza Shah the son of the nation took to the stage after the country’s dark ages for the people’s good and the society’s redemption.” The author presents the arrival of Reza Shah on the political scene and the state’s attempts at modernizing the country and reaching the level of Western civilization as a resumption of Iran’s lost historical glory. The issue of *Koushesh* published on Esfand 3,1311/February 22, 1933 that celebrates the anniversary of the coup d’état on February 22, 1921 by which Reza Shah rose to power includes an editorial about the significance of this date. The editorial named “The Preface to Iran’s New History” provides another window into the way in which the modern nation of Iran was perceived by the elites. The author celebrates the coup as the start of a new era for Iran and as the beginning of Iran’s new history. He posits that at the time no one believed that the coup would be such a significant and historical incident. “We have witnessed with our own eyes the speed and strength with which the reforms and progress that a select few of the patriots and enlightened youth had always dreamed of have been finally materialized.” The author goes on to mention these reforms that include the building of a strong central state, provision of security, establishment of railways, industrialization and other reform and modernization measures. The conclusion of the editorial is even more significant in regards with its relation to the emergence of the new Iranian nation and

its ties to its history. “Which Iranian citizen could imagine before Esfand 3,1311(February 22,1921) that Iran as his homeland will develop so fast...now the Iranian citizen is woken up from his long slumber of ignorance by the call of the courageous Iranian soldiers on Esfand 3 (February 22) and is keen on reaching the level of civilized nations...Any call with the pure intention of bringing national awakening to a country will have long-lasting effects on the people and they will follow it for their own survival and redemption...The call that was aired on Esfand 3 was of this type and will be reflected in the ancient country of Iran for a long time and contemporary history will repeat it in its preface.” The conclusion shows the way the author and the Iranian elites in general presented the emergence of the new state and the figure of Reza Shah as a continuation of Iran’s ancient history. This new beginning was aimed at making a nation whose members identified with the identity of being Iranian and strived for modernization and joining the ranks of civilized countries.

All in all, in the case of Iran, the elites used the legacy of Iran’s supposedly glorious and civilized ancient history in order to provide a starting point for a nation that was to rebuild itself and modernize to regain its glory. This modern nation was built around the figure of a powerful modernizing king who had taken the country out of its centuries of backwardness and led it toward the ranks of civilization. Moreover, this modern identity was based in the idea of being the members of the “Iranian” nation above and over allegiance to one’s city or tribe, a nation that had supposedly been one of the pillars of civilization in the ancient world but had then been living in its dark ages for the past few centuries.

Another important component of this modern nation was Persian Language that like the nation’s history provided it with a historical source of glory and civilization that had been lost and had to be resurrected. In general, the institution of kingship and the king, the ancient history of Iran and the Persian language are represented by the elites as being the three main pillars of a modern nation that strived to undertake an intense plan of modernization and reform to regain its lost historical glory.

In the case of the Turkish newspapers, the idea of a modern nation is energetically discussed and promoted by the elites since a “Turkish” nation was a concept that was novel to a population used to identifying themselves as “Muslim Ottoman” subjects of the sultan/caliph. Therefore, the Turkish elites undertook a multi-faceted and concentrated campaign of creating the image and the reality of a nation out of ruptures with the past and through the creation of an alternative history. One of the ways through which the Turkish elites tried to give shape to this image of a modern nation was by covering the efforts of the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) which was tasked with discovering the supposedly long and glorious history of the historical nation of Turks and their contributions to the history of civilization. For instance, the issue of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated July 21, 1931 has the photo of Atatürk heading the meeting of the society on its first page while that of July 10, 1932 features a report of the society’s meeting with Atatürk and İsmet İnönü in attendance.



Figure 20. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 21 July 1931

The issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated October 14, 1932 features a report of the meeting of the Turkish Historical Society with the title “The Great Turkish History” and the subtitle “Turks’ Services to Civilization”. As another example the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated September 26, 1937 covers the proceedings of the same society with a new thesis presented by a professor about Turkish history with Atatürk attending the session. The theses presented at the meetings of the society and the fact that Atatürk, İnönü and other senior political figures attended its meetings

demonstrates the seriousness and significance with which the issue of rediscovering the history of Turks for the consolidation of the national identity of the modern Republic of Turkey was treated.

Another way of promoting the features of this modern national identity was to elaborate on it particularly on the anniversary of important dates for the establishment of the new regime such as the National Sovereignty Day or the Republic Day. In the editorials and columns published on such days, the Turkish elites presented their version and vision of the modern national identity they were trying to create for Turkey. As discussed in the subsection on “Modern political system and parties” one of the key features of the new national identity was presented to be its commitment to the new “republic” and Atatürk’s central role in it. Since this issue has been discussed at length in the aforementioned subsection, only brief quotes about it will be given here. For instance, on the issue of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated October 29,1934, Falih Rıfki celebrates the 11th anniversary of the establishment of the republican regime in Turkey. He starts by elaborating on all the changes that Turkey and the nation has gone through compared with its predecessor and attributes all this to the establishment of a “republic” in the country. “...We established a state of peace as a result of our victory...We did not try to confiscate anyone’s rights and did not let anyone take away our rights. The name of Turks regained its fame and respect among nations. The root of all this is the republic. The republic is the same as the Turkish nation’s freedom and unity. This is because it was the republic that freed the nation of what had taken away its freedom and unity. Who in this country wouldn’t know the person to whom we owe all this? Gazi (Atatürk) acted like a shield against fire. He did not leave the nation alone in the villages, in towns, in cities. The amount that he trusted the nation, the nation exactly believed in him the same amount.” The rhetoric shows how the republic was equaled with the identity of the modern nation of Turkey and as the main root of this new identity. This emphasis was meant to sever the links of the nation and the citizens with the Ottoman system and its sultan/caliph by replacing a secular ideal i.e. republic for Islam and Ottoman political traditions. Another issue of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* published on October 29,1929 is another example of the focal importance of the

republic to the new national identity. The editorial's name is "The Foundation Stone" and has Siirt MP Mahmut (Mahmut Nedim Soydan) as the author. He starts by arguing that "The republic that the grand Gazi (Atatürk) trusted to the youth has now turned seven years old. This precious institution is the foundation stone of both the state and nation. Every Turkish citizen pays its respects to this institution while filled with a deep love for it" and goes on to elaborate on all the various achievements that have become possible as a result of the establishment of the republic. The rhetoric again demonstrates the fact that the republic was viewed by the elites as being the real core of the new modern national identity.

As another pillar of the modern national identity, a concentrated effort was made to create a historical narrative that depicted Turkish language as an ancient one with its glorious history and contributions to civilization. This effort coupled with reforming and modernizing the language and changing the script to Latin made up a package that tried to present the Turkish language as an important pillar of the modern national identity. Since the issue of language reform and in general Turkish language were discussed at length in the subsection on "Language Reform" they will not be repeated here. All in all, in the case of Turkey, the creation of a modern nation was one of the top priorities of the state/elites and they ran a full-blown campaign to do it. The main pillars of the modern nation of Turkey as the elites conceived of it were the republic, Atatürk as the leader, Turkish history and Turkish language. All these features were extensively discussed and promoted by the Turkish elites on the front pages of the selected newspapers. Indeed, there was a huge emphasis on the "ideological" aspect of modernization in regards with creating a modern nation as the leader/elites saw the creation of a modern nation as being necessary for severing the society and people's links with their Muslim Ottoman historical identity. Moreover, such a measure was essential in creating a common national narrative that would serve as the basis for a secular nation that would be ready to take part in the overall modernization project undertaken by the state. There was, however, some emphasis on the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization as well since the new institutions of the republic worked to actively shape the society in line with the new definition of the

nation and performed various campaigns like changing the transcript into Latin to do so.

In comparison, the elites of Iran and Turkey both dedicated considerable time and energy to creating a modern nation. The supposed glory of ancient Iranian history and Persian language were the sources to which Iranian elites resorted to create a modern national identity. In the case of Turkey, the same emphasis on history and language existed with the difference being that the Turkish elites had to create historical and linguistic narratives that enabled the new Turkish nation to imagine a sense of continuity with an ancient and glorious past. In both countries, the figure of the leader was presented by the elites to be a conduit for the new national identity and ambitions. However, while in the case of Iran, the traditional political institution of kingship was kept and integrated into the narrative of the modern nation, in the case of Turkey, the establishment of the republic itself became one of the pillars of the national identity.

5.4.3.4. Modernization of Laws and Legal System

One of the key aspects of political/legal modernization in the cases of Iran and Turkey was modernization of laws and legal system. The leaders/elites of both countries knew well that it was impossible to run a modern nation and state without creating modern laws and a modern legal system that could serve the purposes of modernizing their countries. Modernization of laws and the legal system also gave them the possibility to project their power into every corner of their societies in a more effective way and to erode the power of tradition and Islam in their societies. It was on the back of such a vision that the states/elites of the two countries tried to modernize laws and the legal system and to present this aspect of the modernization project of the state as an essential component for the future of their countries. In order to do so, they resorted to various ways in the pieces they published or reported on the front pages of the newspapers.

In the case of Iranian newspapers, reprinting the text of the newly passed laws was one of the ways through which the elites tried to promote modernization of laws. The texts of all the major bills passed by the national assembly were printed on the

front pages of the newspapers and given full coverage by the elites on the front pages of the newspapers. For instance, the issue of *Koushesh* dated Mordad 24,1310/August 16,1931 has dedicated a large space on its front page to the text of the new and reformed marriage law passed by the national assembly. Another instance is the *Koushesh* issue dated Mordad 17,1313/August 8,1934 which has reprinted the newly passed bill on training teachers in full. Another instance is the reprinting of the new law on registering property on the front page of *Ettelaat* issue dated Shahrivar 24, 1308/September 15,1929. Such a measure was meant to both inform and educate the public in regards with modern laws and to promote their importance to the country's modernization and development.

Another way of promoting modern laws and the legal system was the publication of editorials that emphasized the significance of laws and abiding by them as part of the duties of a modern citizen. For instance, the issue of *Ettelaat* dated Azar 24, 1309/December 15, 1930 has printed a piece called "Respecting Laws" as its editorial. The introduction of the piece is indicative of its main argument. "The development and evolution of the nations is a result of respecting laws. This is because major progress in the country would not be possible unless people commit themselves to abiding by the laws." The author goes on to emphasize the importance of instilling a law-abiding spirit in the citizens arguing that they should abide by the laws not out of fear but as part of the duties of a modern citizen. "Among other nations, it is not the presence of the law enforcement official that guarantees that laws are abided by. Following laws is among the sacred national tasks among such nations and it is due to this that people enthusiastically choose to stick to laws." The rhetoric demonstrates how the elites tried to present modern laws and observing them as one of the features of a modern society and citizen. Another interesting example is the editorial of *Koushesh* published on Shahrivar 19,1316/September 10,1937 with the title "Observing Laws". Again the way the editorial opens is indicative of its main argument. "There is a direct relationship between individuals' performing of their duties and observance of laws and the society's progress and happiness. There is a clear logic behind this correlation since laws are the result of thinking, experience and technical and scientific studies that

have been then drafted to maximize the well-being of the public. Society consists of individuals and when an individual commits himself to observing rules and laws, he has made a contribution to social progress and society's happiness." The author presents the argument that drafting of new laws and abiding by them serves as an important basis for society's development. He elaborates on several newly passed laws and the benefits they have for individuals and society and posits that becoming civilized depends on the consolidation of the preliminary reforms. He concludes just like the author of the previous editorial by positing that internalizing the necessity of abiding by the laws by every individual is the key to the society's development. "People who are the main beneficiaries of the administration of new laws should observe the laws by themselves and without any need for external enforcement. And when such a characteristic becomes part of the individual's personality, he cannot ignore or break the laws. We provided this example to show that there are many such things in social life that are consolidated by individuals' actions." The conclusion repeats the editorial's main argument for the necessity of internalizing the observance of laws by individuals as the main beneficiaries of laws. Moreover, it presents reforming and modernization laws as the key to the development of society and individuals.

Another aspect of the drive to modernize laws and the legal system was reforming and modernizing the legal system through passing laws and structural changes. These changes had the aim of creating a modern legal system that gave the secular state power over the judicial system and minimized the power of religion over legal affairs. Such laws were proposed by the Iranian state/elites and passed by the national assembly. The Iranian elites had an active role in passing such laws and promoted their importance on the front pages of the newspapers. For instance, the issue of *Koushesh* dated Mordad 24, 1310/August 16,1931 printed the text of the newly passed law on marriage which increased the power of civil courts over the issue of marriage and decreased the clergy's power in this regard. In a similar manner, the issues of *Koushesh* dated Mordad 13,1312/August 4,1933 and Mehr 15,1316/October 7,1937 printed and discussed the new laws passed respectively on evkaf and notary offices which were previously controlled by the ulema.

All in all, passing such laws and consequently modernizing the legal system and promoting its importance was an important aspect of the state/elites' measures to modernize laws and the legal system that they followed with energy. This subtheme of modernization was carried out with almost equal level of emphasis on both the "ideological" and "pragmatic" aspects of modernization. On one side, the elites tried to convince the people of the importance of modernization of laws and the legal system by presenting such laws as being necessary for the country's development and the importance of fully abiding by them. On the other side, they actively tried to modernize laws and the legal system in line with a secular and civil understanding of laws in order to minimize the power of religion and the clergy over this sphere.

In the case of Turkey, the initiative to modernize laws and the legal system had made some progress in the late Ottoman era under the CUP governments. However, it was left to the Turkish elites of the new republican regime to pursue it in order to carry out a full-scale modernization of laws and the legal system. One of the ways the Turkish elites tried to perform this was through printing the script of the new laws on the front pages of the newspapers together with some commentary and analysis. For instance, the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated May 6, 1930 features Alaettin Cemil's editorial on the newly passed criminal law and its importance to bringing justice to society. As another example, the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated June 12, 1936 features an editorial by Yunus Nadi on the new labor law passed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its significance to the workers and the working environment. The editorial depicts this new law as giving work and workers the value that they were not assigned and as functioning to rid the society of any harmful class struggle. As a further example, the issue of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* dated March 1, 1934 includes an editorial by Falih Rıfkı on the new law passed in regards with forests and protecting them. The editorial goes over the details of the new law and stresses its importance for protection of Turkey's nature and forests. As can be seen, printing news reports of the new laws were aimed at both informing the public about them and stressing the importance of new modernized laws to the well-being of individuals and society.

Another way that Turkish elites promoted modern laws and legal system was through editorials that emphasized the observance of laws by citizens as being essential to the individuals' and society's move toward a civilized and modern level. The issue of *Ulus* dated March 15, 1945 by Falih Rıfki titled "Turkey, the Land of Culture and Order" discusses the situation of the country and the importance of observing laws to help the country develop. "In Turkey, we use all the financial and moral tools at our disposal in order to create a country of laws and order with good culture, a healthy economy and good social and political situation." The emphasis on Turkey as a country of laws and order demonstrates the elites' promotion of laws and abiding by them as a necessity for the country's development. The author continues by mentioning the achievements the country has had as a result of its working according to laws and introduces this phenomenon as the key for future success "to defend this system, it would be enough to mention that the laws passed by the national assembly since many years ago are followed in society without any need for force. Near and far, there are many countries that are caught in anarchy and unrest and for us it is difficult to understand why they have big fights to create a balanced social and political system." The editorial clearly links Turkey's supposed success on the various spheres of life to the fact that the laws passed by the national assembly are followed by all people and that the country works on the basis of laws and regulations. This clearly demonstrates the elites' emphasis on the importance of modernized regulations and more importantly the citizens' observance of the new laws as key to the country's well-being and development. The issue of *Ulus* dated September 22, 1945 features an editorial by Falih Rıfki that emphasizes the importance of law and order and abiding by the laws in Turkey. Discussing the new controversies regarding the establishment of new parties and the discussions it has given rise to in the national assembly, he starts by positing that Turkey's constitution, its national assembly and other laws determine the limits of law in the country and those limits should be followed by everyone. "This country is a country of laws and regulations. Turkey has not been ruled in an arbitrary manner and cannot be. It has not been ruled in a personal manner and cannot be...The laws passed to protect national interests have been valid in the past and will be valid in the future."

The emphasis on laws and depicting Turkey as a country of laws and regulations that apply to everyone clearly depicts the Turkish elites' promotion of the necessity of abiding by laws as a vital component of a modern nation and individual.

Another way of modernizing laws and legal system by the elites was to take active part in passing laws to modernize the legal system and to promote them on the front pages of the newspapers. Such laws were meant to bolster the secular state's power over the legal system while minimizing the impact of religion on the legal system and society. For instance, the issue of *Cumhuriyet* dated May 6, 1930 features the editorial by Alaettin Cemil on the new criminal law and the civil courts that would be established as a result of this new law. The courts were meant to transfer all jurisdiction over civil affairs to the secular state and shatter the remnants of the religious establishment's power over marriage and family law. As another example, the front page of *Cumhuriyet* dated June 20, 1934 features the report of the new law passed on the selection of judges. The new law modernized the laws in this regard and made secular judges in charge of the legal system and terminated the last vestiges of influence the religious judges had. Another example is the issue of *Ulus* dated November 26, 1948 that reports the passing of the new law on the creation of labor courts to settle the disputes between workers and companies.

All these examples show a clear effort to modernize the legal system along Western secular lines in order to improve the secular state's power over the judicial system, run the society based on modern secular laws and eliminate any vestiges of influence religion may have over the legal system. The Turkish elites pursued this aspect of modernizing laws and the legal system on both the "ideological" and "pragmatic" levels of modernization through reforming the legal system along modern secular lines and promoting the importance of such changes as being key to the country and society's well-being. All in all, the Turkish elites performed a concentrated campaign of materializing and promoting modernization of laws and the legal system. This was undertaken through the actual passing of laws and creation of new institutions along the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization while there was an equal emphasis on persuading the public of the necessity of modernizing laws and legal institutions and the public's task to abide by the decrees

of such new laws and institutions. The latter was done along the “ideological” aspect of modernization through the reprinting and discussion of the newly passed laws.

In comparison, the elites of both Iran and Turkey used similar strategies in regards with the subtheme of modernizing laws and the legal system. They reprinted the script of the newly passed laws on the front pages of the newspapers in order to both inform and educate the people in regards with the new laws and to promote their significance to the country’s development. Also, both groups penned editorials on the importance of laws and abiding by them to the modern citizens and societies and argued that internalizing the observance of laws by the citizens would be the key to their respective countries’ and societies’ development. Finally, they actively took part in and promoted the modernization of the legal system along secular lines which was meant to establish and consolidate the power of the secular state over the judiciary and remove any vestiges of the religion’s power in this regard. As mentioned above, both the ideological and pragmatic aspects of modernization were used in regards with this subtheme with almost equal emphasis.

In summary, the overarching theme of political/legal modernization received a lot of emphasis by the Iranian and Turkish elites of the time since they well understood the significance of reforming and modernizing the political and legal spheres to creating a modern state and society that could catch up with the modern countries of the day. However, the main difference was that the Iranian leader/elites could not and did not want to modernize the political system or create any political parties and instead kept the traditional institution of kingship and concentrated their efforts only in creating a modern nation and modernizing laws and the legal system. This may explain the reasons for the Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system later and the lack of such a transition in the case of Iran. Meanwhile, there was a strong emphasis on the “ideological” aspect of modernization in all the three subthemes of political/legal modernization including “modern political system and parties,” “creation of a modern nation” and “modernization of laws and legal system” in particular with regards to the first and second subtheme in the case of Turkey and the second one in the case of Iran. The elites of both countries aimed at creating a legacy of modern political and legal institutions that could serve as the platform for the

country's and nation's future. There was also an emphasis on the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization since the establishment of the republic and political parties in the case of Turkey needed extensive pragmatic work of creating new institutions for the republic and the establishment of the whole structure of the People's Republican Party. Modernization of the laws and the legal system were also addressed in line with the "pragmatic" aspect of modernization since passing the new laws and creating modern legal institutions required real-life effort. The Turkish elites presented all the three discussed subthemes as being essential to the state's overall modernization drive and in the path toward producing a modern society and individuals, while the Iranian elites put forth an image of kingship as being an unchangeable part of the nation's historical narrative and emphasized the second and third subthemes. In terms of the Selectorate theory, the elites of a rather small winning coalition in both Iran and Turkey made radical decisions to transform the political and legal arenas that had strong and deep impacts on the selectorate. Indeed, both regimes possessed the features of systems with a small winning coalition and a large selectorate where elections do not mean a competition among rival parties to win. In these systems, elections are usually rigged and there are no effective oppositions and as a result, the decisions are made by the leader and his small winning coalition without recourse to the demands of the majority of the selectorate. However, the elites of both countries tried to present such decisions as being taken and accepted by the majority of the selectorate and this would explain the effort in case of Turkey to present the establishment of the "republic" as being the people's decision and to promote CHP as a populist party. In the same vein, the elites in both countries developed fabricated or exaggerated narratives of a glorious nation gathered around a common historical and linguistic identity. This new identity was depicted as being a public good that guaranteed both nations' development and survival. Similarly, the efforts to modernize laws and the legal system were presented as public goods which was true to a great extent. However, the members of the winning coalition used it as a private good since the majority of the population had very limited understanding of and access to the new complicated laws and legal procedures. Moreover, the efforts undertaken under the political/legal modernization

theme made the emergence of a challenger to the leader very difficult since the small winning coalitions in both Iran and Turkey received a good share of private goods and demonstrated a high level of loyalty to the leader which is characteristic of systems with small winning coalitions and large selectorates. In general, the elites of both countries staged a concentrated and robust effort of presenting the modernization of political and legal arenas as being integral to the country's survival and development in the future.

5.5. Final Argument and Insights

The empirical research done into the various aspects of modernization with an emphasis on the overarching themes of “economic modernization,” “socio-cultural modernization,” and “political/legal modernization” and their respective subthemes sheds light on the contours and details of the modernization programs undertaken by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites in the founding eras of these two nations. Utilizing thematic analysis as the methodological tool and modernization and selectorate theories as the theoretical backbones of the present study helped create a first-hand narrative and an in-depth look into the details and subtleties of the modernization drive in Iran and Turkey in the foundation eras of these two modernizing nations.

The final argument put forth by the present study is that the elites of both countries pursued a two-pronged approach to the process of modernization consisting of both an “ideological” aspect and a “pragmatic” one. This was due to the fact that they had understood that in order to develop and consolidate a modern country/society, simply establishing modern economic and political institutions or modernizing the country's infrastructure on the ground would not be enough. They had figured out the necessity of waging an all-out and robust campaign of modernizing the society's and individuals' ideas and ways of seeing the world and living in it. This “ideological” aspect of modernization was pursued intensely by the elites and was viewed as being as important as the “pragmatic” aspect, if not more. All in all, the leaders/elites of Iran and Turkey saw their foundation eras as the opening of a new chapter in the life of their nations and worked to lay the ground for

the two-pronged “pragmatic” and “ideological” modernization drive that continued to define these two nations/countries’ fortunes for decades to come. Indeed, many of the contentious social, political, cultural, economic and ideological debates energetically discussed in Iran and Turkey today have their roots in the modernization efforts and ideas discussed in these two countries in their foundation eras.

The findings of the present study also provide insights into the actual process of modernization in two countries/nations that were not part of the early modernizing Western countries/nations and instead pursued an alternative path of modernization. Indeed, the modernization project in both Iran and Turkey in their foundation eras was a statist, elitist, top-down and authoritarian one aimed at taking the country/nation to the level of modernized nations in one big leap. As such, comparing the insights gained from this study with the basic tenets of the modernization theory would be enlightening. For one thing, the current study showed that the paths of modernization the various nations took did not converge as the classic modernization theory posited. On the contrary, each country followed its own particular path toward modernization that was both limited and facilitated by its history, social, political, economic and cultural context of the time and the constellation of actors controlling power in the country.

For another thing, the cases of Iran and Turkey challenge the assumption that modernization was a historical and teleological process that would necessarily lead from traditional to modern societies. In both cases, elements of modern and traditional societies continued to exist side by side for a long time and many of the modern institutions were built on the foundation of traditional ideas and institutions. For instance, in both cases, history and language as traditional sources of identity were used to create the modern national identity. Yet another point is that the cases of both Iran and Turkey call into question modernization theory’s assumption that there is a causal or correlational link between economic development and modernization. In the case of Iran, economic development did not lead to democracy since the leader/elites chose to keep the institution of kingship. And in the case of Turkey, the transition to the multi-party system following the single-party era

happened due to the negotiations by the elites and the decision that such a transition was best for the regime and the country. The cases of Iran and Turkey, however, seem to lend credit to modernization theory's assumption that modernization is an endogenously driven process and its trajectory is decided by the mechanism and forces inside a country. While the state/elites of Iran and Turkey were always constrained in their modernization efforts by exogenous factors such as the world war and the activities of powerful countries, they exerted considerable power and influence over the modernization of their countries and shaped its trajectory to a large extent.

The present study's findings also provide interesting insights into the propositions of the Selectorate theory. The concept of the "winning coalition" and its definition go a long way to describe the way the process of modernization was performed in Iran and Turkey. In both cases, the winning coalition consisted of the elites holding the key positions of power in the social, political and economic spheres and who made it possible for the leader to retain his power and execute the modernization initiative. The leaders in both cases distributed private goods including positions of power and economic rents to these members of the winning coalition in order to guarantee their loyalty. While both leaders made changes to their winning coalition due to various reasons, no challenger could emerge who could attract enough members of the leader's winning coalition to put up a successful challenge to him. Another important point is that the small winning coalition and large selectorate in both countries gave rise to a system of rigged elections where the candidates for the national assembly were handpicked by the leader. It also caused the emergence of a system where the winning coalition decided the political and social agenda without resorting to the ideas of the majority of the selectorate. As a result, the winning coalition decided the contours and details of the modernization plan in isolation from the majority of the population. However, the winning coalition members used the newspapers as avenues through which they tried to convince the people to join the modernization drive. However, the ideological battle waged in favor of modernization by the Iranian and Turkish elites cannot be explained solely by recourse to the notions of private and public goods since many of the elites

supported the leader and his plan of modernization due to their espousal of a specific ideology and ideological objectives and not just out of the desire to receive private goods.

As a final point, the Selectorate theory cannot explain the reasons why the Iranian and Turkish leaders decided to pursue the specific form of government and the modernization plan they chose to undertake in their countries. Explaining each leader's choice in terms of the particular ideology he wanted to execute in his respective country in order to take it to the ranks of modern countries would be a plausible explanation. However, such an explanation would work to undermine Selectorate theory's main assumption which would posit the logic of the leader's decisions to be his political survival only and not any ideological issue.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1. Outline of the Chapter

The present chapter concludes the thesis by presenting a brief restatement of the main findings of the research and what those findings may entail for the cases of Iran and Turkey and the Middle East and North Africa studies from a comparative perspective. It also provides a multi-faceted and deep understanding of the theoretical and analytical leverage of modernization and Selectorate theories as the main theoretical pillars of the present study. Weighing the assumptions of these two theories against the insights gained from the study of modernization process in Iran and Turkey would help assess the validity and accuracy of these two theories. Finally, the present chapter will talk about the contributions of the present thesis to the existing literature. It will mention the ways in which the present study builds on the main arguments existing in the literature and presents new ones that go beyond the existing ones in the literature.

6.2. Restatement of the Main Findings

The present research studied the front pages of the state-aligned Iranian *Ettelaat* and *Koushesh* and the Turkish *Ulus* (published under the name *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* from January 10, 1920 until November 28, 1934) and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers in the 1920s-1940s in order to shed light on the ways in which modernization was presented and undertaken by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites. The study was concentrated on the economic, socio-cultural and political/legal aspects of modernization and their subthemes as discussed on the front pages of the selected newspapers. The main findings of the study and what they entail for the cases of Iran and Turkey and more generally MENA studies are briefly presented in the following paragraphs.

The modern nation-states of Iran and Turkey embarked on the path of modernization by building on the ideals of reform and Westernization pursued by the elites of the two country in the several decades preceding the 1920s that marked the establishment of modern Iran and Turkey under the respective leadership of Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and their supporting elites. In particular, the Constitutional Revolution of Iran (1905-1911) and the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire (1908-1918) served as turning points for the progressive elites' efforts at modernizing their states and societies. The ideas of Westernization of individual and society, secularization, industrialization, establishing a public education system, modern tax collection and modernization of economy, construction of modern transportation infrastructure and modern political institutions and concepts such as a modern state, parliament, democracy and nation, among others first came to the fore and were seriously debated in these two key constitutional periods in each country. The legacies of these two periods had important repercussions for the modernization efforts undertaken under the auspices of Iranian and Turkish states led respectively by Reza Shah and Atatürk.

The Iranian state under Reza Shah inherited the legacy of a weak state that was unable to project its power to the various parts of the territory and lacked a centralized and effective bureaucracy. Political power was decentralized and dispersed among various actors and groups including the ulema, landed aristocracy, heads of tribes, Qajar princes and the Qajar king and his court. Moreover, the Constitutional of Revolution of Iran was led by a coalition of West-leaning progressive elites and some of the major moderate ulema. This meant that Islam and the ulema remained influential factors and major power sources in Iranian politics and state. Such a legacy left its impact on the modernizing Iranian state under Reza Shah as Islam remained the official religion of the country in the constitution and the ulema retained a good portion of power over society regardless of the state's secularizing efforts.

The story was different for Turkey where championing of science and a thorough criticism of Islam were the main tenets of the ideology promoted by the radical wing of the Committee of Union and Progress which was the main force

behind the Young Turk Revolution and the advent of the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire. This was a key reason for the relative success of the secularization effort in Turkey which led to the drafting of a secular constitution under the republican regime and helped Atatürk and his supporting elites minimize the power of Islam and ulema over state and society. The top-down secularization effort undertaken by the Iranian state had limited success in breaking down the power of the ulema and ending the continued sway of Islam over the state affairs and society. Indeed, the alliance between the secular and progressive elites and the moderate ulema that brought the Constitutional Revolution into fruition handicapped the later efforts at secularization by both the more radical members of the National Consultative Assembly of Iran before the reign of Reza Shah and during his reign. Therefore, in the case of the Iranian state, secularization failed in penetrating the various classes of society and remained mostly superficial and limited to the upper classes which viewed themselves as being separate from the masses. Such a legacy had long-lasting impacts that were foregrounded in the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In the course of the revolution, the ulema used their considerable power over society and the masses' belief in Islam as the guiding principle for society and state to establish a system in which religion served as the main basis for the state and politics, in direct contradiction to the ideals of the Constitutional Revolution and the secularist states run by Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah. In the case of Turkey, Islam has held some influence however, the secular constitution has survived the various upheavals of the multi-party era and still serves as the basis for the Turkish state today. This means that the secularization effort undertaken by the Turkish state was highly successful in building on the efforts taken by the CUP during the Second Constitutional Period in breaking down the power of the ulema over society and was also rather successful in penetrating the various social classes. It is due to this fact that while Islam remained a political card for the conservative parties in Turkey, specifically in the more contemporary period, it could never rise to the level of being a rival meta-narrative for secularization in regards with running the affairs of state and society. The same issue was behind the fact that the class of ulema could never re-emerge as a politically influential and decisive political actor in

the case of Turkey and could never stage a significant challenge to the dominant secular political regime.

This has significant repercussions for modernization and secularization in the MENA region. Modernizing states/elites of this region tried to undertake modernization in highly traditional societies in which the majority of population strongly believed in Islam's power as the main source for organizing the personal and social arenas. As such, modernization which was meant to replace Islam with modern Western ideals as the guiding principles of individual and social life has had slow and challenge-filled progress in this region. Indeed, modernization and secularization have been established in these societies through top-down reforms pushed through by a specific group of reform-minded elite, with the military elite occupying a special place in these efforts. Such a historical legacy and its impacts are still clearly visible in the recurrent emergence of extremist Islamist groups and also Islamic movements and parties that try to re-establish the link between state and Islam in their own societies. This is also one of the major factors for the weak or missing link between state and society in most of the countries in the MENA region and the dictatorships and democracy deficit that characterize politics in the region.

Another significant finding is that the modernization process in Iran and Turkey was a statist, elitist and top-down project carried out by reform-minded leaders and elites, with the constant use of decrees and force and only secondary recourse to persuasion. These leaders/elites of these two nations were usually distanced from the masses of their societies and imagined themselves as modern prophets whose mission was to guide the ignorant masses toward the gates of civilization. It was due to such an approach that the notion of a genuine democratic system was anathema to almost all the members of this elite class. Moreover, the Iranian and Turkish elites tried to transform their societies to join the ranks of modern countries at a very fast pace and during a very short span of time while the same measures had taken several decades and even centuries to materialize in the case of early European modernizers. Indeed, the scope and pace of the modernization process and the ruptures it created caused serious shocks to these two nations and resulted in the occurrence of several minor and major challenges to the modernizing

leaders and states in either country. It was due to all these reasons and others that the various aspects of modernization had a hard time taking root in each respective society and at times failed altogether. The ordinary people were never viewed by the states/elites of Iran and Turkey as being active participants in the process. On the contrary, they were viewed as a shapeless mass or mob whose only “duty” was to accept and follow the decrees of the leader, the state and the ruling elites. Meanwhile, newspapers were perhaps among the few public communication channels used by the Iranian states/elites to spread their ideological package of modernization to the various corners of society. While the state-aligned newspapers studied here served as conduits for regime propaganda, they were also means through which the leaders and also states/elites of the two countries depended to bring the masses to their side and convince them of the merits of the modernization drive. These newspapers also served as educational platforms where the elites taught the mostly uneducated members of their nations about the features and subtleties of modernity and the modern world.

Studying the front pages of these newspapers demonstrates the systematic, concentrated and energetic effort by the Iranian and Turkish elites put into presenting the vision and notions of modernity and modernization to their respective nations with the aim of transforming traditional individuals and society to modern ones. However, the tone and rhetoric through which modernization’s various aspects are presented by the elites on the front pages of the selected newspapers remain patronizing, didactic, imperative and harshly disparaging toward any criticism of the state’s modernization ideals. As such, the state-society relationship remained weak in both countries at the time and has still remained so to the present time with people’s low level of trust in the state being one of the major issues in both countries.

Moreover, the overall project of modernization and its various aspects have had difficulty gaining a foothold and being consolidated in these two societies where tradition and traditional ways of individual and social life are still deep-rooted and visible. Indeed, the ideological battle between modernity and tradition is still ongoing in these societies with a considerable level of intensity. In these societies, modern ways of life and structures have been either built over the remains of

tradition or assumed a life of their own in co-existence with traditional structures and ways of life. As such, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the original ideological battles under way in the foundation eras of these two nations (1920s-1940s) still define politics in either case and the main battlefronts and contours of the battle between tradition and modernity have remained mostly unchanged. The same story is true about the ongoing ideological battle between the supporters of tradition and the proponents of reform and modernization in the MENA region where the appearance of most countries has been modernized to a considerable level. However, ideological modernization has not been able to keep pace with developments on the ground and still the symbols and components of traditional society hold considerable power. This major ideological battle seems to be ongoing for the foreseeable future with piecemeal and incremental progress in regards with the modernization of ideas and ways of life.

A further major finding of studying the front pages of the selected newspapers was that the modernization effort undertaken by the Iranian and Turkish leaders and states/elites in the 1920s-1940s was a two-pronged approach emphasizing both the pragmatic and ideological aspects of modernization. The elites of both countries had recognized the importance of modernization on the pragmatic level which translated into measures aimed at modernizing the everyday reality of life in the two nations. Such efforts included modernizing the economy, constructing modern communication and transportation infrastructure, urbanization, establishing modern schools, modernizing the dress code, secularizing the legal system and similar efforts that aimed at modernizing the appearance and face of the society. These measures were enthusiastically undertaken by the Iranian states/elites and emphatically promoted on the front pages of the selected newspapers. The new leaders/elites of Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s tried hard to present themselves as saviors and modernizers who had taken their nations from the depth of insecurity and backwardness and delivered them to the golden age of modernity and civilization. They presented themselves as having fended off all the existential threats to the survival of their nations and as being the only people who could guarantee a successful and modern future for their respective nations.

These elites had also recognized the significance of modernization on the ideological level and as a result, waged a concentrated campaign of criticizing traditional individual and society and promoting the merits of modern individuals and societies. These measures included efforts such as promoting a Western lifestyle and dress code, promoting women's rights, modernizing the school curricula, modernizing and purifying the national language, introducing the modern concept of the nation, establishing a modern political system and parties (in the case of Turkey), establishing modern parliaments and modernizing the laws among others. Such measures were aimed at modernizing the world of ideas and individuals' ways of thinking in order to guarantee the consolidation of modern ideas and ideals in regards with Iranian and Turkish individuals and societies. The ideological aspect of modernization was the aspect that was resisted most fiercely by the traditional masses whose ties to tradition remained strong. The ideological aspect of modernization and its components made slow progress in these societies and were only reluctantly accepted by the ordinary people.

The same story seems to be true about modernization efforts in these two countries in the present time as the pragmatic aspect of modernization and its components have made considerable progress while the ideological aspect is still lagging way behind. In the same vein, the modernizing states of the MENA region and their supporting elites are pursuing a similar two-pronged approach, however, there seems to be a weakening of efforts at the ideological level as the now fully consolidated authoritative states in the region prefer using force over persuasion for modernizing their countries and societies. Meanwhile, pragmatic modernization has been applied to states in this region as they have made considerable progress in establishing the institutions of a modern state such as a capable and centralized state and bureaucracy. However, the same states and the leaders/elites running them have failed to make much progress in the ideological level of modernization. They have refrained from accepting and utilizing the modern political ideas of democracy and people's will as the basis of government and as such still hold on to traditional conceptions of ruling, people as subjects and society being subservient to the state. Meanwhile, the forces of tradition have stifled the progress in regards with

modernization in some countries such as Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 where the state does not hide its hostility toward all the symbols of modernization, in particular those having to do with the ideological aspect of modernization.

6.3. Analytical Leverage of Modernization and Selectorate Theories

The present study also provides insights into the analytical leverage of the modernization and Selectorate theories and makes it possible to gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of these two theories. A discussion of these insights is presented in the following paragraphs.

For one thing, the current study showed that the paths of modernization the various nations took did not converge as the classic modernization theory posited. On the contrary, each country followed its own particular path toward modernization that was both limited and facilitated by its history, social, political, economic and cultural context of the time and the constellation of actors controlling power in the country.

For another thing, the cases of Iran and Turkey challenge the assumption that modernization was a historical and teleological process that would necessarily lead from traditional to modern societies. In both cases, elements of modern and traditional societies continued to exist side by side for a long time and many of the modern institutions were built on the foundation of traditional ideas and institutions.

Yet another point is that the cases of both Iran and Turkey call into question modernization theory's assumption that there is a causal or correlational link between economic development and modernization. In the case of Iran, economic development did not lead to democracy since the leader/elites chose to keep the institution of kingship. And in the case of Turkey, the transition to the multi-party system following the single-party era happened due to the negotiations by the elites and the decision that such a transition was best for the regime and the country.

The cases of Iran and Turkey, however, seem to lend credit to modernization theory's assumption that modernization is an endogenously driven process and its trajectory is decided by the mechanism and forces inside a country. While the state/elites of Iran and Turkey were always constrained in their modernization efforts

by exogenous factors such as the world war and the activities of powerful countries, they exerted considerable power and influence over the modernization of their countries and shaped its trajectory to a large extent.

The present study's findings also provide interesting insights into the propositions of the Selectorate theory. The concept of the "winning coalition" and its definition go a long way to describe the way the process of modernization was performed in Iran and Turkey. In both cases, the winning coalition consisted of the elites holding the key positions of power in the social, political and economic spheres and who made it possible for the leader to retain his power and execute the modernization initiative. The leaders in both cases distributed private goods including positions of power and economic rents to these members of the winning coalition in order to guarantee their loyalty. While both leaders made changes to their winning coalition due to various reasons, no challenger could emerge who could attract enough members of the leader's winning coalition to put up a successful challenge to him.

Another important point is that the small winning coalition and large selectorate in both countries gave rise to a system of rigged elections where the candidates for the national assembly were handpicked by the leader. It also caused the emergence of a system where the winning coalition decided the political and social agenda without resorting to the ideas of the majority of the selectorate. As a result, the winning coalition decided the contours and details of the modernization plan in isolation from the majority of the population. However, the winning coalition members used the newspapers as avenues through which they tried to convince the people to join the modernization drive. However, the ideological battle waged in favor of modernization by the Iranian and Turkish elites cannot be explained solely by recourse to the notions of private and public goods since many of the elites supported the leader and his plan of modernization due to their espousal of a specific ideology and ideological objectives and not just out of the desire to receive private goods.

As a final point, the Selectorate theory cannot explain the reasons why the Iranian and Turkish leaders decided to pursue the specific form of government and

the modernization plan they chose to undertake in their countries. Explaining each leader's choice in terms of the particular ideology he wanted to execute in his respective country in order to take it to the ranks of modern countries would be a plausible explanation. However, such an explanation would work to undermine Selectorate theory's main assumption which would posit the logic of the leader's decisions to be his political survival only and not any ideological issue.

6.4. Contributions of the Present Study to the Existing Literature

The present study builds upon the previous literature on modernization in general and the comparative studies of modernization that include Iran and Turkey in particular. However, the theoretical and methodological tools used in the present thesis have resulted in the making of several contributions to the existing literature on modernization in general and the comparative studies of modernization in Iran and Turkey in particular.

First, the present study went beyond the dominant trend in literature that was obsessively focused on the role of the leaders of the Iranian and Turkish nations, respectively Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in creating these modern nations and modernizing their respective societies. The previous literature mostly attributed the progress of modernization drive in the two nations to the will and perseverance of these two leaders with little reference to the significant legacy of the efforts undertaken in the constitutional periods preceding the emergence of the modern nations of Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s. The literature also paid little attention to the crucial role played by the elites supporting the leader and the state at the time and mostly depicted their role and efforts as being secondary. The present study emphasized both of these dimensions. It highlighted the significant continuities between the modernization project carried out by the Iranian and Turkish states in the 1920s-1940s and the efforts made by the modernizers of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran and the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire. As it turned out, the modernization drive carried out in Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s was more a continuation and culmination of the legacy of each respective constitutional period rather than a rupture from it. The major rupture happened in the

case of Turkey with the establishment of a republic and a modern political party out of the ashes of an empire and the termination of the caliphate altogether. Highlighting the key role of the elites in supporting the leader and their indispensable role in promoting and executing the modernization drive was another significant point discussed in the present thesis that departed from the literature's focus on the figure of the leader for explaining the modernization drive. Indeed, the Selectorate theory utilized in the present study helped track members of the elite group who shaped the modernization debate and discourse in their respective societies. It would be reasonable to argue that without the key intellectual and political support of these elites, the modernization drive undertaken in Iran and Turkey in the 1920s-1940s could not have proceeded very far.

Second, the present study makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by going beyond the dominant focus on secondary sources in the literature. Instead, the present study has taken newspapers as primary sources to be the raw material of the research. This choice of material has had several important implications for the study of modernization in the cases of Iran and Turkey and the existing literature. For one thing, studying the front pages of the four selected state-aligned newspapers provided an unprecedentedly comprehensive and multi-faceted look into the Iranian and Turkish states'/elites' modernization plans and their various features. The large pool of data with close to 1000 newspaper issues being studied and the three overarching themes and the ten subthemes elaborately discussed made it possible to reimagine and reconstruct the particular visions of modernization promoted by the Iranian and Turkish states/elites of the time with considerable accuracy and detail. For another thing, newspapers were among the few existing public communication means at the time, making it possible for the state and its ideology on the one side and society and the ordinary people on the other side to meet and communicate. This particular point makes the choice of newspapers as the raw material of the present study significant as it helped the research gain an understanding of the people's stance toward modernization and the challenges they faced in the process by studying the issues covered in news reports, photos and editorials on the front pages of the selected newspapers. While this is not fully a case

of studying “history from below,” it is an approach that is closer to the public and gives them a fairer share of attention and importance.

Third, the study of the front pages of the selected newspapers demonstrated that the realities of the modernization process are far more complicated, multi-faceted, elusive and sinuous than the version presented by the classic modernization theory. In particular, the assumptions that economic development was the primary step in the modernization process and was necessarily followed by the modernization of individuals and various aspects of social and political life were called into question. Indeed, studying the front pages of the four selected newspapers showed how the modernization drive was launched and pursued as the materialization of several-decades-long grievances of a group of elites who wanted to reshape their respective states, countries and societies using the modern Western ideas and ideals of government, society and individual. In the cases of Iran and Turkey, modernization was not an organic, slow process of economic growth, criticism of religion and its subsumption under the state, and the emergence of merchant and professional middle classes who challenged the authoritarian regimes of the day. In the cases studied in the present thesis, modernization was the conscious effort by a small group of elites to materialize their particular vision of an ideal society and to shape the existing societies of the time in line with that vision. Such insights gained from the study of the modernization drive as a result of studying the front pages of the selected newspapers call into question the dominant arguments in the literature that economic development is the first and necessary step in the process of modernization and that it necessarily leads to modernization at some point. In the same vein, it seems that the international financial aid programs aimed at triggering modernization and also democracy in certain underdeveloped or developing countries has minimal impact at best.

Finally, the comparative approach of the current study, while not novel, makes a significant contribution to the existing literature. The previous comparative studies mostly focused on secondary sources as their points of departure and mostly remained fixated on the comparison of the leaders of the two nations or the procedures and actions of the state in performing the modernization drive. As such,

most provided a one-sided comparative look into the process of modernization that failed to provide a narrative that reflected on the side of modernization related to the society and the ordinary people as well. The present study has tried to address this gap in the literature. In order to do so, it has presented an account of the Iranian and Turkish states'/elites' efforts at modernizing their respective countries gained from the existing literature coupled with the insights gained from the elites' promotion of their particular version of modernization on the front pages of the selected newspapers. It has also tried to assess the ordinary people's reaction to and reception of the various aspects of the state's modernization drive by analyzing the themes that are emphasized and discussed more elaborately by the elites on the front pages of the selected newspapers. As such, the present study makes a unique contribution to the existing literature by comparing newspapers from the Iranian and Turkish cases and due to the large data sample and scope used for this comparison.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Teorik Araçlar

Modernleşme, sosyal bilimlerde en çok çalışılan kavramlardan biri olmuştur. İktisat, siyaset bilimi, tarih ve politik ekonomi gibi çeşitli akademik alanlardan ve diğer birçok akademik alandan akademisyenler, bir ülkenin veya ulusun gelenekselden moderne dönüşüm sürecini açıklamaya çalışmışlardır. Bu bilim adamları, modernleşme sürecinin çeşitli yönlerine odaklanmış ve bireylerin ve toplumun modernleşmesine ilişkin çeşitli hipotezler üretmiştir.

Modernleşme teorisi, modernleşmenin gerçekleştiği mekanizmalar ve süreçleri detaylandırmak amacıyla 1950'ler ve 1960'larda yayımlanan akademik kitap ve makalelerin bir koleksiyonunu ifade eder. Disiplinlerarası ve makro-sosyolojik bir sosyal değişim teorisi olarak Modernleşme teorisindeki dikkate değer çeşitlilik, Modernleşme teorisi kapsamında kapsanan tüm fikirlerin hakkını verecek bir tanım bulmayı çok zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu arada, “ilerici tarihsel değişimin sosyal, ekonomik ve teknolojik süreci” (Gilman 2007,7) gibi modernleşmenin daha yeni tanımları, bize teorinin özü hakkında çok şey anlatmak için çok geniş görünmektedir. Sorun, modernleşme teorisyenlerinin kültür ve ekonomik ilerleme, kültür ve siyasi gelişme ve ayrıca ekonomik büyüme ve demokrasi arasındaki ilişkiyi içeren çoklu odak noktaları tarafından daha da karmaşık hale gelmektedir (Knöbl 2003, 96). Bu teorisyenlere göre modernite, ekonomik üretimi organize etmenin yeni yollarının ötesine geçen, bunun yerine toplumun, siyasetin, kültürel normların ve bireylerin toptan dönüşümüne atıfta bulunan bir fenomendir. Modernleşme teorisyenleri bu modernite anlayışını göz önünde bulundurarak iki yönlü bir yaklaşım geliştirdiler. Projelerinin ilk kısmı, bir toplumun moderniteye doğru "kalkışıyla" sonuçlanan nedensel mekanizmaları keşfetmeye adandı. Teorisyenler “Teknolojide, askeri ve bürokratik kurumlarda ve siyasi ve sosyal yapıda ilerleme tarafından tanımlanan

ortak ve temel gelişme modelini” keşfedebileceklerine inanıyorlardı (Gilman 2007, 3). Böyle bir keşif, gelişmekte olan ve az gelişmiş toplumlar tarafından kullanılacak ampirik olarak yararlı ve uygulanabilir bir sosyal değişim teorisi geliştirmeyi içeren projelerinin ikinci bölümünde onlara yardımcı olabilir.

Teoristler, yaygın ve disiplinler arası doğasına bakılmaksızın, modernleşme teorisyenleri moderniteye geçişi karakterize eden belirli süreçlerden bahsetmişlerdir. Bu tür süreçlerin listesi sanayileşme, kentleşme, merkezileşme, bürokratikleşme, sekülerleşme, eğitimin toplumun her düzeyine yayılması, teknolojik ilerleme, gazete gibi kitle iletişim araçlarının ortaya çıkması, artan gelir, ileri ulaşım teknolojilerinin tanıtılması ve siyasi demokratikleşmedir. (Gilman 2007; Lerner 1958; Marsh 2014; Wucherpfennig ve Deutsch 2009). Bu süreçlerin bazıları modernleşme teorisyenlerinin eserlerinde daha fazla vurgulanmış ve tartışılmıştır.

Modernleşme teorisi çok fazla çeşitlilik içerir ve farklı bakış açılarından yayınlanmış makale ve kitapların çok gevşek bir demetidir. Bu nedenle, teorinin temel varsayımlarını özetlemek zor olacaktır. Bununla birlikte, diğer herhangi bir sosyal, politik veya ekonomik düşünce okulunda olduğu gibi, modernleşme teorisyenlerinin eserlerinde bir takım gizli ve ifade edilmiş varsayımlar bulunabilir. Bunların en önemlilerinden Knöbl (2003) tarafından bahsedildiği şekliyle burada bahsedilecektir.

Modernleşme teorisinin ilk varsayımlarından biri, modernleşmenin “on sekizinci yüzyılın ortalarında Avrupa’da Sanayi Devrimi ile başlayan ve tüm dünyayı ilgilendiren küresel ve geri dönüşü olmayan bir süreç” olduğudur (Knöbl 2003, 96). ilerledikçe. Modernleşmeyi, zorunlu olarak geleneksel toplumlardan modern toplumlara götüren tarihsel ve teleolojik bir süreç olarak kabul etmek, ikinci önemli bir varsayımdır. İki toplum tipi arasındaki ayrım, gelenek ve modernite arasında bir antitezi ima eder; birincisi geri olan her şeyi, ikincisi ise ilerlemeye elverişli olan her şeyi temsil eder. Üçüncü bir varsayım olarak, modernleşme teorisyenleri, farklı toplumlarda moderniteye doğru hareketin az çok tek biçimli, doğrusal ve yakınsak bir mantık izleyeceğini öne sürerler. Böyle bir önerme, moderniteye geçişi çeşitli toplumlar için kaçınılmaz kılan, neredeyse determinist ve hiyerarşik bir toplumsal değişim anlayışına tekabül etmektedir. Batının modern toplumlarında seküler, bireyci

ve bilimsel deęerlerin hakim olduęu varsayımı, “üçüncü dünya”nın geleneksel toplumlarında ise “atıf”, “tikelcilik” ve “işlevsel daęınıklık” gibi deęerlerin baskın olduęu varsayımı (Knöbl 2003, 97) kalkınmanın önündeki güçlü engeller olarak Modernleşme teorisinin dördüncü ana ilkesidir. Modernleşme teorisyenlerinin modernleşmenin “toplumlar içinde yerelleşmek için içsel olarak yönlendirilen bir süreç” olduęu (Knöbl 2003, 97) argümanı, teorisinin beşinci önemli varsayımıydı. Böyle bir önermeye göre, bir toplumun modernleşme yörüngesi, bir ülkenin içindeki mekanizma ve güçler tarafından belirlenir. Ekonomik kalkınma ve demokrasi arasında nedensel veya korelasyonel bir bağlantı olduğunu varsaymak, Modernleşme teorisinin altıncı ana varsayımıdır ve muhtemelen onun en çok tartışılan ve tartışılan varsayımıdır. Gerçekten de, çeşitli modernleşme teorisyenleri, sosyo-ekonomik gelişme ile demokrasi arasında önemli bir ilişki olduğunu temel alan bir evrim tezinin var olduğunu ima etmişlerdir (Lipset 1959; Almond ve Coleman 1960; Boix ve Stokes 2003). Bu varsayım, çeşitli nitel ve daha yakın zamanlarda nicel çalışmalarda, çeşitli bilim adamları tarafından çarpıcı biçimde karşıt sonuçlarla ele alınmıştır. Tartışma, literatür taraması alt bölümünde biraz ayrıntılı olarak ele alınacak olan orijinal tezin ötesinde çeşitli yeni yönler de taşınmıştır.

Bu çalışmanın bir dięer teorik bölümü, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ve ortak yazarları tarafından 2003 yılında yayınlanan Politik Hayatta Kalmanın Mantığı adlı kitaplarında geliştirilen “Selectorate Theory” dir. Teorileri, bir toplumdaki siyasi liderin ve seçkinlerin iktidarda kalmak için ne yaptıklarına bakarak sosyal ve siyasi gelişme mekanizmasını açıklamaya çalışır. Liderlerin seçimlerini ve bir toplumdaki sosyal ve ekonomik deęişim beklentilerini açıklamak için “Selectorate” ve “kazanan koalisyon” gibi iki anahtar kavramına başvururlar. Onlara göre, seçmen, liderin seçimine tercihlerini ifade etmede resmi bir rolü olan tüm bireyleri içerir. Ancak tercihlerini ifade etmeleri sonucu doğrudan etkileyebilir veya etkilemeyebilir; başka bir deyişle, oy kullanma hakkına sahip olanlardır. Bu arada, görevdeki lider görevde kalmak istiyorsa, seçmenlerin daha küçük bir alt kümesinin desteęi gereklidir. Bu gruba kazanan koalisyon denir. Kazanan koalisyonun önemi, “mevcut devletin siyasi hayatta kalması için hayati önem taşıyan kaynakları kontrol etmeleri” (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, 38) ve her liderin yanıt vermesidir. Liderler her zaman sistem

içinden meydan okuyanlar tarafından görevden alınma tehdidiyle karşı karşıyadır. Bu tür meydan okuyucular, görevdeki şirketin kazanan koalisyonunun yeterli üyesini çekerek görevdeki kişiyi görevden alabilirler. Bu nedenle lider, görevde kalabilmek için vergi oranı, gelirlerin harcanması ve iktidarda kalmak için özel ve kamu mallarının bir karışımını sağlama konusundaki karar verme yetkilerini kullanır.

Selectorate Teorinin argümanının özü, politik seçim kurumlarının liderlerin politika seçimlerini açıklamaya yardımcı olduğu ve gelir seviyeleri, gelir dağılımı ve büyüme oranları dahil olmak üzere o toplumun ekonomik beklentilerini önemli ölçüde etkilediğidir. Birkaç nicel oyun teorik testi yaptıktan sonra, kazanan büyük bir koalisyonun gelir artışına yardımcı olduğu sonucuna varıyorlar (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 20). Ardından, büyük kazanan bir koalisyon dedikleri şeyin ekonomik kalkınmayı nasıl kolaylaştırdığını göstermek için başka oyun teorik testleri yürüttüler. Bir liderin politikalarında koalisyon büyüklüğü ile kamu ve özel malların görece önemi arasındaki ilişkinin çok önemli olduğunu öne sürüyorlar. Bunun nedeni, kazanan koalisyon demokrasilerde olduğu gibi önemli ölçüde genişledikçe, liderlerin, nüfusun büyük bir bölümünü içeren kazanan koalisyonlarının refahını tatmin eden kamu politikaları yürütmeyi siyasi hayatta kalma şansları ile aynı doğrultuda bulmalarındır. . Bunu yaparak, bu tür liderler ekonomik büyümeyi ve kişi başına geliri desteklemeye yardımcı olur. Gerçekten de, seçim kurumlarının liderleri nasıl nüfusun çoğunluğuna fayda sağlayan ve ekonomik büyümenin yaratılmasına yardımcı olan siyasi hayatta kalma kararları almaya teşvik ettiğini açıklıyorlar.

Selectorate teori, birkaç nedenden dolayı mevcut çalışmanın temel teorik omurgasını oluşturmaktadır. Mevcut çalışma esas olarak modernleşme söyleminin İran ve Türkiye'deki seçkinler tarafından devlet bağlantılı gazeteleri analiz ederek nasıl yaratıldığı ve teşvik edildiği ile ilgilidir. "Selectorate" ve "kazanan koalisyon" kavramlarını kullanmak, her liderin kazanan koalisyonunun üyelerini ve onların toplumu nasıl yeniden şekillendirmeye çalıştıklarını ve belirli modernleştirici temaları, fikirleri ve söylemleri teşvik ederek görevdeki lideri nasıl iktidarda tutmaya çalıştıklarını izlemek için teorik araçlar sağlar. kitle iletişim kanalları olarak gazetelerin kurulması ve gazetelerde yazılması. Gerçekten de bu gazeteler, kazanan koalisyonun modernleşme vizyonlarını toplumlarının çeşitli köşelerine yaydığı

platformlar olarak hizmet etti. Ek olarak, Selectorate teorisinin “meydan okuyan” nosyonları ve onun “küçük kazanan koalisyonlar ve büyük seçmenler tarafından karakterize edilen... ve Türkiye. Yönetici seçkinlerin gazetelerde tanıtılan siyasi muhalefet, partiler ve demokrasi hakkındaki söylemlerini analiz etmek için bu kavramları kullanmak, iki vakamızda da siyasi demokratikleşmenin önündeki engelleri anlamak için pencereler olarak hizmet eder. Böyle bir uygulama, etkili muhalefet figürlerinin ve görevdeki liderlere meydan okuyan partilerin, bu iki ülkeye bazı resmi demokrasi mekanizmalarının getirilmesine rağmen, İran ve Türkiye'nin kuruluş dönemlerinde neden bir yer edinemediklerini anlamamıza yardımcı olabilir.

Metodoloji

1920'lerde ve 1940'larda İran ve Türkiye'de yayınlanan devlet bağlantılı dört gazete, bu çalışmanın verilerini topladığı ana kaynaklar olarak seçilmiştir. Devlete sempati duyan İran Ettelaat ve Koushesh gazetelerinin ve Türkiye Cumhuriyet ve Ulus gazetelerinin ön sayfalarını analiz etmek, İran ve Türk rejiminin ve onların Rıza Şah ve Mustafa Kemal liderliğindeki destekleyici müttefiklerinin nasıl ilerlediği konusunda derin ve kapsamlı bilgiler sağlayacaktır. Atatürk, 1920'ler ve 1940'lar boyunca geleneksel toplumlarını modernleştirmeye yönelik ideolojik kampanyasını yürüttü.

Gazeteler, İran ve Türkiye'nin modernleşme yörüngeleri hakkında anlamlı bir araştırma yürütmek için çeşitli önemli fırsatlar sundukları için mevcut tüm kaynaklar arasından seçilmiştir. Gazeteler, kuruluş dönemlerinde İran ve Türkiye'deki reform, modernleşme ve kalkınma dinamiklerini daha derinlemesine ve daha geniş bir şekilde analiz etme ve anlama fırsatı sundukları için bu çalışmanın ana kaynakları olarak seçilmiştir. Ayrıca, böyle bir analiz literatürde bahsedilen boşlukların giderilmesine yardımcı olabilir. Bir kere, gazeteler akademik makale ve kitaplardan görece halka daha yakındır ve İran ve Türkiye'nin kuruluş dönemlerinde halk arasında geniş çapta dağıtılmış ve okunmuştur (Abrahamian 2008; Ahmad 1993; Amanat 2017; Lewis 1961). Bu nedenle gazeteleri doğal olarak “aşağıdan tarih”e odaklanan birincil kaynaklar olarak incelemek, modernleşme süreçlerini, modernite ve kalkınmayı çevreleyen tartışmaları ve modern devletlerin yaşadığı toplumların özelliklerini ve koşullarını daha derin ve doğru bir şekilde anlamamıza yardımcı olur.

İran ve Türkiye ve onların destekleyici seçkinleri yeniden şekillendirmeye ve modernleşmeye çalıştı. İkinci olarak, gazeteler devlet ve toplumun bulunduğu sitelerdir (Conboy 2004; McNair 1998; Starr 2005). Dolayısıyla hem devlet/elitlerin modernite ve modernleşme anlayışlarını hem de modern kültür, toplum ve devlet değerlerini mevcut geleneksel toplumlarına yerleştirmek için ürettikleri söylemleri değerlendirmek için paha biçilmez kaynaklardır. Ayrıca, devlete bağlı bu gazeteler çoğunlukla resmi devlet ideolojisi ve propagandasının sınırları içinde kalırken, zaman zaman modernleştirici reformların sıradan insanların yaşamları ve servetleri üzerindeki etkilerine ve onların üstlendiği modernleştirici reformları anlamalarına ve almalarına pencere açtılar. Mevcut çalışmanın süresi boyunca durum. Üçüncü olarak, elitlerin gazetelerde modernleşme ve demokrasiye ilişkin söylemlerini ve bunların birbiriyle bağlantılı veya neden/neden olup olmadıkları şeklinde tasvir edilme biçimlerinin analiz edilmesi, Türkiye'deki demokrasi ve demokratikleşme süreçlerinin yörüngesini ve patolojisini anlamak için yeni yollar sağlayabilir. İran ve Türkiye'den günümüze kadar yapılan araştırmalar elimizin altındadır. Devletin/seçkinlerin kendi devletçi/elitist modernleşme versiyonunu anlama ve yayma yol(lar)ını ve bu tür söylemlerde insanlara yükledikleri rolü ve siyasete ve topluma katılımlarını incelemek, Türkiye'nin yaşadığı zorlukları anlamak için yeni yollar açabilir. çok partili sisteme geçişinden bu yana demokrasi ve İran örneğinde demokratikleşmede somut ilerlemenin fiilen yokluğu. Son olarak, seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfalarını analiz etmek, seçkinler tarafından daha fazla yer ve vurgu ayrılan ve onlar tarafından kapsamlı bir şekilde tartışılmayan modernleşmenin belirli özelliklerini değerlendirmeyi sağlar. Bu, elitlerin üstün ve modernleşme sürecinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak gördüğü özelliklerin, diğer yönler pahasına çıkarılmasına yardımcı olacaktır. Ayrıca, halkın daha güçlü direnç gösterdiği ve seçkinlerin diğer özelliklerden daha sık ve çok daha güçlü bir şekilde borazanlık yapma ihtiyacını hissettiği belirli modern özelliklerin ve değerlerin çıkarılmasına da yardımcı olabilir.

Bu çalışmanın amaçları için seçilen belirli gazeteler, yani İran örneği için Ettelaat ve Koushesh ve Türkiye örneği için Cumhuriyet ve Ulus, zamanlarının rejimlerine siyasi ve ideolojik yakınlıkları ve ittifakları nedeniyle seçilmiştir. . Gerçekten de, 1920'lerde ve 1940'larda İran ve Türkiye'nin modernleştirici

liderlerinin ve seçkinlerinin kitlelerin zihnine modernleşme ve kalkınma ideolojilerini aşılama çalışmaları kamu iletişim kanalları olarak hizmet ettiler.

Bu araştırma, seçilen dört gazetenin ön sayfalarında yer alan modernleşmeyle ilgili tartışmaları ve tartışma noktalarını değerlendirmek için nitel bir metodoloji kullanılmaktadır. Mevcut çalışmanın amaçları ve araştırmayı yürütmek için kullanılan belirli kaynaklar olarak gazetelere odaklanma göz önüne alındığında, ne içerik analizinin ne de söylem analizinin bu araştırmanın amaçları için en iyi eşleşme olmayacağına karar verildi. Tematik analiz, bu iki ulusun kuruluş dönemlerinde seçilen dört gazetenin ön sayfalarında İran ve Türk devletleri/elitleri tarafından öne sürülen modernleşmeyi çevreleyen tartışmaları ve temaları analiz etmek için nitel metodolojik araç olarak seçilmiştir. Tematik analiz, Boyatzis'in (1998) en iyi formüle edilmiş tanımlarından biri olmak üzere, çeşitli bilim adamları tarafından çeşitli şekillerde tanımlanmıştır. Bu tanıma göre TA, araştırmacının bir veri kümesindeki kalıpları (temaları) tanımlamasına, analiz etmesine ve raporlamasına yardımcı olan bir yöntemdir. Bir tema, veri kümesine uygulanan araştırma soruları hakkında önemli bir yönü veya noktayı yakalar ve "veri kümesi içinde belirli bir düzeyde kalıplanmış yanıt veya anlamı temsil eder" (Braun ve Clarke 2006, 82).

Bulgular

“Ekonomik modernleşme”, “sosyo-kültürel modernleşme” ve “politik/hukuki modernleşme” gibi kapsayıcı temalar ve bunların ilgili alt temaları üzerinde durularak modernleşmenin çeşitli yönleri üzerine yapılan ampirik araştırma, ana hatlara ve ayrıntılara ışık tutuyor. Bu iki ulusun kuruluş dönemlerinde İran ve Türk devletlerinin/elitlerinin üstlendikleri modernleşme programlarından Tematik analizin metodolojik araç olarak ve modernleşme ve Selectorate teorilerin bu çalışmanın teorik omurgası olarak kullanılması, kuruluş dönemlerinde İran ve Türkiye'deki modernleşme hamlesinin ayrıntılarına ve inceliklerine ilk elden bir anlatı ve derinlemesine bir bakış yaratılmasına yardımcı oldu. modernleşen bu iki ulustan.

Bu çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu son argüman, her iki ülkenin elitlerinin modernleşme sürecine hem “ideolojik” hem de “pragmatik” yönlerden oluşan iki yönlü bir yaklaşım izledikleridir. Bunun nedeni, modern bir ülke/toplum geliştirmek ve sağlamlaştırmak için sadece modern ekonomik ve politik kurumlar kurmanın veya

ülkenin altyapısını zeminde modernleştirmenin yeterli olmayacağını anlamış olmalarıydı. Toplumun ve bireylerin fikirlerini, dünyayı görme ve içinde yaşama biçimlerini modernize etmek için topyekûn ve sağlam bir kampanya yürütmenin gerekliliğini anlamışlardı. Modernleşmenin bu “ideolojik” yönü seçkinler tarafından yoğun bir şekilde takip edildi ve daha fazla değilse de “pragmatik” yönü kadar önemli olarak görüldü. Sonuç olarak, İran ve Türkiye'nin liderleri/elitleri kuruluş dönemlerini milletlerinin hayatında yeni bir sayfanın açılışı olarak gördüler ve iki yönlü “pragmatik” ve “ideolojik” modernleşme hamlesinin zeminini hazırlamak için çalıştılar. gelecek on yıllar boyunca bu iki ulusun/ülkenin kaderini belirlemeye devam etti. Nitekim bugün İran ve Türkiye'de hararetle tartışılan tartışmalı sosyal, siyasi, kültürel, ekonomik ve ideolojik tartışmaların birçoğunun kökleri, bu iki ülkede kuruluş dönemlerinde tartışılan modernleşme çabalarında ve fikirlerde yatmaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın bulguları, aynı zamanda, erken modernleşen Batılı ülkelerin/ulusların bir parçası olmayan ve bunun yerine alternatif bir modernleşme yolu izleyen iki ülkede/ulusta gerçek modernleşme sürecine ilişkin içgörüler sağlar. Nitekim hem İran'da hem de Türkiye'de kuruluş dönemlerinde modernleşme projesi devletçi, elitist, tepeden inme ve otoriter bir projeydi ve ülkeyi/ulusu büyük bir sıçrayışta modernleşmiş milletler düzeyine çıkarmayı hedefliyordu. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmadan elde edilen içgörülerini Modernleşme teorisinin temel ilkeleriyle karşılaştırmak aydınlatıcı olacaktır. Bir kere, mevcut çalışma, çeşitli ulusların modernleşme yollarının klasik Modernleşme teorisinin öne sürdüğü gibi birbirine yaklaşmadığını gösterdi. Aksine, her ülke, kendi tarihi, sosyal, politik, ekonomik ve kültürel bağlamı ve ülkedeki gücü kontrol eden aktörlerin takımıyla tarafından hem sınırlandırılan hem de kolaylaştırılan modernleşmeye yönelik kendi özel yolunu izledi.

Bir başka şey için, İran ve Türkiye örnekleri, modernleşmenin geleneksel toplumlardan modern toplumlara zorunlu olarak yol açacak tarihsel ve teleolojik bir süreç olduğu varsayımına meydan okuyor. Her iki durumda da, modern ve geleneksel toplumların unsurları uzun bir süre yan yana var olmaya devam etti ve modern kurumların birçoğu geleneksel fikir ve kurumların temeli üzerine inşa edildi.

Örneğin, her iki durumda da, modern ulusal kimliği yaratmak için geleneksel kimlik kaynakları olarak tarih ve dil kullanılmıştır. Bir başka nokta da, hem İran hem de Türkiye vakalarının, Modernleşme teorisinin ekonomik kalkınma ile modernleşme arasında nedensel veya korelasyonel bir bağlantı olduğu varsayımını sorgulamaya çağırmasıdır. İran örneğinde, liderler/elitler krallık kurumunu korumayı tercih ettikleri için ekonomik gelişme demokrasiye yol açmadı. Türkiye örneğinde ise, tek parti döneminden sonra çok partili sisteme geçiş, elitlerin müzakereleri ve böyle bir geçişin rejim ve ülke için en iyisi olduğuna karar verilmesi nedeniyle oldu. Ancak İran ve Türkiye örnekleri, Modernleşme teorisinin modernleşmenin içsel olarak yönlendirilen bir süreç olduğu ve gidişatının bir ülkenin içindeki mekanizma ve güçler tarafından belirlendiği varsayımına kredi veriyor gibi görünüyor. İran ve Türkiye devleti/elitleri, modernleşme çabalarında her zaman dünya savaşı ve güçlü ülkelerin faaliyetleri gibi dışsal faktörler tarafından kısıtlanırken, ülkelerinin modernleşmesi üzerinde önemli bir güç ve etki uyguladılar ve yörüngesini geniş bir alana şekillendirdiler. kapsam.

Bu çalışmanın bulguları aynı zamanda Selectorate teorisinin önermelerine ilişkin ilginç bilgiler de sağlamaktadır. “Kazanan koalisyon” kavramı ve tanımı, İran ve Türkiye’de modernleşme sürecinin gerçekleştirilme biçimini açıklamak için uzun bir yol kat ediyor. Her iki durumda da, sosyal, politik ve ekonomik alanlarda iktidar pozisyonlarını elinde tutan ve liderin iktidarını korumasını ve modernleşme girişimini yürütmesini mümkün kılan seçkinlerin anahtarının kazanan ortaklığı. Her iki durumda da liderler, sadakatlerini garanti altına almak için kazanan koalisyonun bu üyelerine güç konumları ve ekonomik rantlar dahil olmak üzere özel mallar dağıttı. Her iki lider de çeşitli nedenlerle kazanan koalisyonlarında değişiklikler yaparken, liderin kazanan koalisyonundan kendisine başarılı bir meydan okuma koyacak kadar üye çekebilecek hiçbir rakip ortaya çıkamadı. Bir başka önemli nokta da, her iki ülkedeki küçük kazanan koalisyon ve büyük seçmenlerin, ulusal meclis adaylarının lider tarafından seçildiği hileli bir seçim sistemine yol açmasıdır. Ayrıca kazanan koalisyonun seçmen çoğunluğunun fikirlerine başvurmadan siyasi ve sosyal gündemi belirlediği bir sistemin ortaya çıkmasına neden oldu. Sonuç olarak, kazanan koalisyon, modernizasyon planının ana hatlarını ve ayrıntılarını nüfusun

çoğunluğundan izole ederek kararlaştırdı. Ancak kazanan koalisyon üyeleri, gazeteleri insanları modernleşme hamlesine katılmaya ikna etmeye çalıştıkları yollar olarak kullandılar. Ancak İranlı ve Türk elitlerinin modernleşme lehinde yürüttükleri ideoloji, yalnızca özel ve kamusal mal kavramlarına başvurulmuş olarak açıklanamaz. ve ideolojik amaçlar ve sadece özel mal alma arzusundan değil.

Son bir nokta olarak, Selectorate teorii, İranlı ve Türk liderlerin kendi ülkelerinde üstlenmeyi seçtikleri belirli hükümet biçimini ve modernleşme planını sürdürmeye karar vermelerinin nedenlerini açıklayamaz. Her liderin seçimini, modern ülkelerin saflarına çıkarmak için kendi ülkesinde uygulamak istediği belirli ideoloji açısından açıklamak makul bir açıklama olacaktır. Bununla birlikte, böyle bir açıklama, Selectorate teorisinin, liderin kararlarının mantığını herhangi bir ideolojik mesele değil, yalnızca onun politik hayatta kalması olarak ortaya koyan ana varsayımını baltalamak için işe yarayacaktır.

Mevcut Literatüre Katkılar

Bu çalışma, genel olarak modernleşme üzerine önceki literatüre ve özellikle İran ve Türkiye'yi içeren karşılaştırmalı modernleşme çalışmalarına dayanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, mevcut tezde kullanılan teorik ve metodolojik araçlar, genel olarak modernleşme üzerine mevcut literatüre ve özel olarak İran ve Türkiye'deki karşılaştırmalı modernleşme çalışmalarına çeşitli katkılarda bulunulmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır.

İlk olarak, bu çalışma, İran ve Türk milletlerinin liderlerinin, sırasıyla Rıza Şah ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün, bu modern milletleri yaratma ve kendi toplumlarını modernleştirmedeki rolüne saplantılı bir şekilde odaklanan edebiyattaki baskın eğilimin ötesine geçmiştir. Önceki literatür, İran ve Türkiye'nin modern uluslarının ortaya çıkışından önceki anayasal dönemlerde üstlenilen çabaların önemli mirasına çok az atıfta bulunarak, iki ulustaki modernleşme hamlesinin ilerlemesini çoğunlukla bu iki liderin iradesine ve azmine bağladı. 1920'ler-1940'lar. Literatür, aynı zamanda, o dönemde lideri ve devleti destekleyen seçkinlerin oynadığı önemli role çok az ilgi gösterdi ve çoğunlukla rollerini ve çabalarını ikincil olarak tasvir etti. Bu çalışma, bu boyutların her ikisini de vurgulamıştır. 1920'lerde ve 1940'larda İran ve Türk devletleri tarafından yürütülen modernleşme projesi ile İran Meşrutiyet

Devrimi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nin modernleştiricilerinin çabaları arasındaki önemli süreklilikleri vurguladı. Görüldüğü gibi, 1920'lerde ve 1940'larda İran ve Türkiye'de yürütülen modernleşme hamlesi, her bir anayasal dönemin mirasından bir kopuştan ziyade onun devamı ve doruk noktasıydı. En büyük kırılma, bir imparatorluğun küllerinden bir cumhuriyetin ve modern bir siyasi partinin kurulması ve hilafetin tamamen ortadan kaldırılmasıyla Türkiye örneğinde oldu. Elitlerin lideri desteklemedeki kilit rolünün ve modernleşme dürtüsünün teşvik edilmesi ve yürütülmesindeki vazgeçilmez rolünün vurgulanması, literatürün modernleşme dürtüsünü açıklamak için lider figürüne odaklanmasından ayrılan bu tezde tartışılan bir diğer önemli noktaydı. Gerçekten de, bu çalışmada kullanılan Selectorate teori, kendi toplumlarında modernleşme tartışmasını ve söylemini şekillendiren seçkin grubun üyelerinin izlenmesine yardımcı oldu. Bu seçkinlerin temel entelektüel ve siyasi desteği olmadan, 1920'lerde ve 1940'larda İran ve Türkiye'de girişilen modernleşme hamlesinin çok ileri gidemeyeceğini iddia etmek mantıklı olacaktır.

İkinci olarak, bu çalışma literatürde ikincil kaynaklara yönelik baskın odağın ötesine geçerek mevcut literatüre önemli bir katkı sağlamaktadır. Bunun yerine, bu çalışma, araştırmanın hammaddesi olarak gazeteleri birincil kaynak olarak almıştır. Bu malzeme seçiminin İran ve Türkiye örneklerinde ve mevcut literatürde modernleşme çalışması için birkaç önemli anlamı oldu. Her şeyden önce, devlete bağlı dört gazetenin ön sayfalarını incelemek, İran ve Türk devletlerinin/elitlerinin modernleşme planlarına ve bunların çeşitli özelliklerine eş görülmemiş derecede kapsamlı ve çok yönlü bir bakış sağladı. 1000'e yakın gazete sayısının incelendiği geniş bir tarih havuzu ve üç kapsayıcı tema ve ayrıntılı bir şekilde tartışılan on altı tema, dönemin İran ve Türk devletleri/elitleri tarafından desteklenen belirli modernleşme vizyonlarını yeniden tasavvur etmeyi ve yeniden yapılandırmayı mümkün kıldı. doğruluk ve detay. Bir diğer yandan gazeteler, bir yanda devletin ve onun ideolojisinin, diğer yanda toplumun ve sıradan insanların bir araya gelip iletişim kurmasını mümkün kılarak, o dönemde var olan az sayıdaki kamusal iletişim araçlarından biriydi. Bu özel nokta, gazete haberlerinde, fotoğraflarda ve metinlerde ele alınan konuları inceleyerek, insanların modernleşmeye karşı duruşunu ve süreçte

karşılaştıkları zorlukları anlamalarına yardımcı olduğu için, bu çalışmanın hammaddesi olarak gazetelerin seçimini önemli kılmaktadır. Seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfalarında başyazılar. Bu tam olarak “tarihi aşağıdan” incelemekle ilgili bir durum olmasa da, halka daha yakın olan ve onlara daha adil bir ilgi ve önem payı veren bir yaklaşımdır.

Üçüncüsü, seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfalarının incelenmesi, modernleşme sürecinin gerçeklerinin klasik Modernleşme teorisinin sunduğu versiyondan çok daha karmaşık, çok yönlü, anlaşılması zor ve dolambaçlı olduğunu gösterdi. Özellikle ekonomik kalkınmanın modernleşme sürecinin ilk adımı olduğu ve bunu zorunlu olarak bireylerin modernleşmesi ile sosyal ve siyasi hayatın çeşitli yönleriyle takip ettiği varsayımları sorgulanmıştır. Gerçekten de, seçilen dört gazetenin ön sayfalarını incelemek, modern Batı'yı kullanarak kendi devletlerini, ülkelerini ve toplumlarını yeniden şekillendirmek isteyen bir grup seçkinin onlarca yıllık şikayetlerinin gerçekleşmesi olarak modernleşme hamlesinin nasıl başlatıldığını ve sürdürüldüğünü gösterdi. hükümet, toplum ve bireyin fikirleri ve idealleri. İran ve Türkiye örneğinde, modernleşme organik, yavaş bir ekonomik büyüme süreci, dinin eleştirisi ve devlet tarafından boyunduruk altına alınması ve dönemin otoriter rejimlerine meydan okuyan tüccar ve profesyonel orta sınıfların ortaya çıkması değildi. Bu tezde incelenen durumlarda modernleşme, küçük bir seçkinler grubunun kendi ideal toplum vizyonunu gerçekleştirmeye ve zamanın mevcut toplumlarını bu vizyon doğrultusunda şekillendirmeye yönelik bilinçli çabasıydı. Seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfalarının incelenmesi sonucunda modernleşme dürtüsünün incelenmesinden elde edilen bu tür içgörüler, literatürdeki ekonomik gelişmenin modernleşme sürecinde ilk ve gerekli adım olduğu ve bunun zorunlu olarak öncülük ettiği yönündeki baskın argümanları sorgulamaktadır. bir noktada modernleşmeye Aynı şekilde, bazı az gelişmiş veya gelişmekte olan ülkelerde modernleşmeyi ve demokrasiyi tetiklemeyi amaçlayan uluslararası mali yardım programlarının en iyi ihtimalle minimum etkisi olduğu görülmektedir.

Son olarak, mevcut çalışmanın karşılaştırmalı yaklaşımı yeni olmasa da mevcut literatüre önemli bir katkı sağlamaktadır. Önceki karşılaştırmalı çalışmalar, çıkış noktaları olarak çoğunlukla ikincil kaynaklara odaklanmış ve çoğunlukla iki

ulusun liderlerinin karşılaştırmasına veya modernleşme hamlesini gerçekleştirirken devletin prosedür ve eylemlerine sabitlenmiş halde kalmıştır. Bu nedenle çoğu, modernleşmenin toplum ve sıradan insanlarla ilgili tarafına yansıyan bir anlatı sağlayamayan modernleşme sürecine tek taraflı karşılaştırmalı bir bakış sağladı. Bu çalışma literatürdeki bu eksikliği gidermeye çalışmıştır. Bunu yapmak için, İran ve Türk devletlerinin/elitlerinin kendi ülkelerini modernleştirme çabalarının mevcut literatürden elde ettikleri ve elitlerin kendi modernleşme versiyonlarını teşvik etmelerinden elde ettikleri içgörüler hakkında bir açıklama sunmuştur. seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfaları. Ayrıca, seçkinler tarafından seçilen gazetelerin ön sayfalarında daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde vurgulanan ve tartışılan temaları analiz ederek, sıradan insanların devletin modernleşme hamlesinin çeşitli yönlerine tepkisini ve algısını değerlendirmeye çalıştı. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma İran ve Türkiye örneklerinden gazeteleri karşılaştırarak ve bu karşılaştırma için kullanılan geniş veri örneği ve kapsamı nedeniyle mevcut literatüre benzersiz bir katkı sağlamaktadır.

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